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Abstract 
As the title suggests, the dissertation focusses on critiquing animations to understand their 
scope in children’s socialisation, as to what extent animations could offer a type of content 
that possesses an ‘edutainment’ value. As a result, animations (1) attempt to reinforce 
some ‘intrinsic’ values related to a variety of subjects/themes, including personal growth, 
meaningful relationships, and social responsibility, (2) providing children with an 
opportunity to rehearse those values that are deemed key elements for their socialisation. 
To understand this more closely, we have analysed animations from five different 
perspectives, leading the dissertation to be designed as a ‘patchwork quilt’ (Wibben, 
2011). This metaphor implies that the five chapters are autonomously distinct and deal 
with exclusive frameworks that are later contextually assimilated in the conclusion to 
provide the reader with a complete picture that vindicates animations’ scope in children’s 
socialisation. 
Chapter I looks at the framework of the ‘odyssey’ employed in animations as a metaphor 
for personal growth and identity-formation. Chapter II focusses on how Doraemon 
reconceptualises the features of the classical Greek/Aristotelian form of ‘tragedy’ to 
develop its own postmodern critique of the Seven Deadly Sins through the image of its 
transgressive protagonist. Chapter III studies the role of ‘utopianism’ in children’s 
superhero narratives that inspires a more critical mode of hoping and envisions social 
progress and welfare. Chapter IV is founded upon the concept of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ 
to (1) analyse the transition and development of animated women’s representation from 
passivity to subjectivity and individuality, and (2) briefly explore the evolving 
representations of new, subversive masculinities. Chapter V emphasises the significance 
of ‘anthropomorphism’ in children’s media, and is informed by the literary genre of animal 
autobiography to critique animal-centric narratives as tales of animal liberation that 
reposition and rehabilitate the ‘human-animal kinship, bestowing ‘the animal’ with a 
voice. 
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Introduction: Not just sheer pleasure! 
 
Over the course of the 20th century, animations have proven their potential to 
complement and support the process of children’s socialisation by offering a type of 
content, as Disney (1954) implied, that juxtaposes education with entertainment. This 
mechanism amalgamates to develop what is now colloquially addressed as 
‘edutainment’, re-echoing the traditional combination of “the delightful with the 
useful” (Ziegler, 2006, p. 134). As a result, animations (1) ‘play’ with children’s 
inherent attraction towards similar animated forms of entertainment (Habib & 
Soliman, 2015) and (2) apprise and advise children about what Grusec (2002) labels 
as “intrinsic” values that encompasses a variety of subjects, including “personal 
growth, meaningful relationships, social responsibility, and physical health” (p. 144). 
 
Wells’ (1998) critiques on the discourse of ‘animation’ have been invaluable to our 
understanding of the philosophy of animation. Expanding upon Jan Svankmajer’s 
(1992) subjective experiences with animations, Wells (1998) appraises the latter’s 
ability to “redefine the everyday, subvert our accepted notions of 'reality', and 
challenge the orthodox understanding and acceptance of our existence. . . and endow 
lifeless things with dynamic and vibrant properties” (p. 11).  
 
Wells’ (1998) arguments impart an ideological agency to animations with respect to 
their abilities to be construed as ‘performances’. These performative agencies help 
animations communicate what Schechner (2013) calls “‘restored’” or “‘twice-
behaved’” modes of behaviour/norms that have been passing down as part of any 
community’s close-ended traditions (p. 22). In doing so, animations may function 
either as reinforcements of ‘restored’ behaviour or as challengers to the same (Wells, 
1998). Consequently, animations transform into ubiquitous socialising sub-category 
of mass media, helping children understand both themselves and the world around 
them (Özer & Avci, 2015, Wright & Huston, 1983).   
 
This awakens us to animations’ clever reliance upon an ‘edutainment’ content. The 
idea of edutainment was pioneered by J.A. Komenský, though it was Disney (1954) 
who had first employed the portmanteau word to imply the juxtaposition of ‘the 
delightful with the useful’ (Ziegler, 2006). Komenský had used the phrase, ‘school as 
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play’, to elucidate his belief in a stronger pedagogical effect when traditional 
manifestations of education are combined with other aesthetically delightful elements 
(Nêmec & Trna, 2007). It has been realised that, unlike strictly-formal teaching 
methods, edutainment could serve as a less formal and, thereby, a more interactive, 
student-friendly, and open-ended pedagogy (Makarius, 2017; Rapeepisarn et al., 
2006). We believe that animations are informed by a similar pedagogical framework, 
as they narrate and reinforce a miscellany of intrinsic values for children to cultivate 
and internalise (Grusec, 2002) while, simultaneously, playing on children’s fascination 
for television as a source of entertainment (Habib & Soliman, 2015, p. 250). 
 
However, before we progress any further, we would like to reflect over the overall 
structural dynamics of the dissertation which shall help inform our understandings of 
socialisation, animations, and the key ideas that have been raised within. We have 
sought significant help from Wibben’s (2011) metaphor of a “patchwork quilt” (p. 8) 
to design and describe the dissertation. Re-echoing Wibben (2011), the five chapters 
have been “individually crafted in detail” (p. 8) but are autonomous in terms of the 
conceptual questions they raise/trigger. Here, the conclusion would serve as the final 
connecting post - “sewing together” (p. 8) all the conceptual arguments raised in the 
chapters to manifest a complete, bigger picture that would validate animations’ 
complementary significance in the processes of children’s socialisation. 
 
Introducing the Chapters 
 
We are now aware that the dissertation is going to develop according to Wibben’s 
(2011) metaphorical framework of a “patchwork quilt” (p. 8). Therefore, despite 
focusing on distinct concepts and frameworks, we aim at returning to a collective 
awareness of their incorporation within the thematic structure(s) of the discussed 
animations, which the latter pursue for the combined purpose of apprising and advising 
(to inculcate) children about “intrinsic” values (Grusec, 2002, p. 144), supporting 
children’s social and emotional growth. It should be noted that the chosen frameworks 
and concepts have been discussed at-length in the succeeding chapters and so, at this 
stage, we would only glance through all of them to develop an idea about how they 




Chapter I dwells over Forceville’s (2016) reconceptualization of the metaphor of 
‘journey’ to explore the self-transformative potentials of independent journeys 
(Morgan, 2010). It aims to understand how ‘the journey’ could be perceived as a 
powerful metaphor for personal growth and self-discovery. For this purpose, we focus 
on three animations- Triton of the Sea (1972), Belle and Sebastian (1981 - 82), and 
Heidi, Girl of the Alps (1974)- and employ Smelser’s (2009) paradigmatic trajectory 
of what he calls “the odyssey experience” (p. 8) to analyse the respective journeys 
recorded in these animations and how these independent enterprises transform into 
invaluable sources of self-knowledge for our eponymous protagonists (Dietz, 2019). 
 
Chapter II probes into Doraemon (1979 - 2005) to understand the anime’s 
contemporary remodifications of (1) the Aristotelian/Greek tradition of ‘tragedy’ and 
(2) the once-medieval concept of the ‘Seven Deadly Sins’. The anime pursues this 
framework to re-locate its protagonist, Nobita Nobi, at the epicentre of tragic katharsis. 
Nobita’s endless tragic downfalls- triggered by his excessive indulgence in the ‘five 
sins of the spirit’- translate into moral lessons to young viewers about ethical notions 
pertaining to high moralities. Nobita’s ‘eroded’ moralities manifest into an 
introspective mirror for the audiences to ‘peep-within’ and treat Doraemon’s many 
‘narratives of sufferings’ (Silverstone, 2007) as an opportunity for self-analysis, self-
regulation, and self-redemption (wherever possible) (Rorty, 1992).  
 
Chapter III digresses to encapsulate superhero-narratives into our oeuvre. We perceive 
superheroes as exemplary models of utopian imagination and thought and attempt to 
understand how a variety of superhero-narratives could be perceived as exploratory 
avenues for ‘a mode of critical utopian hoping’ (Webb, 2008, p. 199). Superheroes 
significantly personify Nietzsche’s (1883-1885/1969) notion of the ‘übermensch’ and 
strive to accelerate contemporary humanity towards a spectrum of positivity, hope, and 
progression. As “moral examples” (Loeb & Morris, 2005, p. 30), superheroes possess 
the potential to communicate morally-transformative values to modern humanity that 
has been lost in self-centredness, hatred, and hopelessness. These ideas are largely 
embodied in the two 1978-produced superhero-animations- The Freedom Force and 




Chapter IV serves as an exclusive investigation into ‘gender’ and analyses the media-
representations of gender in three animations: Triton of the Sea, Josie and the 
Pussycats (1971-72), and Doraemon. To begin with, we reflect over what Tuchman 
(1978) addresses as the “symbolic annihilation” of women in - and by - media (p. 8) 
and move forward to explore a rising feminist consciousness in media, driven by 
women animators and cartoonists, that Wells (1998) has called “the feminine 
aesthetic” (p. 198). Against the gender-stereotypes attached to Pipiko (from Triton of 
the Sea), we analyse the women characters from the remaining two texts as pioneers 
of a wave of feminist thought that began in the 70s and culminated in the 90s and early 
2000s (Perea, 2015). We aim to discover how these animations pursue this fresh 
consciousness to embody their women characters with an empowered frame-of-mind.  
 
Later, in our discussions on Doraemon, we briefly reflect over the character-
development of Nobita as the anti-thesis of what Connell (1987) calls ‘hegemonic 
masculinity’. In Nobita, we may partially perceive instances of the “new man” 
(Beynon, 2004, p. 200) which is frequently treated as one of the sub-branches of 
subordinated masculinities (Sales, 2019). This brief discussion paves the way to our 
understanding of how Doraemon bifurcates from several animations of its times (like 
Triton of the Sea) to communicate the rise of other masculinities that defy(ied) the 
norms of hegemony and heteronormativity. Overall, the chapter offers an overarching 
understanding of how the changing paradigms in media-representations of gender 
were reflected in animations. 
 
Chapter V appraises the presence of the ‘autobiographical animal’ in three animated 
movies - Finding Nemo (2003), The Ant Bully (2006), and Ferdinand (2017) - and 
advances into understanding a contemporary genre of children’s fiction called “the 
animal autobiography” (You, 2021, p. 190). This new genre of fiction bestows animal 
characters with a poignant sense of agency that allows them to re-position themselves 
as independent ecological entities, beyond the need of human control. We analyse 
these movies within this contextual model to perceive these anthropomorphic animal-
characters as archetypal symbols of the ‘autobiographical animal’, and how these 
anthropomorphic representations could pave the way to our recognition of the 
nonhuman-environment as an equal and worthy ‘subject-of-a-life’ (Regan, 1988). 
These arguments punctuate an urgent necessity to re-evaluate ‘the human-nonhuman’ 
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relations and seek out other similar mediums through which these strained dichotomies 
could be resolved and improved. This chapter asks for peoples’ discovery of what 
humanity can stand for. 
 
From an overarching perspective, the five chapters help inform our defence of (1) 
animations’ apparent role in children’s socialisation and (2) to what extent could mass 
media be generally perceived as a helpful medium to reinforce- and sometimes instate- 
positive thoughts about ourselves and others. However, before we progress onto the 
individual chapters, it is necessary to review a body of research that concentrates upon 
the processes of socialisation; the arrival of mass media onto mainstream thought; and 
the impact (both negative and positive) of its popularity onto the public imagination. 
These reflections, then, can become critically vital to support our affirmation about 
animations’ socialising capacities and demand substantial exploration and reflective 
analysis. Because children’s socialisation is an important sub-component of our 
research thesis, we genuinely need to understand what this process really signifies. 
 
Children’s Socialisation: Some Reflections 
 
The culmination of children’s socialisation, retrospectively speaking, may not be 
possible without a firm intervention of “stories”. Gerbner (2004)- in his foreword to 
Shanahan and Morgan’s (2004) apology of the cultivation theory, Television and its 
Viewers - notes that stories help “socialize us into roles of gender, age, class, vocation 
and life-style, and offer models of conformity or targets of rebellion” (p. ix). Such 
stories, irrespective of the communicating medium, are often deemed milestones for 
children’s systematic entry into their socio-cultural community, supporting the 
development of what Mills (2000) calls “the sociological imagination” (p. 5). This 
phrase is defined as “the quality of mind essential to grasp the interplay of man and 
society, of biography and history, of self and world” (Mills, 2000, p. 4). The 
sociological imagination is central to socialisation, as it helps individuals not only 
develop an inherent understanding of themselves and society, but also stimulates 
necessary reactions against any institutional shortcomings society may have. Situated 
at the crossroads of “history and biography” (Mills, 2000, p. 4), the sociological 
imagination enables individuals to (1) position themselves against the leap of historical 
reality, (2) identify any societal issues, and (3) move forward as “history makers” 
14 
 
(Thompson et al., 2019, p. 4). As archetypes of the latter-category, individuals could 
manifest benevolent/progressive changes in society, for instance by reforming social 
ideologies (explored in Chapter III), dismantling gender-based stereotypes (Chapter 
IV) or championing animal rights (Chapter V). The sociological imagination, 
therefore, empowers them to be able to make a difference. 
 
This corresponds to Gerbner’s (1999) account of how and why stories are formed: to 
act as inspirational sources of reformation. To Gerbner (1999), stories awaken us to a 
cognizance about how a society works, while, at the same time, presenting “things, 
behaviours or styles of life as desirable (or undesirable), [and proposing] ways to 
obtain (or avoid) them” (p. x). In doing so, stories leave the possibility of any 
reaction/action (if needed) upon the reader/audience concerned, like the animations 
discussed herein. These stories indirectly perform a socialising/enculturating function 
by either revealing an existing problem within society or recommending the adoption 
of morally-upright behaviour but leaving the thought of all potential action (or 
reaction) up to the individual. For example, Doraemon (Chapter II) plays on Nobita’s 
tragic misadventures as they “convert into a sort of life lesson added to the experiences 
children [like Nobita] need in order to pass successfully into adulthood in a social 
context” (Gonzalez, 2018, p. 72). However, the anime never imposes or dictates its 
moral lessons onto its viewers, leaving them to their discretion to internalise or avoid. 
 
The social importance of stories is crucially explained by the process of socialisation. 
As Elkin (1960) underpins, a human develops in three ways: biologically, 
psychologically, and sociologically. This is where Elkin (1960) explains that an 
individual’s sociological development is as vital as the former two, and that without 
socialisation, the other two developments may hold a “limited value” (p. 3). Similarly, 
Mead’s (1934) reflections on the ‘self’ become pivotal to our understanding of 
socialisation (1) as a process and (2) as a catalyst for the development of the ‘social 
self’ which he perceives as being composed of a “spontaneous and creative” ‘I’ and a 
“reactive” ‘Me’ (Thompson et al., 2019, p. 90). According to Mead (1934, p. 177-
178), despite having the same bio-social source, the “I” and “Me” function quite 
differently: where the ‘I’ is more inclined towards the individual’s personal interests 
and choices; the ‘Me’ is a reactive recognition to the individual’s own actions towards 
society and others and, therefore, is prompted by the individual’s awareness of their 
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social position and impact. Mead (1934) concludes that the development of the ‘self’ 
vastly relies upon human experience and interaction. Here, the role of animations 
comes into play, as they could be treated as ‘brief instances of substituted human 
experience’. We have reserved an intensive discussion over this argument for the 
conclusion because we suspect that this argument could not be connected to 
animations’ socialising symptoms without having first explored what animations 
really stand for in the succeeding chapters. For now, it would be helpful if we quickly 
return to our reflections over children’s socialisation, the self, and human nature. 
 
Mead’s (1934) concept of the ‘self’ influences the formation of what Cooley (1964) 
had called the “human nature” (p. 31), a human-faculty that comprises the ability to 
experience universally sentient feelings, like love or ambition (Elkin, 1960, p. 13). 
However, where Elkin (1960) treats human nature as a precondition for socialisation, 
implying its presence in human genealogy- which even Cooley partially agrees with- 
Cooley (1964) perceives it as part of an individual’s social make-up that develops, 
shapes and reshapes over the socialisation years and is consistently “subject to change” 
(p. 33). These intriguing discussions about the formation of the self and human nature 
conjoin with Wrong’s (1961) observations on the subject, who takes socialisation as 
being in possession of dual connotations, as he differentiates the way the phenomenon 
should be perceived: 
 
on the one hand socialisation means the ‘transmission of 
the culture’, the particular culture of the society an 
individual enters at birth; on the other hand the term is 
used to mean the ‘process of becoming human,’ of 
acquiring uniquely human attributes from interaction 
with others (p. 192). 
 
The latter-half of Wrong’s (1961) definition- that emphasises the ‘humanisation of a 
human’- may invite curious rhetorical questions about our anatomical birth as humans: 
‘Are we not born as humans, and post-birth develop to become human?’. Turchenko 
(1973) as cited in O’Dell (1978) provides rational answers to such questions, as he 
equates the process of ‘becoming human’ to the “process of becoming a social being” 
(p. 47). By ‘becoming human’, however, Wrong (1961) does not imply any anatomical 
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or embryological aberration in human biology but perceives socialisation as a process 
involving an internalisation of general human values and norms through significant 
and productive human interaction (Elkin, 1960) and experience (Mead, 1934).  
 
Turchenko (1973) as cited in O’Dell (1978, p. 47) goes further to include ‘education’ 
as another gateway to children’s socialisation. Although it is not exactly clear what 
type of education Turchenko (1973) purportedly hints at, it could be deduced that it 
embraces all forms and mediums of education which can even encompass open-ended 
mediums as mass media. It is surprising to see how mass media has made a riveting 
mark for itself over the last century as an influential socialising medium for individuals 
of all age-groups (White, 1977). However, with special relation to children, mass 
media has been critically accused of reinforcing misleading and stereotypical content 
that may not be suitable for children to cultivate on (Elkin, 1960, p. 71) and, 
subsequently, has caught the attention of critics and researchers who often propose 
conflicting opinions about mass media’s (ab)use and interference in children’s parental 
socialisation. However, because the criticism on mass media mostly stems from its 
representations of gender and sexuality (Levinson, 1975; Wilson, 2008), it is 
imperative to first analyse what gender and gender socialisation implies and some of 
its takeaways for children. 
 
Gender Socialisation: Its Necessity and Impact 
 
As Gonzalez (2018) beautifully reflects, “childhood does not only consist of the child’s 
social standing and the adult’s rules; it represents children’s voice, view, and actions 
in the world” (p. 74). This observation suggests children’s ability to self-socialise, 
which also further informs their understandings of gender(s) from a relatively early 
age (Coltrane, 1998). Wharton (2005) speaks about gender as “one of the forces that 
contributes to [the] patterning of social life” (p. 2). Gender quickly develops as an 
intrinsic aspect of children’s socialisation, for “it is something that individuals possess 
as part of themselves and that accompanies them as they move through life... [and] is 
understood as something that resides in the individual” (Wharton, 2005, p. 17).  
 
From the standpoint of gender constructivism, children are usually upheld as ‘active 
agents’ (Liben & Bigler, 2002) during their early socialisation years. They develop 
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their own concepts about gender and gender-correlations, while simultaneously being 
influenced by other socialising agents (Coltrane, 1998, Gelman et al., 2004; Maccoby, 
1998). The efficacy of parental influence could be, however, slightly questioned after 
zero/negligible similarity was once-discovered between parents’ and their children’s 
attitudes about gender (Tenenbaum & Leaper, 2002). Nonetheless, this constitutive 
agency of children informs us about their tendency to “essentialize gender” (Gelman 
et al., 2004, p. 2), forming and reshaping their own first-hand opinions about gender 
based on what ideologies they are reinforced with, sometimes dwelling upon the same 
opinions till adolescence (Martin et al., 1990). It is here that both parents (Bem, 1983; 
Witt, 1997) and mass media (Levinson, 1975) may help children by communicating 
“gender-aschematic” (Bem, 1983, p. 610) ideas, values and concepts pertaining to 
gender, sexuality, or both. 
 
In the wake of mass media’s stereotypical reinforcements, Levinson (1975) notes that 
these reinforcements damage notions of self-esteem relatively in females. Triggered 
by this problem, Witt (1997) calls for an urgent need for more “androgynous” parents 
who do not conform to a “strict adherence to traditional gender roles” (p. 253) but 
instead offer an unbiased, anti-sexist environment for children to grow. This could be 
implemented either through parents’ own reversal of traditional gender roles in their 
private and professional lives (Witt, 1997, p. 257), by educating children about gender-
equality and freedom (from the beginning years), or both. Interestingly, Witt’s (1997) 
androgynous parents share a striking similarity to Bem’s (1983) “feminist parents” (p. 
610) who want to cultivate similar gender-free ideologies in their children. To serve 
that purpose, Bem (1983) suggests three alternative schemas that feminist parents may 
adopt. Firstly, the “individual differences schema” (p. 613) that provides 
counterexamples to stereotypes (pointed out by children themselves) from a circle of 
people that they are acquainted with. Secondly, the “cultural relativism schema” (p. 
614) that highlights the co-existence of beliefs that oppose the dormant norm(s) in 
society and does not present this oblique set of beliefs as an abnormality; and lastly, 
the “sexism schema” (p. 615). 
 
About the latter-most schema, Bem (1983) encourages feminist parents to react against 
the often-mediated sexism and apprise children of its lurking ideological dangers. Bem 
(1983) strongly feels that such parents “should not be satisfied to pretend that they 
18 
 
think all ideas- particularly those about gender- are equally valid” (p. 615). As an 
inevitable factor of gender socialisation, the ‘sexism schema’ prompts children to 
question about the hegemonic media-images of gender and sex-roles that they witness 
predominating children’s television/entertainment (Davis, 2006; Carter & Steiner, 
2004; Levinson, 1975). 
 
For example, the children’s literature of the late 80s/90s has substantially reflected on 
this sexist tendency and contributed to the emergence of what Lehr (2001) calls a 
“feminist book” (p. 15). As a reaction against traditionalist stories that feature passive, 
dependent women characters, a feminist book is a form of literature that provides 
independence and agency to its women characters, paving the way to their individual, 
social growth as a woman (Trites, 1997). This is where the feminist novels, for 
example, by Cynthia Voigt (b. 1942) and Mildred Taylor (b. 1943) not only outshine 
as exceptional archetypes, but also poignantly correspond to Bem’s (1983) conception 
of the “sexism schema” (p. 615). As models, such novels for children/young adults 
reinforce the ideas that are explicitly advocated by Bem’s (1983) feminist parents 
about gender-equality and anti-sexism, helping children develop gender-free 
ideologies and notions about themselves, their sexuality, and others. 
 
Gender has been one of the overriding components of children’s socialisation and 
features as a vital ingredient in an individual’s identity formation processes (Wharton, 
2005). Therefore, naturally, gender socialisation becomes crucial in children’s social 
development. It enables feminist parents (Bem, 1983) to (1) instate a balanced and 
emancipated perspective about gender-values in their children and (2) ‘de-influence’ 
the latter from damaging media-representations. 
 
The ‘Positives’ and ‘Negatives’ of Mass Media  
 
It is overwhelming to notice that much of the research conducted on the effects of mass 
media on children centres around television. This is because, as Levinson (1975) 
highlights (though in context to American children), television functions as one of the 
earliest examples of mass media that children are exposed to (p. 561). Its popularity 
amongst- and proximity to- children is bound to attract large-scale criticism from 
researchers and critics who frequently raise concerning questions about the role of 
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television (or mass media in particular) in children’s moral development (Anderson & 
Pempek, 2005; Elkin, 1960; Livingstone, 2007; Wright & Huston, 1983). In terms of 
children’s relationships with television, most criticism is often levelled either against 
an abnormal manifestation of violence (Anderson et al., 2003; Hapkiewicz & Roden, 
1971) or sexism (Perea, 2018; Thompson & Zerbinos, 1995). One of the reasons for 
this thoughtless inclination towards re-presenting similar damaging aspects on 
children’s television finds its foundations in materialism and capitalist interests 
(Chouliaraki, 2008; Seiter & Mayer, 2004).  
 
To tackle these conundrums, the concept of ‘media advocacy’ is alarmingly 
propagated by some researchers. This not only involves “‘the strategic use of mass 
media for advancing a social or public policy initiative’” (Strasburger & Donnerstein, 
1999, p. 134) but also encapsulates a whole-range of regulations that could be 
independently used by parents (Vandewater et al., 2005), the government (Strasburger 
& Donnerstein, 1999), and the media-industry (Levinson, 1975) to monitor children’s 
involvement with television. Conway et al. (1981) had asserted that children learn 
“attitudes and opinions” (p. 165) from media sources, making it essential to regulate 
televised contents for children and ensure that children’s early socialisation years are 
not wasted in dwelling over regressive ideologies. 
 
Having said that, there are some intriguing opinions that have been brought forward 
by researchers in favour of mass media (in general) and television (in particular). It is 
argued that television possesses “the potential to foster positive social interactions, 
reduce aggression, and encourage viewers to be more tolerant and helpful” (Mares & 
Woodard, 2005, p. 316). However, this becomes realistically possible only through (1) 
parents’ active intervention into children’s television-viewing habits/behaviours and 
(2) constant rehearsals and re-enactments of the ‘accepted’ media-reinforcements 
(Wilson, 2008). If achieved, Wilson (2008) argues that children’s television may 
capitalise on children’s moral reasoning, improving their levels of empathy and role-
taking abilities (p. 91). This is usually pursued through the introduction of likeable and 
relatable on-screen animated characters who may help promote certain prosocial 
ideologies (Warren, 2017), therefore, not only paving the way to children’s 
identification with the characters, but also helping parents achieve their motives to 
inspire ‘intrinsic’ values within children (Grusec, 2002). 
20 
 
Chouliaraki (2008)- in her discussions about the suffering of ‘distant others’- leads us 
to a dualistic understanding of how we approach questions pertaining to mass media. 
On one hand, she criticises contemporary media-images as indulging in “the play of a 
sensuous hype” (p. 834). On the other, however, she proposes the possibility of media 
as becoming a source of “moral education”, relying on “a power that capitalizes on a 
set of potential capabilities for civil action that television both ‘imagines’ on behalf of 
the spectator and enables the spectator to enact as a ‘free’ subject” (p. 
845). Chouliaraki (2008) defines the spectator’s ‘free’ position as being 
“‘conditional’” (p. 846), implying the capacity of a television-image to evoke an 
ethical response of emotional connectivity within the spectator for a suffering ‘other’, 
while, at the same time, leaving the call to action onto the spectator. In a sense, media 
re-performs a reality, or re-presents a problem (a tragic one, in this case; could be a 
manifestation of any intrinsic value at other instances) but leaves the choice to act or 
avoid on the viewer concerned. For example, as mentioned above, this is exactly what 
Doraemon engages in with its representations of Nobita’s tragedies. It suggests a rather 
‘take-or-leave’ approach with the audiences’ understandings of the very moral 
transgressions that led to Nobita’s misadventure. Doraemon offers the audiences with 
the ‘conditional freedom’ to reflect over Nobita’s flaws and rectify (if they discover a 
similar-looking flaw) their own ‘self’ to save them from a similar tragic discomfiture.  
 
Chouliaraki (2008), further, makes a few remarks about media’s ability to ‘humanise’ 
viewers by departing from what Strasburger and Donnerstein (1999) loathe as “crass 
commercialism” (p. 137) and stimulating the rise of ethically-informed morals within 
individuals. To Chouliaraki (2008), media mediates between the relationship of a 
representation and its public consumption, and it is this “pedagogic function” (p. 832) 
that helps - and triggers - viewers to respond in empathetic ways towards a media 
image. Quite differently, Grusec (2002) re-echoes a similar standpoint (though in 
context to parental socialisation) when he writes, “the foundation of a successful 
socialisation may indeed lie in a secure relationship with the caregiver and in 
minimization of feelings of forced compliance” (p. 163). Grusec’s plea to abstain from 
‘forced compliance’ subtly corresponds with Chouliaraki’s (2008) concluding 




Animation, Childhood, and Socialisation 
 
Re-tracing the latter arguments back to children and their association with television, 
Fisch (2004) argues in support of what he terms as “educational television” (p. 1) that 
he deems a gateway to the introduction of a gamut of opinions, experiences, attitudes 
for children. Although Fisch’s (2004) arguments are more inclined towards 
highlighting the ‘academic’ benefits of such mediums, he, nevertheless, expands upon 
animations’ role in reinforcing not only ‘academic’ insights, but also prosocial values 
and attitudes that are considered bedrocks for children’s socialisation as discussed 
above. This notion also co-relates to the production contexts and aesthetics of 
animation, and how they inform the production of rhetorical meaning being 
disseminated through and across a range of digital formats (Yoon, 2017; Yoon & 
Malecki, 2010; Wells, 2002). Katsaridou (2014) mentions that the language of 
animation is significantly governed by exo-semiotic sociocultural and material forces. 
These ideas retrieve us to the cultural nuances of McLuhan’s (1964) idea of ‘medium 
[as] the message’. It oscillates around the view that the production aesthetics influence 
the semiotic and cultural construction of animation, further shaping the type of 
content/message being propagated to the public eye. 
 
Popular children’s culture, unlike other modes of traditional learning, is deemed a 
sensitive conglomerate (Giroux, 1994), apart from being a burgeoning space for 
“consumerism and commodification” (p. 26). The centrality of children’s edutainment 
in socialisation stimulates the importance of concentrating on the industrial 
dimensions of animation-production to explore its ideological manifestations. As 
Wells (2002) illustrates, the conceptualisation phase of animation-production unfolds 
the “‘controlling idea’” (p. 16) that governs the potential outputs of any animated 
work. This phase anticipates how the final animated product would stand as, including 
the characters’ depictions, narrative structure, dialogues, and background (Yoon, 
2017). Essentially, this becomes apparent why several major animation studios 
outsource to smaller transnational/off-shore studios for only a restrictive ‘production 
phase’. As Lee (2011) observes, “the animation industry operates in the dynamics of 
transnational geography” (p. 184). This suggests that animation-production is not 
geographically-limited, but remains culturally and socially-grounded. The language of 
animation, as Katsaridou (2014) reflects, is determined by the localised nuances of the 
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industrial site that conceptualises it. The animation speaks through the vocabularies of 
the editorial team that manages the structural and narrative architecture of a specific 
animated product (Wells, 2002), which we consume later. 
 
Furthermore, Lee (2011) notes, the language of animation is equally affected by the 
otaku community, who consistently intervene with the distribution processes by 
facilitating translations/dubbed versions of several animations. Even though this 
illegitimate practice hampers the economic prospects of the sector, Lee (2011) 
mentions that otakus’ intervention translates into a strong promotional medium that, 
nonetheless, reproduces the possibility of a product’s popularity in the public 
imagination. These contemporary interventions become plausible due to the recent-
upsurge in multiple digital formats through which animations become available. 
Before the introduction of the Internet and globalisation, cinema and television were 
the only sources of animation distribution and consumption (Yoon & Malecki, 2010). 
However, technological advancements like information technology and computer-
generated imagery and graphics have stimulated the introduction of animation onto 
other multimedia formats like DVDs, iPods and mobiles (Ichikohji, 2013). This 
digitalisation of humanity, however, unpacks issues pertaining to socialisation and the 
public reception of these products. Many of these concerns address the 
potential/possibilities of these transitioning formats to affect the audiences’ 
interpretation of the broadcast content (Greenfield & Beagles-Roos, 1988), or if 
differences in the medium(s) influence how a specific content is perceived (Bell & 
Dittmar, 2011).  
 
McLuhan’s (1964) concept of the ‘medium’ becomes illuminating in these contexts. 
A study exploring the impact of television and radio on audience-interpretation 
revealed largescale differences between how a specific content was interpreted in 
exclusively distinct ways when it was played on a radio versus when it was depicted 
on a television (Greenfield & Beagles-Roos, 1988). This study validates McLuhan’s 
claim and the centrality of the ‘medium’ in the processes of reception and 
interpretation. Bell and Dittmar’s (2011) correlational study, however, unsettles the 
notion that interpretation is exclusively dependent on the ‘medium’; instead, their 
research argues that media-type does not determine the interpretation of any depicted 
image, and would have the same impact on individuals irrespective of how an image 
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was presented (p. 489). The latter argument, nonetheless, is not a negation of 
McLuhan’s idea; it briefly helps us support the hypothesis that unless an animation is 
depicted on audio-visual platforms, its meaning may remain unchanged/stable. Yet 
again, this does not imply that any animation cannot be differently perceived/received 
by audiences, or that it denies the theory of reception aesthetics (Tatum, 2014; Holly, 
2002; Iser, 1980; Holub, 1984; Schmidt, 1979). These arguments stimulate a closer 
understanding of the unlikeliness of an audio-visual format (including television, 
cinema, or DVDs) to affect the language and meaning of an animation. What may 
affect the interpretation is the viewers’ sociocultural backgrounds, life experiences, 
and their personal characters and beliefs, which is where we may appreciate the 
polysemic nature of artforms and the credibility of reader-response. Nonetheless, the 
digitalisation of entertainment has exploded a gamut of animated productions, 
intensified the production and marketing processes, triggered the rise of animation as 
a viable creative-cultural industry, and centralised animation in the public 
imaginations of childhood (Yoon & Malecki, 2010). 
 
Raffaelli (1997) makes a controversial remark about the presence of animations in the 
universe of children when he writes, “the world of animated cartoons is closely linked 
with that of the child” (p. 113). Even though his statement broadly fuels our insights 
about children’s fascination for animations, it is, nonetheless, only scarcely true. 
Similar opinions about animations as being only ‘child/family-centred’ have been 
subject to severe criticism, with supporters claiming animations’ ability to ‘perform’ 
much more than slapstick humour (Wells, 1998) and influencing people irrespective 
of age (Pilling, 1997). Criticising this stream of thought, Pilling (1997), at one instance, 
accused Disney of this shallow approach, leading animations to be conceived as only 
materials for a ‘child’s play’. Some critics even mention that Disney’s intervention led 
to a personal paradox. On one hand, where Disney thrived in materialist profits (at the 
expense of exploiting the art of animation); on the other, animation - as a form of 
artistic expression - received a setback in its decline in receiving scholarly attention 
(Pilling, 1997). 
 
However, around the 60/70s, these opinions started re-forming, and animation (as an 
artform) began re-gaining its lost position in the media-industry, with its significance 
and modes of approach being analysed, studied, and critiqued (Wells, 1998). As 
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Halberstam (2009) notes, animations approach us with “a pedagogical opportunity” 
(p. 47), in the sense that they provide parents/the school with a platform wherein they 
may “rehearse” the cultivation of the values (in children) that the former reinforces 
(Wright & Huston, 1983, p. 842). Indeed, this argument widens our approach about 
animations as (1) intelligent tools to complement children’s socialisation and as (2) 
“an ideal medium for suggesting what cannot be said by the printed word” (Kemnitz, 
1973, p. 84). The latter-point seems most intriguing. It hints at animations’ inherent 
ability to indulge in two disparate possibilities: (1) to explore/satirise sensitive and 
tabooed subjects ‘from a distance’ (Wells, 2009); and (2) provide expression to 
emotions/metaphors that cannot be represented within the physical limits of theatre or 
live-performances (Boguszak, 2014). Even though Boguszak (2014) is strictly 
speaking in context of animated adaptations of Shakespeare (and the live-theatre’s 
inability to capture many of Shakespeare’s outstanding metaphysical and abstract 
feats, which the animated versions successfully achieve), his arguments could be used 
to establish a more general opinion about animations’ abilities to ‘perform’ the 
unspoken, the inexplicable, and the abstract (Kemnitz, 1973), and yet manage to neatly 
convey “socialist messages” (Halberstam, 2009, p. 47) that empower and contribute to 
the personal growth of viewers (mostly children). 
 
At a parallel thought, it would be beneficial to shed light on some proposed definitions 
of ‘animation’ that may further widen our understandings of the latter in context of 
children and childhood. On an extremely basic, technical level, Bendazzi (2006) 
defines animation “as a ‘frame by frame’ method of creation of movement” (p. xxi). 
He advances to treat ‘animation’ from a philosophical standpoint when he notes that it 
is “a pure work of the spirit” (p. xxi). On the contrary, however, Denslow (1997) notes 
that the word is usually defined within academia as a “‘created performance’” (p. 3).  
 
One may discover a subtle thread of connectivity here. In both cases, animation is 
conceived as a process of ‘creation’, which is where one could be reminded of the 
word’s etymology. Wells (1998) discusses the origin of the word, ‘animation’ from 
the “Latin verb, animare, which means ‘to give life to’” (p. 10). Within this context, 
animation emerges as an expressive artform that “endow[s] lifeless things with 
dynamic and vibrant properties” (Wells, 1998, p. 11), a point we had briefly touched 
earlier. This ability to impart life to inanimate entities can push animation to the 
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category of performative media-texts (Chouliaraki, 2008, p. 832) that plays on the 
inanimation of animated characters and upholds them as ‘alive’, moving subjects. 
 
Furthermore, as Tinwell and Sloan (2014) highlight, children relatively fail to identify 
with ‘uncanny’, emotionless characters, thereby, unintentionally revealing another 
milestone that the animation industry has achieved. Their arguments become helpful 
to suggest that for animation to function as a socialising agent, it is essential for its 
characters to be full-blooded and expressive of a heterogenous range of human 
emotions (Wells, 1998). In the presence of an emotional distance, animations may lose 
their ideological efficiency as sources of entertainment, instruction, and socialisation. 
 
This leads us to an understanding about animations and their contributions in 
cultivating progressive and altruistic thoughts in children about a plethora of 
discourses, including leadership, courage, humanity, gender-sexuality, and human-
animal relationships. Here, the successive chapters would help validate and vindicate 
animations’ position- as a sub-category of mass media- in children’s socialisation. The 
world of animation is a world abundant with meanings which may only help children 
to establish/reshape their own meanings about the nature of things and the world 
around them. This further notifies us about the far-reaching influence of animations 
and to what degrees they could be used to not only complement certain child-related 
developmental phenomena (Wilson, 2008), but also function as remarkable 
inspirations for socio-political, cultural, and moral change (Halberstam, 2009). It is on 
this note that we may now turn our attention to analyse how animations play with the 
metaphor of ‘the journey’ to understand their protagonists’ development of the self 






Tales of Wandering Children: The ‘Animated’ Odyssey Experience 
and the Journey to Selfhood 
 
Into the Journey, Towards the Self 
 
Forceville (2016) refers to the concept of ‘journey’ as a “conceptual metaphor” (p. 8). 
This metaphor offers individuals a space to (re)imagine their aspirations, ‘sense of 
being’ and future expectations, deepening their understandings about the communities 
they are a part of, the people they are related to, and the values and norms they are 
expected to cultivate as part of the culture they grow up in. These aspects could be 
cited as one of the central meanings that the metaphor intends to explain to us about 
who we are and what purposes do we have as members of society (Maclean et al., 
2015). Considering the scope of our research, we aim to approach this metaphor in the 
context of children’s animations and analyse (1) the transformative potentials of 
independent journeys and (2) how the latter may function as a metaphor for what 
Morgan (2010) calls a “superior existential mode of ‘being-in-the-world’” (p. 248). 
This analysis would help us return to animations’ participation in children’s 
socialisation, and how their participation envisages mass media’s potential to edutain. 
 
We shall discuss the social significance of this metaphor more closely at a later stage, 
but, here, it is more important to highlight that for the purpose of our discussions, we 
focus on three animations- Triton of the Sea (1972), Heidi, Girl of the Alps (1974), and 
Belle and Sebastian (1981 - 82). These three animations share one significant factor 
within their narratives that stands as crucial to our contextual framework for our 
analyses in this chapter. All three animations revolve around exclusively autonomous 
journeys being undertaken by our protagonists that help these characters reshape their 
identities- usually in a positive light- as independent, responsible, and empowered 
individuals (Dietz, 2019). 
 
Here, it would be necessary to highlight that the journeys recorded within each 
narrative follow a specific trajectory that roughly aligns with Morgan’s (2010) 
threefold scheme of “pre-liminal”, “liminal”, and “post-liminal” phases (p. 252). This 
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threefold scheme is expanded over by Smelser’s (2009) empirical framework of “the 
odyssey experience” (p. 8). The ‘odyssey experience’ is usually marked by neat 
demarcations between what Smelser (2009) addresses as (1) the “social destructuring” 
of everyday routine, (2) a phase of liminality, and (3) a “re-entry into the world of 
routine on a new. . . regenerated basis” (p. 11, 206-207). Smelser (2009) opines that 
the journey is a “finite” phenomenon (p. 10), in the sense that the odyssey/journey is 
temporary, but frequently results in perpetual, long-lasting social benefits, and that the 
essence of the odyssey lies in a voyager’s status of liminality. 
 
It is in the liminal phase that the voyager can encounter the ‘Other’- a disparate, 
separable, unrecognisable identity- and may be in a situation to interpret their own 
identity against the reflection(s) of the ‘Other’ (Galani-Moutafi, 2000; Morgan, 2010). 
Mezirow (2000) offers a befitting framework to understand this process, when he 
proposes his concept of the ‘disorienting dilemma’ which allows for the voyager’s 
encounters with the ‘Other’ to facilitate the reshaping of their ways of thinking about 
the world or what Mezirow (2000) calls the “habits of mind” (p. 18). This might also 
be addressed as an act of “‘coming to consciousness’” (Clifford, 1988, p. 167), in the 
sense that a journey may facilitate what Galani-Moutafi (2000) calls a “simultaneous 
discovery of self and the Other” (p. 205). It is here that one may perceive such journeys 
as being “existential” by nature, defined by a transition “from immaturity to maturity; 
ignorance to wisdom. . . from egocentrednes to reality-centeredness” (Morgan, 2010, 
p. 248). These subjective transitions become possible due to the temporary liminal 
phase that a voyager passes through that opens the possibility for the latter to locate, 
recognise, and understand his sense of self that they had previously formed against the 
image of the ‘Other’.  
 
A journey, additionally, may reconfigure the cultural position/status of the ‘Other’ as 
more of a known territory/reality, rather than belonging to the realm of imagined 
impossibilities that could never be identified or explored (Galani-Moutafi, 2000). It is 
for such aesthetic reasons that journeys are often called self-reflexive exercises. They 
enable the individual to transform the self and their ability to comprehend others and 
the world around them (Dietz, 2019). The three animations, therefore, employ the 
framework of a ‘journey’ to encapsulate their characters’ self-transformations into 
individuals, who now possess a strong sense of what Dietz (2019) refers to as the 
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“‘knowledgeable self’” (p. 197), with a purpose of simultaneously inspiring 
viewers/readers to ‘travel-along’ with the characters and reshape their own selves, as 
the characters venture out (Stock, 1993). 
 
The Journey Models and their Contextual Value 
 
Due to the ubiquitous nature of the metaphor of ‘journey’, it has immediately gained 
immense popularity in contemporary times and is often reconceptualised to introduce 
narratives revolving around an array of diverse themes including education (Murray, 
2009; O'Shea & Stone, 2014), mental health recovery (Fullagar & O'Brien, 2012; 
Thomas & Rickwood, 2016), and entrepreneurial philanthropy (Maclean et al., 2015). 
Several developed models incorporate a metaphorical framework of the journey to 
understand the participants’ journeys of self-transformation (Morgan, 2010), as (1) 
they entered a university, (2) recovered from a mental illness or (3) participated in 
charity. Here, it is imperative to shed some light upon three key models that have 
shaped the modern understandings of the ‘journey metaphor’, before we advance 
forward in the chapter. 
 
One famous example is Joseph Campbell’s (1968) mono-mythic, linear model, 
providing a proper trajectory for the classical odyssey or the hero's quest. The model 
is divided into three distinct phases- involving “departure” (p. 49), “initiation” (p. 97), 
and “return” (p. 193)- to imply a one-way movement from ignorance to knowledge or 
darkness to light (Morgan, 2010). In more than one way, Campbell’s (1968) model 
speaks about the self-transformative potential of journeys, wherein it emphasizes a 
hero’s return as a wiser, more experienced, individual. However, Campbell’s model 
has been criticised (1) for not considering “the many social and psychological 
differences between men and women” and, thus, (2) has been branded as “gendered” 
(Ray & McFadden, 2001, p. 202, 201). 
 
Contrary to the outward-physical journey that the hero embarks, the journey of the 
“heroine” is more of an inward voyage that could be called a 
 
quest to fully embrace [her] feminine nature, learning 
how to value [herself] as [a woman] and to heal the deep 
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wound of the feminine. It is a very important inner 
journey toward(s) being a fully integrated, balanced, and 
whole human being" (Murdock, 2020, p. 3). 
 
This argument stimulates the arrival of the ‘Heroine Model’ that views the heroine’s 
quest as a non-linear “lifelong cycle of development, growth, and learning” (Murdock, 
2020, p. 5), unlike Campbell’s (1968) linear model. More intriguing is the fact that 
Murdock’s model is an offspring of Campbell’s model, emerging from the latter’s 
deficiencies. It often derives much of its structure from Campbell’s, but digresses to 
capture women’s journeys to highlight and extract their sense of identity and an 
empowered manifestation of ‘the feminine’ (Murdock, 2020). Extending this argument 
is Ray and McFadden’s (2001) model that emphasises the possibility of using the 
alternative metaphors of “the web and the quilt” (p. 203) to reflect over women’s 
journey towards the spiritual and the aesthetic. 
 
Ray and McFadden (2001) believe that the metaphor of a journey is “limited” (p. 201) 
and may not be adequate to be able to collectively hold the “richer diversity and 
complexity in spiritual development” (p. 203). For this reason, they propose the idea 
of using the ‘web’ as a metaphor to embody women’s lives as an “interconnected 
pattern of relationships that are typical of women’s development, and the interactive 
nature of women’s lives” (Murray, 2009, p. 111). The metaphor of the ‘web’, 
furthermore, could be substituted by the ‘quilt’ that serves similar purposes as the 
former to reflect the diverse and interdependent aspects and factors of women’s 
spiritual/personal journeys, dimensions that were overlooked by Campbell (1968). 
 
It is interesting to note how vividly Campbell’s (1968) model of the classical hero’s 
quest has been critiqued, modified, and reconsidered to become more inclusive by 
nature, and be able to reflect the journey of the ‘individual’ towards personal growth, 
irrespective of any differences between sex. Unfortunately, this has not been properly 
achieved yet. It is precisely because where Campbell (1968) focusses on the ‘hero’, 
Murdock (2020) and Ray and McFadden (2001) overlook the ‘hero’ while paying more 
attention to the ‘heroine’s’ journey. None of these models have been able to perceive 
the ‘individual’ from what Robbins (2006) calls a “gender-neutral” lens (p. 777). This 
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discrepancy leads her to insist upon using the word ‘hero’ from a “gender-neutral and 
racially-blind” perspective (p. 777) during the formulation of any similar model(s) of 
journey in the future.  
 
Le Guin (1996) attempted to transform this normative trajectory of hero-centrality by 
criticising traditional forms of fiction that dwell over uncomforting instances of 
exclusion and focus solely on moments of conflict. Such stories celebrate the ‘hero’ 
who is revered only because of his participation in gory “killer stories” (p. 152), 
without which a ‘hero’ may not stand as a significant entity. In an attempt to revitalise 
fiction, Le Guin (1996) proposes the metaphor of the “carrier bag” (p. 151) that 
concentrates on the diversification of human experience and debunks the one-way 
dimension through which we have been looking at the hero. 
 
The ‘Other’ and the ‘Knowledgeable Self’  
 
Despite a few limitations, these models, nonetheless, help validate the transformative 
potential of a journey and how journeys could be understood as metaphors for self-
growth. As mentioned above, the concept of a ‘journey’ symbolizes a simultaneous 
process of discovering and identifying the “self and the Other” (Galani-Moutafi, 2000, 
p. 205) that helps the voyager to become self-conscious about oneself and others 
(Clifford, 1988). It is essential for the voyager to encounter the ‘Other’ and its 
‘Otherness’ because it would be against the latter’s image that the former would be 
able to view and identify one’s self: 
 
. . . only in the context of the relation with the Other- 
concerning what it is not or what it precisely lacks- can 
‘identity’ be produced and conceptualized. . . Overall, 
the process of identity construction is subject to the 
‘game’ of difference and presupposes the drawing of 
symbolic boundaries" (Galani-Moutafi, 2000, p. 205). 
 
The above-cited lines reify the significance of the ‘Other’ in the existential 
journey/quest for inner growth and self-transformation. It is worth noting that this 
perception is shared by many thinkers, including Morgan (2010), Smelser (2009), and 
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Mezirow (2000). It is often felt that the introduction of the ‘Other’ during the liminal 
phase of a journey renders the latter existentially complete and meaningful. Here, we 
could perceive the significance of transformative expeditions, as they cater to the 
formation of a rising consciousness- an enlightening pathway that conjoins the self to 
the world (Clifford, 1988), informing the individual about pragmatism that often 
stands as a crucial element for the continuance of a community. Campbell (1968) 
vividly reiterates the same principle when he writes, “it is not society that is to guide 
and save the creative hero, but precisely the reverse” (p. 391). 
 
Additionally, the encounter with the ‘Other’ is usually attributed as a symptom of what 
we may address as “autonomous cross-cultural hardship travel” (Lyons, 2010, p. 286). 
This could be defined as a form of travel marked (1) by “intense cross-cultural 
engagement” and, subsequently, (2) a precursor to feelings of “personal growth”, 
“autonomy”, “creativity”, and courage (Hirschorn & Hefferon, 2013, p. 285). It is 
interesting to note that the four-mentioned traits are inter-related to peoples’ 
connections with the vital self (p. 296) and contribute to the moral and social growth 
of the voyager, the individual, and the hero. 
 
However, with respect to children’s involvement with the metaphor of journey, there 
is a slight twist in how the metaphor could be reconceptualised to integrate with a 
child’s universe and imagination. Brian Stock, in his seminal essay, “Reading, 
Community and a Sense of Place” (1993), reflects over the two significant processes 
of “seeing” and “reading” (p. 315) and how they are co-dependent on one another. He 
maintains that both are, in a way, crucial to an understanding of the “sense of place” 
(p. 314) or temporal spaces. Leading ahead from this context is Feike Dietz’s (2019) 
argument that seeks to understand children’s reading of travel narratives as “a process 
of ‘reading about’ created places” (p. 197). She draws much of her arguments from the 
18th century Dutch travel-narratives for children which integrated the processes of 
‘reading’ and ‘travelling’, transforming reading experiences into a form of “mental 
travelling” (Dietz, 2019, p. 200). 
 
To Dietz (2019), these narratives often invite the child-reader to accompany the 
travellers on their journeys without having to cross the physical boundaries of the 
home. In doing so, the child’s reading experience translates into an episode of ‘mental 
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travelling’, functioning as “a stepping stone to inner growth and mental reflection” (p. 
199). The process of ‘reading about’ (Dietz, 2019) a journey may facilitate a similar 
reaction amongst children like the travellers in the fictional story, paving the way to 
the formation of the “knowledgeable self” (p. 197) which is defined as the ability to 
comprehend knowledge about the world, others, and oneself. This context shall help 
us focus on the three animations and each respective journey as a ‘text’ for child-
viewers to ‘watch’, and learn from, as “an opportunity for personal growth” (Hirschorn 
& Hefferon, 2013, p. 285). 
 
The journeys documented in these animations could be deemed a proper medium to 
inform the child-viewer about the possibility of not only ‘travelling’ with the 
characters, but also ‘growing-up’ as they do. In their characters’ transformative phases, 
child-viewers receive an equal opportunity to acknowledge (1) their sense of identity, 
(2) their relationship with others and the community, and (3) how their “habits of 
mind” (Mezirow, 2000, p. 18) could be (re)organized, (re)framed, and(re)shaped. 
Quite alike the characters on-screen, child-viewers may be provided with as much of 
insights as the characters, given if they are ready to be inspired and be open to advice. 
 
Discussion: The Odyssey Experiences 
 
I. Triton of the Sea (1969) 
 
Triton of the Sea has been structured as a quest for revenge that manifests itself as a 
journey towards personal growth and self-discovery. We aim to analyse how the 
backdrop of a revenge-narrative helps the protagonist discover his identity as a 
member of the Triton-clan, accompanied by the consequent-formation of a 
“knowledgeable self” (Dietz, 2019, p. 197). In terms of the trajectory that Triton’s 
journey adopts, we can quickly perceive that, unlike Smelser’s (2009) contention that 
an odyssey experience is “finite” (p. 10), Triton’s path is neither finite nor linear 
(Forceville, 2016). It would be beneficial to address, at this stage, that Triton’s journey, 
in terms of trajectory, is non-linear and does not explicitly comply to Smelser’s (2009) 
concept of “restructuring. . . into the world of routine” (p. 206-207), like the other two 
animations that possess more of a cyclic journey-outline and, therefore, could be called 
as closer adherents to the framework formulated by Smelser (2009). However, this 
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does not imply that Triton of the Sea fails to co-relate its narrative with any other 
features of the “odyssey experience” (Smelser, 2009, p. 8). 
 
Here, it would be interesting to note that one of the earliest visible features of the 
odyssey experience within the animation is the feeling of existential dilemma- 
explained by Smelser (2009) as “emotional ambivalence” (p. 16)- that Triton initially 
struggles with during the first three chapters of the narrative. Smelser (2009) reflects 
over ‘emotional ambivalence’ as an assimilation of more positive emotions of hope 
and “euphoria” (p. 16) with negatives like “apprehension and anxiety” (p. 16). This is 
vividly reflected in the breaking of Triton’s images of the ‘home’ in the first three 
chapters. He dwindles between feelings of belongingness with the land or the sea (as 
in Episode I, “The Calling from the Distant Sea”) before he decides on refusing the 
call of the odyssey (Campbell, 1968) in Episode III, titled “The Coruscant Olihan 
Dagger”. In this context, Campbell (1968) makes a pertinent observation, writing “that 
sometimes the predicament following an obstinate refusal of the call proves to be the 
occasion of a providential revelation of some unsuspected principle of release” (p. 64). 
 
What is implied here is that the hero’s refusal is often overturned by a sort of a strange 
predicament that pushes the hero to accept the calling. This is where Triton’s refusal- 
in Episode II- to (1) accept his identity as a Triton and (2) “fight for the peace at sea” 
(Triton of the Sea, 2018a, 13:42), is overturned by the death of the giant sea-turtle, 
Merton, at the hands of Siren (a follower of Poseidon). It is the death of Merton that 
stimulates Triton’s anger and sense of participation in the nemesis of the Poseidon-
clan, and, therefore, avenge the death of his parents and the rest of the Triton-clan. 
This episode serves as the penultimate “destructuring” (Smelser, 2009, p. 11) of Triton 
from Yipin’s ‘home’, as he ventures out to the Atlantic to fight against the Poseidon 
family, never to return to Yipin’s village again in the future. This is precisely why we 
address Triton of the Sea as a non-linear journey towards identity and self-awareness 
(Hirschorn & Hefferon, 2013). The animation stands as Triton’s journey towards truth 
and an understanding of who he is as a Triton. Here, we may perceive his discovery of 
the self as a metaphor for ‘home-coming’, or rather as what Smelser (2009) calls the 
“re-entry into the world. . . on a new and presumably regenerated basis” (p. 206-207). 
Even though Triton never returns to the same village from where he began his journey, 
the final episode paves the way to the audiences’ understandings of the development 
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of an altogether new perspective of the “‘sense of place’” (Morgan, 2010, p. 253) for 
Triton. We aim to discuss this at a later stage of the analysis, typically because this 
formation occurs at the concluding phases of Triton's journey and is informed by other 
factors that unfold in the middle. 
 
The middle part- the liminal phase- of Triton’s odyssey, however, is “fraught with 
uncertainty, danger, threat, or loss of security” (Smelser, 2009, p. 14). It is precisely 
in this phase that Triton encounters, and fights, the ‘Other’ to recognise his own 
identity, or a sense of “‘being-in-the-world’” (Morgan, 2010, p. 248), against the 
horrific images of the evil Poseidons who have been modelled as embodying the 
metaphorical presence of the ‘Other’ in the animation. Within the present context, we 
could refer to one of Galani-Moutafi’s (2000) pertinent arguments to understand more 
closely the intricacies of the processes of Triton’s phases of identity-development. 
Galani-Moutafi (2000) observes that “identities are constructed in relation to 
difference” (p. 205). On a similar vein, Triton views himself as a Triton- as the 
harbinger of “peace at sea” (Triton of the Sea, 2018a, 13:42)- against the Poseidons 
who are the present rulers of the sea, epitomizing chaos, disruption, and disharmony. 
However, it is worth noting that the stages of Triton’s identity-formation are amplified 
as the narrative progresses. Triton’s identity-formation is instigated after the death of 
Merton in Episode III and reaches a culmination once Triton defeats the anchor, the 
main villain, of the Poseidon clan in Episode-XXVII, wherein the narrative concludes. 
 
The audiences may find the liminal phase of Triton’s odyssey as the most enlightening 
for the protagonist. Not only is it marked by a complex experience with the ‘Other’, 
but also paves the way to the resolution of his existential ‘disorienting dilemmas’ 
(Mezirow, 2000). Within the framework of any transformative journeys, many critics 
have held the phase of liminality to be of immense value to the voyager (Morgan, 
2010; Smelser, 2009). The ‘liminal’ phase is deemed to have self-transformative 
potentials, particularly through a direct exposure to the ‘Other’ and its related factors 
of ‘Otherness’. This even echoes in Triton’s journey as he (1) ventures out to discover 
his “secret” (Triton of the Sea, 2018a, 1:08) and self-identity, (2) battles not only 
demons and sea-monsters but also his own personal feelings of anxiety and “emotional 
ambivalence” (Smelser, 2009, p. 16), and (3) finally begins to understand and 
appreciate his communal roots as a member of the Tritons which he had earlier been 
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exposed to, at the beginning of the narrative, but had chosen to initially deny and refuse 
(Campbell, 1968). Triton’s journey represents a dramatic, but ‘fantastic’, ritualistic 
passage from one “psychological and social. . . role or phase of life to another” 
(Smelser, 2009, p. 7), as he transforms into an altogether different individual who 
appears ready, and able, to revive the socio-cultural legacy of the Tritons that had been 
once damaged by the chaotic forces of disorder and anarchy, the Poseidons.  
 
Furthermore, as part of the odyssey, Smelser (2009) mentions that during the journey, 
one may experience a few relationships or bonds of a more “unique and special” nature 
(p. 18) that may not re-occur once the voyager has restructured him/herself to the 
place/society of the odyssey’s origin. Considering this, one cannot overlook the 
relative importance of Ruka (the white dolphin) in Triton’s journey for revenge, 
identity, and redemption. As one memorable character-companion, Ruka embodies 
Campbell’s (1968) characterisations of the “protective figure” (p. 69) or the animal-
form of the “fairy godmother” (p. 71) for Triton. She represents that “benign, 
protecting power of destiny” (Campbell, 1968, p. 71) that enables Triton to 
successfully justify the purposes of his journey. Triton’s odyssey was strewn with 
battles against monsters and evil symbols, and it was Ruka who helped and protected 
through those adventures. Even though Campbell’s (1968) ‘helper’ bears more 
supernatural parameters, Ruka may still qualify as the former, considering her saintlike 
presence and undying support across Triton’s odyssey in the sea. 
 
Here, one may mention that there were other characters as well, including the other 
three dolphins- Uru, Karu, and Fin- and Pipiko, who accompanied Triton on his quest 
against the Poseidons and, at times, even ‘helped’ him battle some monsters. However, 
the type of relationship Triton and Ruka share within the animation, unfortunately, is 
not something that Triton shares (or entertains) with others from his team, including 
Pipiko, who is often suggested to be Triton’s sexual partner in the future. The 
animation mostly prioritises the refinement and development of Ruka and Triton’s 
relationship and centralizes Ruka as a crucial element in Triton’s journey. Sadly, the 
animation fails to balance-out the representation of the other four characters due to 
which (1) Triton’s bonds of association stays limited to only Ruka (Smelser, 2009) and 
(2) Pipiko, as a female figure, remains sequestered- and, most importantly, voiceless- 
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in the narrative, a point which is integral, and of special interest, to our analyses in 
Chapter IV. 
 
Coming back to Triton’s journey is the “‘sense of place’” that eventually develops for 
Triton to locate his socio-psychological boundaries (Morgan, 2010, p. 253). As 
mentioned above, Triton’s journey is non-linear, unlike Smelser’s (2009) linear 
odyssey-model; however, one may perceive that Triton still re-structures himself to 
“routine life” (p. 18), precisely as a “transformed home comer” (Morgan, 2010, p. 
252). Certainly, both the locational points of initiation and return are separate in 
Triton’s case, but what Triton, indeed, develops is embedded in imagination and 
perception. By locating and identifying his ‘sense of being’ as a Triton, he not only 
sheds off the identity he had earlier assumed in Yipin’s care, but also moves on to 
accept “the sea” as his (1) place of origin and (2) destination of return. Morgan (2010) 
speaks of the “‘sense of place’” as a “complex connection between people. . . and 
places or landscapes that goes beyond the merely material or functional to consider the 
affective and existential” (p. 253). 
 
This is more vividly registered in Heidi, Girl of the Alps (which we will discuss later 
in the chapter); in Triton of the Sea, however, it is more implicit than outwardly 
suggested. However, the audiences could still recognise the emergence of this ‘sense 
of place’ within the psyche of Triton as (1) he never returns to Yipin and (2) journeys 
ahead to the sea on the back of Ruka in Episode-XXVII, “The Sun will rise again in 
the Atlantic Ocean” (Triton of the Sea, 2018f, 21:35). In a way, Triton’s 
acknowledgment of the “sea” as his home suggests a spiritual and psychological 
journey towards the inner self, as a manifestation of “‘coming to consciousness’” 
(Clifford, 1988, p. 167). In Triton’s acceptance of (1) his identity and (2) the sea as 
‘home’ lies the central meaning of the odyssey experience which is grounded in the 
possibility of growth, emancipation, and self-realisation (Galani-Moutafi, 2000; 
Hirschorn & Hefferon, 2013; Morgan, 2010). 
 
Triton’s journey, as highlighted above, is not a simple tale of revenge, but more of a 
subtle exploration of self-identity and self-discovery, sharpened with the emergence 
of the “knowledgeable self” (Dietz, 2019, p. 197). The latter-most argument may be 
best illustrated via Triton’s recognition of the true powers of the magical, ‘olihan 
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dagger’, which is also situated as a cultural symbol of Triton heritage and ancestry. 
The dagger emits an unbearable radiation, rendering Triton invincible, and, therefore, 
Triton uses it each time he gets in trouble until, in Episode-XVIII, “The Torrid Giant, 
Taros” (Triton of the Sea, 2018e, 16:13), he realizes that the dagger ceases to work if 
overused. From there onwards, he acknowledges the physical limitations of the dagger 
and resorts to employing it vigilantly and prudently, as the narrative continues ahead. 
 
Triton of the Sea, thus, enables the audiences to appreciate the odyssey experiences of 
Triton as not only an episode of self-transformation and self-perseverance (Morgan, 
2010), but also as a private lesson/opportunity of involving themselves with the 
transformative journey of Triton. His journey, further, may help the audiences reduce 
the possibility of unclear “habits of mind” to occupy the social and psychological 
spaces of their selves (Mezirow, 2000, p. 18) and rather shift their focus on more 
productive opportunities to gather knowledge about one’s self, others, and society 
(Dietz, 2019; Murray, 2009). The animation desires to move child-viewers to ‘watch’ 
Triton’s journey as a medium to view themselves both in “the inner and the outer 
dimensions” (Galani-Moutafi, 2000, p. 205) of their social and psychological circles 
as potentially transformed and enlightened. The animation, most certainly, asks from 
child-viewers to look up to Triton for inspiration. 
 
II. Belle and Sebastian (1981-82) 
 
Unlike the linear nature of Triton’s journey, in Belle and Sebastian, the audience may 
clearly perceive the nature of Belle and Sebastian’s adventures as being circular. It 
implies that their journey not only involves more defined patterns of “destructuring”, 
but also a finite possibility of “restructuring” (Smelser, 2009, p. 12), thereby, hinting 
at the formal completion of the hero's quest (Campbell, 1968). This does not mean that 
Triton’s linear journey fails to hold any substance due to the open-ended nature of its 
conclusion. Where Triton’s sense of restructuring is enriched by his rejuvenated 
associations with his familial history and, therefore, is more psychological than 
outwardly projected; the circular nature of Sebastian’s journey more formally abides 
by Smelser’s (2009) inherent odyssey-model. What intersects their journeys is the 
sense of development that the former assumes in the lives of the protagonists, 
culminating their adventures into a manifestation of a ritualistic passage (Smelser, 
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2009. This factor about odysseys helps transform not only the protagonists to 
knowledgeable individuals (Dietz, 2019), but also their journeys into a quest towards 
consciousness, identity, and self-awareness (Clifford, 1988; Morgan, 2010). 
 
What seems the most attractive factor about Sebastian’s journey is his sense of amity 
and belonging that he constantly shares with the great white Pyrenees, Belle. Their 
relationship is marked by a strange aspect of commonality that not only connects their 
individual narratives, but also facilitates the enrichment of their sense of mutual love 
and identification with (or for) each other. This suggested aspect could be defined with 
respect to the social position that both the characters share as being what we may 
address as ‘outcastes’. In both Belle and Sebastian’s treatments by others as “a vicious 
dog” and “farm kid” (Belle & Sebastian, 2012a, 5:17; 12:20) respectively, the 
audiences may perceive how (1) intricately-close the two characters have been 
intertwined within the narrative, and (2) how this line of commonality helps to 
perpetuate Sebastian’s journey to Spain, or rather quest to “the simultaneous discovery 
of self and the Other” (Galani-Moutafi, 2000, p. 205).  
 
The equation that Sebastian develops between himself and Belle as being victims of 
the same system strengthens his sense of belief that Belle is to be protected, as he 
‘promises’ to the latter in “The Hunt for Belle” that he “won't let anyone hurt [her]” 
(Belle & Sebastian, 2012b, 22:48). It would be worth mentioning that the animation 
extends its treatment of the theme of ‘social segregation’- which is introduced in the 
representations of both Sebastian and Belle- through its portrayal of the ethnically-
discriminated Romanies, something that we would be taking up ahead in the chapter. 
For now, it is adequate if we look at Sebastian’s journey with Belle to Spain (1) as a 
reaction to his village’s hostility against both himself and Belle and (2) as an 
opportunity to discover his mother, Isabel, when he finally ventures out in “The 
Journey Begins”. 
 
Sebastian’s journey could be defined as an extended quest to understand the ultimate 
meaning of “friendships”, which is an aspect frequently suggested within the narrative. 
Initially, this aspect remains limited to what Belle and Sebastian share, but, later, 
covers a whole range of people who Sebastian meets and befriends during his journey, 
who may be able to constitute the image of ‘Other’ (Galani-Moutafi, 2000) for 
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Sebastian and his own journey towards self-discovery (Clifford, 1988). It is here that 
Sebastian’s meeting with Sarah (in “A Visit to Jail”) not only closes the door of ‘friend-
lessness’ for Sebastian, but also paves the way to his self-recognition of the first 
glimpses of true friendship, as the narrator concludes, “he knows he has found a friend 
at last” (Belle & Sebastian, 2013a, 23:14).  
 
This friendly encounter, furthermore, assumes a developed manifestation in Billy, the 
bank robber, who sacrifices himself to save Belle and Sebastian from the searching 
police (who were, simultaneously, looking for both Billy and the latter-two), teaching 
the two “the power of true friendship” (Belle & Sebastian, 2013c, 23:34). It is here- 
through these interactions- that the audiences could perceive the transformative and 
facilitative potentials of Sebastian’s liminal phase. It helps him cultivate a keen sense 
of “unique and special membership” (Smelser, 2009, p. 18) with an optimistic ‘Other’, 
and manifests his development into a self-reflexive individual who understands his 
social roles, mostly as a friend (Dietz, 2019). 
 
Sebastian’s encounters with the ‘Other’ appear to reach a culmination in the portrayal 
of Benedict, an aristocratic boy, when the former understands the social and cultural 
differences between himself and the latter (Benedict). Sebastian’s interactions with 
Benedict and his family (in “The Runaway Car”) represent a subtle, implicit 
manifestation of what Lyons (2010) had called the “autonomous cross-cultural 
hardship travel” (p. 286) which could be related to a form of travel, involving “intense 
cross-cultural engagement” and a sudden acknowledgment of one’s own social and 
cultural reality (Hirschorn & Hefferon, 2013, p. 285-286). Ahead of this argument, it 
is crucial to highlight that Sebastian’s cross-cultural hardships have not been widened 
up by the anime (as in Heidi, Girl of the Alps) but they perfectly glisten his 
understandings of his sense of identity as “the boy from the tiny mountain” (Belle & 
Sebastian, 2013b, 2:40), which soon intermixes with his socio-cultural identity as the 
son of a ‘Romani-mother’ (as in “Help! Save Belle”). 
 
As already mentioned, the sympathetic representation of the Romanies intersects with 
the themes of identification and socio-cultural segregation, and it is precisely these 
factors that facilitate the themes of ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’ (Morgan, 2010; 
Smelser, 2009). It is here that we could be reminded of Belle and Sebastian’s episode 
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with Jake Lombard, who Sebastian mistakes for a dangerous kidnapper, an assumption 
that Sebastian makes strictly based on Jake’s physical appearances. Within this 
context, the narrative provides a befitting conclusion (in “Chased by the Desperados”): 
 
“Sebastian now realized he had been wrong about Jake. 
Just as many people were frightened of Belle because of 
her size, Sebastian had mistaken big, gruff Jake for a 
dangerous kidnapper- looks can be deceiving” (Belle & 
Sebastian, 2014a, 23:36 – 23:50). 
 
Sebastian’s misinterpretation of Jake’s sense of otherness corresponds to the socio-
cultural segregation of the Romanies within the anime, based on the latter’s cultural 
construct of ‘difference’, as viewed from the mistaken perspectives of the “Other” 
(Galani-Moutafi, 2000, p. 205). This cultural distance manifests as a ‘double- Other’ 
for Sebastian, who treats both the modernism of the ‘city’ and the traditionalism of the 
‘Romani’ as significantly invaluable ‘Others’. Having grown up in the village- away 
from any Romani influences- the animation positions Sebastian as culturally unaware 
of his roots, which he may pick up after he begins living with Isabel and, therefore, in 
the present, struggles with both the modern values of the “big city” (Belle & Sebastian, 
2013b, 2:43) and traditional and conservative notions of the Romanies, all of which he 
perceives as ‘new or different’ (Campbell, 1968). These intercultural experiences of 
differentiation transform his journey into an “opportunity for personal growth” 
(Hirschorn & Hefferon, 2013, p. 285) and as an outlet for self-consciousness about 
where his roots actually lie (Clifford, 1988; Murray, 2009). 
 
Within the circle of the Romanies, Sebastian grows closest to Mitch and Mingo. They 
not only actively support Sebastian to rescue Belle from police custody, but also 
emerge as primary role models from whom Sebastian learns some lessons about hope, 
courage, and togetherness. Surprisingly, they also become the few of the first 
individuals to recognise Belle not as “the white monster”, but as an “obedient. . . [and] 
friendly” Pyrenees, as Mingo, at one instance, argues, in “Belle is Captured” (Belle & 




Our values and sense of self are anchored in our frames 
of reference. They provide us with a sense of stability, 
coherence, community, and identity. Consequently, 
they are often emotionally charged and strongly 
defended (p.18).  
 
Leading from Mezirow’s (2000) argument, Sebastian’s interactions with the ‘othered’ 
Mitch and Mingo stimulate the reconstruction of his ‘frames of reference’ into a more 
malleable frame of reference. Such a frame is not only built upon personal experiences, 
but also is palpable to change and reformation, which Mezirow (2000) has explained 
as a “dependable frame of reference”: 
 
one that is more inclusive, differentiating, permeable. . . 
critically reflective of assumptions, emotionally capable 
of change, and integrative of experience (p. 19). 
 
Naturally, Sebastian’s encounters with Mitch and Mingo, and other Romanies, serve 
as the culmination of not only his odyssey/journey to discover Isabel, but also his 
understandings of the ways of the world and its peoples. However, his initial promise 
to Belle is fulfilled later, in “Climbing a Wall of Stone”, when the head of the Spanish 
Border Guards, Costello, advises against capturing or harming either Belle or 
Sebastian, as he alerts his team: 
 
“It would be a disgrace to our honour if we shot such a 
brave boy and his dog. They should remain free because 
of their courage” (Belle & Sebastian, 2014c, 23:06 – 
23:11). 
 
It is this sense of undaunted courage that Sebastian significantly learns from the 
Romanies- intermixed with faith in both Belle and his friendship with her- which later 
helps Sebastian earn Costello’s respect and actively facilitates “as a vehicle to growth” 
(Hirchorn & Hefferon, 2013, p. 294). Sebastian’s odyssey, thus, transforms into a self-
reflexive opportunity that disavows the negative influence of criminals or smugglers 
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like Hernandez and Fernandez and allows for the reconstruction of an altogether 
different, fresh, and self-conscious frames of reference (Mezirow, 2000, p. 19). 
 
One of our final thoughts about this odyssey pertains to Sebastian’s partial ‘refusal to 
return’ (Campbell, 1968) which might coincide with what Smelser (2009) writes about 
“affects of. . . nostalgia” (p. 18). In this context, Sebastian mentions to Belle, at one 
instance, about his psychological inclination to remember only “the bad memories”, 
rather than concentrating on “the good ones” (Belle & Sebastian, 2014d, 12:54). Here, 
Campbell (1968) makes a pertinent observation about the hero’s responsibility to carry 
those “runes of wisdom. . . back into the kingdom of humanity” (p. 193). We address 
Sebastian’s refusal or sense of “emotional ambivalence” as ‘partial’ because his 
anxieties are solely the aftermath of an exhaustive ritual-passage (Smelser, 2009, p. 
16, 18) and are, therefore, of a more fleeting nature than psychologically-embedded in 
Sebastian’s imagination. 
 
What seems certain, however, is Sebastian’s return to the Pyrenees as a content, 
“transformed home comer” (Morgan, 2010, p. 252). His odyssey serves him multiple 
objectives, including his personal, unanticipated discovery of his sense of self or what 
Morgan (2010) calls as a “superior existential mode of ‘being-in-the-world’” (p. 248). 
Furthermore, in discovering his ‘Romani-mother’, Sebastian discovers a dual-identity: 
one of ‘not’ being an orphan, and the other of being a member of the Romani-clan. 
Both identities assimilate to re-form Sebastian’s personal and social identity that 
perpetuates itself as the subject of narrative-construction within the anime to delineate 
Sebastian’s realisation of selfhood (Galani-Moutafi, 2000). Again, the narrator 
supplies a befitting conclusion to the present-argument, in “A Happy Ending”: 
 
“Sebastian was home. . . and now that his mother was 
there, his family was complete. . . he had done a lot of 
growing up. He now understood what friendship meant 
and how you sometimes had to work hard for it” (Belle 
& Sebastian, 2014e, 22:58 – 23:15). 
 
This sense of completeness corresponds with Sebastian’s identity-formation as not 
only a son, but, more importantly, as a friend, which becomes one of the central themes 
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in Belle and Sebastian. His journey enables him to discover Isabel, but what remains 
the most defining aspect of the former is that it paves the way to Sebastian’s private 
recognition of the true meanings of friendships, sacrifice, love, courage, and hope, 
which he could not have understood without crossing both symbolic and physical 
boundaries of the ‘home’. It was through his odyssey experience that Sebastian 
transforms the meaning of Cecil’s house into a metaphor that possesses the 
characteristics of what he can now address as ‘home’. Besides, his odyssey strengthens 
his bonds of friendship with Belle, yet again suggesting how Sebastian becomes more 
self-aware of what friendships stand for: as a symbol of compassion, sacrifice, and 
hope (Campbell, 1968). Strangely, the animation brings back memories of what Billy 
and his sacrifice had embodied, and how Sebastian takes his legacy forward to become 
a ‘friend with a big heart’. 
 
III. Heidi, Girl of the Alps (1974) 
 
Doreen Massey (1996) argues about the possibility for an individual’s “sense of place” 
to be less “self-enclosing and defensive”, and rather become more “progressive”, 
“outward- looking” (p. 237), and inclusive by nature. We may experience a similar 
paradigm unfolding in Heidi, Girl of the Alps (1974), typically through its eponymous 
protagonist’s inner journeys towards the self (Galani-Moutafi, 2000) and, most 
critically, towards nature that facilitates the protagonist’s odyssey towards “spiritual 
maturity” (Hale, 2006, p. 527). Speaking about the transformative potentials of places, 
we may find Tuan’s (1976) conceptual extension of John K. Wright’s concept of 
“geopiety” (p. 11) useful in the context of understanding the development of Heidi’s 
perception of the Swiss Alps in the narrative, and how Heidi’s relationships with 
nature- the wilderness- corresponds to what Morgan (2010) refers to as “individual-
nature transactions” (p. 255). Typically, within Heidi, ‘nature’ assumes a gamut of 
manifestations and each manifestation serves as a valuable bedrock for Heidi to 
simultaneously discover herself and ‘others’, strengthening her sense of “‘being-in-
the-world’” (Morgan, 2010, p. 248). 
 
Heidi, Girl of the Alps is marked by a stark refusal to acknowledge the darker 
ramifications of nature, and instead focuses more upon the glorification of nature’s 
sense of brightness and optimism. Darling-Wolf (2016) has pertinently observed this 
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phenomenon as a striking feature of the earlier works of Hayao Miyazaki who helped 
reconceptualise Johanna Spyri’s 1880 novel of the same name along with Isao 
Takahata. This is reiterated by McCarthy (1999) who mentions about ‘Miyazaki’s 
Europe’ as a “never-never land. . . a rustic paradise of crumbling yet infinitely 
sophisticated cities and castles. . . lakes, mountains, and high flower-strewn meadows; 
and mystery and romance” (p. 65). 
 
Nonetheless, Miyazaki’s systematic, implied deconstruction of European landscapes 
is a symptom of the (re)construction of Heidi’s character as a typical example of the 
‘Miyazaki girl’, who emerges as a symbolic manifestation of nature (Darling-Wolf, 
2016). This idea helps the narrative (re)position Heidi as “a child of the mountain”, 
from “Whistle Louder” (Radical Moose, 2016c, 23:25), and identify her spiritual 
maturity as a journey divided into four distinct phases. Her journey is supplemented 
by the geopietic symbiosis she develops with the Swiss countryside and its wilderness, 
as it emerges into a “focus of value, of nurture and support” (Tuan, 1977, p. 29) within 
the contextual framework of Heidi and her inner journey towards nature (Clifford, 
1988). In a way, the anime’s ignorance towards the darker aspects of nature supports 
the development of Heidi’s odyssey to not only discover the significance of nature, but 
also wake up to epitomise the latter as her anchor, guardian, and spiritual companion-
for-life. The animation elucidates and emphasises Heidi’s spiritual transaction with 
nature as a gateway for the protagonist to discover herself and sense of individuality, 
identity, and direction (Dietz, 2019; Galani-Moutafi, 2000; Morgan, 2010). 
 
Unlike Triton and Sebastian’s odysseys that begin with a defining episode of what 
Smelser (2009) addresses as the “social destructuring of routine. . . [from] the normal 
ebb and flow of life” (p. 11), Heidi’s inner journey towards nature manifests itself 
without the necessary ramification of “departure” (Campbell, 1968, p. 49) that 
conventionally holds a significant place in the hero’s journey or odyssey. The first 
initiative phase of Heidi’s journey occurs as soon as she reaches the Swiss Alps and 
begins sensing an ‘unusual’ attraction towards the mesmerising marvels of nature, as 




“Deeply breathing the delicious air of the wide Alp 
meadows, Heidi's heart rejoices to the utmost” (Radical 
Moose, 2016b, 17:22). 
 
Within this context, Tuan (1977) reflects over the possibility for children- typically 
infants- to understand and explore their physical environment, predominantly, through 
their gustatory senses. In the case of Heidi, her geopietic relationship is strengthened, 
at first, through the fresh dairy products she often consumes at her grandfather’s cabin 
on the mountain-top, typically cheese, goat’s milk, and brown bread. Her geopietic 
bond with the wilderness is, furthermore, complemented by Heidi’s wish to become 
“a goatherd” (in “Whistle Louder”) and remain in the mountains, in proximity to her 
grandfather, nature, and herself which later become the three most pivotal entities 
through which Heidi develops her sense of co-relation with the world around her 
(Dietz, 2019). However, the initiative phase quickly transforms to the second, wherein 
Heidi begins to perceive an inexplicable sense of ‘being-within-nature’ that not only 
helps her understand nature, but also allows her to grow closer to its transcendental 
and existential ramifications. One of Heidi’s earliest experiences with the spiritual 
form of nature are recorded in “The Whisper of the Firs”, where she first mentions 
about the firs’ sounds to be giving the impression that “they are talking” (Radical 
Moose, 2016d, 13:10). Heidi’s strange identification with the fir trees even perpetuates 
itself during her time at the Sesemann household in Frankfurt and, further, helps 
strengthen Heidi’s spiritual and emotional affinities/ties with nature. 
 
Nonetheless, the audiences might discover that Heidi’s relationship with ‘the 
wilderness’ intensifies during the third phase of her inner journey towards self-
consciousness and spiritual growth (Hale, 2006), when she leaves Dörfli and enters the 
Sesemann household to be a “playmate” (Radical Moose, 2016e, 4:26) for the 
physically disabled, Clara Sesemann. Heidi’s stay at the Sesemann household becomes 
extremely crucial in her four-phased odyssey and serves as a milestone for Heidi to 
reaffirm her unbreakable faith in nature. In leaving Dörfli, the animation introduces 
Heidi’s formal ‘disaggregation’ from the Swiss Alpine countryside, and ‘entry’ into a 
new phase of uncertainty, insecurity, and liminality (Morgan, 2010; Smelser, 2009). 
But, most important, the third phase exemplifies the character of Heidi as the 
archetypal ‘Miyazaki-girl’. Conventionally-speaking, the Miyazaki-girl departs from 
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the classical shōjo paradigm of “ultrafemininity that is often passive. . . [and rather is] 
independent and active, courageously confronting the variety of obstacles before 
[her]” (Napier, 2005, p. 154). 
 
This may lead us to acknowledge Heidi’s experiences at the Sesemann household, 
typically with Fräulein Rottenmeier (Clara's governess and the Sesemann 
housekeeper), as a powerful manifestation of Lyons’ (2010) concept of the “cross-
cultural hardship travel” (p. 286). Unlike Sebastian’s brief pockets of cross-cultural 
hardships, in Heidi’s encounters with Rottenmeier, we may perceive a more enduring 
and continued exposure to one’s sense of otherness which worsened with time, but, in 
return, amplified Heidi's love for nature and her sense of place (Massey, 1996). Her 
behaviour or lack of mannerisms at the dinner-table, in “A New Life”, for example, 
best explains her struggle to (1) identify or relate to (with) the ideas of sophistication 
and (2) adjust to the sense of otherness of the aristocratic Rottenmeier, as the latter 
once complains in “I Wish to Fly”: 
 
“She has no manners. She doesn't know how to talk to 
us or the servants. She doesn't even know how to read” 
(Radical Moose, 2016f, 2:12 – 2:22). 
 
Partially, Rottenmeier’s prejudice against our young female protagonist stems from 
her own lack of knowledge about the countryside peoples, which Heidi represents. 
However, the reactions of Rottenmeier to Heidi’s ‘otherness’ may lead us to conclude 
that this narrative-interaction is designed in a way that it evokes the ‘city-pastoral’ 
dichotomy. This dichotomy (1) appears as a key aspect in Miyazaki’s oeuvre and (2) 
serves the purpose of ‘glorifying nature’, while apprehending ‘the dystopian, modern 
city’ (Darling-Wolf, 2016), reconnecting the ‘Miyazaki-girl’ to stand as a metaphor 
for untouched, hidden nature. Heidi’s position as a metaphor for nature helps explain 
Alm-Onji's fear of Heidi’s purported, consequential loss of innocence or emotional 
purity, after Aunt Dete threatens to take Heidi away to Frankfurt in “Separate Ways” 
(Radical Moose, 2016e, 7:14). Fortunately, the animation firmly treasures Heidi’s 
metaphorical connections with nature/environment/wilderness, and instead of 
‘corrupting’ her, it rejuvenates her love for nature and transforms Heidi’s longing for 
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the Swiss Alps into a personal mantra for renewal, hoping and resilience (Hirschorn & 
Hefferon, 2013). 
 
Napier (2005), further, mentions that Miyazaki’s girl characters usually outshone due 
to their empowered outlooks. This seems evident in the ways through which Heidi 
controls her homesickness- her feverish longing for Alps- particularly at the face of 
Clara’s attachment towards her, as she confesses in “Ghost Commotion”: 
 
“Heidi: I dream every night. . . I am at Grandfather's hut. 
I hear the sound of the fir trees outside. I hurry to the 
door of the hut and open it. The stars are twinkling. 
Everything is so beautiful. . . But when I wake up, I'm 
still in Frankfurt. [. . .] 
 
Doctor: "Do you want to go back there?" 
Heidi: "Clara needs me. I cannot leave. (begins 
sobbing)” (Radical Moose, 2016g, 9:59 – 11:30). 
 
In Heidi’s refusal to travel back to the Alps, it seems transparent that Heidi, Girl of the 
Alps celebrates its female protagonist’s gambaru spirit and sense of renewal from the 
mental trauma she experiences due to her immense longing for home: the wilderness 
of the Alps (Darling-Wolf, 2016). Additionally, the anime soon translates Heidi’s 
homesickness into Clara’s physical recovery, where Heidi enters the final phase of her 
spiritual odyssey (Smelser, 2009), when the role of the wilderness shifts to cover 
dimensions of spiritual and physical healing (Asamoah et al., 2019). The anime 
reinforces the significance of nature, nurturing Heidi’s belief in its powers and 
capacities to ‘transform’ humanity on physical, artistic, emotional, and social levels. 
 
Clara’s recovery (as she is affected by being under the influence of nature), in a way, 
not only marks the culmination of Heidi’s spiritual quest towards ‘understanding 
nature’, but also reaffirms Heidi’s inherent faith in nature. Her quest stimulates Heidi’s 
rebirth as not only what Darling-Wolf (2016) suggests the archetype of Miyazaki's 
conception of nature- innocent, untouched, hidden- but also as the “child of the 
mountain” (from “Whistle Louder”). This is reiterated when Heidi sings a song- in the 
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final episode of the series (“Until We Meet Again”)- that positions her and Peter as 
“the goatherds of the cheerful village” (Radical Moose, 2016h, 12:46) and reinforces 
her desire to be a “goatherd”, something that she had even expressed earlier in the 
narrative (in “Whistle Louder”). 
 
Heidi's locational “restructuring” to the Alpine landscapes (Smelser, 2009, p. 206) 
manifests itself into the recognition of (1) her friendship with Clara Sesemann (when 
she comes to the Alps to pay Heidi a visit) that is built upon the idea of sacrifice and 
love, and (2) her sense of kinship or bonding with the Alps’ wilderness and nature in 
general. Her odyssey culminates with an acknowledgment of her geopietic symbiosis 
with nature that is built upon the essential emotion of “piety” or “reverence” (Tuan, 
1976, p. 11), along with an outstanding emotional bonding with Clara, Peter, and Alm-
Onji, who become the anchors for Heidi and her values of innocence, purity, and 
kindness. In Heidi’s journey, the audiences come to terms with the “transformative 
potential of places”, as Morgan (2010, p. 252) writes at one instance, as it completely 
redesigns one’s ‘frames of reference’ or ways of looking at the world and others 
(Mezirow, 2000). Heidi rejoices in the lap of nature, but at the expense of her refusal 
to acknowledge the darker realities of nature; however, it fulfils her sense of being (1) 
a part of nature and (2) around its manifestations and marvels. In a way, her journey 
to her grandfather’s cabin benefits her, as she realizes the peace of being closer to 
nature, thereby, negating Mr. Thomas’ opinions (the horse-cart driver who takes Heidi 
and Aunt Dete to Dörfli in the first episode, “To the Alm Mountain”) about Heidi in 
the beginning: 
 
“Poor girl. She is always going from one place to 
another” (Radical Moose, 2016a, 5:52). 
 
Indeed, Heidi’s uneven movements to ‘places’ magnify her outlook towards the world. 
She begins to appreciate things for what and how they are; meets and befriends some 
“unique and special” individuals (Smelser, 2009, p. 18); and, most critically, revels in 
her identification with nature and its wilderness. Her odyssey completes with her 
recognition of her true-self immersed in the beauty, tranquillity, and isolated modes of 
nature. It manifests to influence the city-based Sesemanns about what nature, the 
countryside, can offer to the displaced or distant ‘Other’ and aligns with the possibility 
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of personal reformation through a reconstruction of what Massey (1996) had originally 
discussed as the “sense of place” (p. 237). Heidi, Girl of the Alps illustrates the 
potential of wilderness (as ‘place’) to conjoin the voyager with deeper existential 




While discussing the hero’s return, Campbell (1968) makes an intriguing observation 
that could be delicately applied to the aftermath of the three individual journeys 
undertaken by our protagonists within the animations discussed herein the chapter. 
These journeys open them up to the enduring possibility of personal growth and self-
consciousness as they gather the lessons together, learnt (from) during their journey(s), 
and apply them later in their lives, and into adulthood: 
 
Though he had feared the terrible hag, he had been 
swallowed and reborn. Having died to his personal ego, 
he rose again established in the Self (Campbell, 1968, p. 
243). 
 
By the end of their odyssey experiences, the protagonists undergo a subtle self-
transformation that targets- and refines- their understanding of themselves, others, and 
their social or communal roles within their socio-political structures (Galani-Moutafi, 
2000). As Morgan (2010) points out, transformative journeys can function as a 
meaningful exercise that possesses the ability to sanitise the voyager by exposing them 
to influences of the ‘Other’, expanding their ways of approaching or thinking about 
the world (Mezirow, 2000). Such journeys help in identifying and reshaping immature 
“habits of mind” (Mezirow, 2000, p. 18) to re-develop or re-adjust them into more 
straight-forward, inclusive, and flexible categories of cognition that pushes the 
voyager towards existential clarity.  
 
In more or less ways, all our three heroes are potentially retransformed into 
experienced, relatively independent, self-aware, and active individuals. Their 
respective homecomings symbolise not only a mode of physical, silent “re-entry into 
the world of routine”, but also a subtle manifestation of personal growth that occurs 
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on the level(s) of conscience (Smelser, 2009, p. 206-207). Triton, in his war against 
the Poseidon-clan, returns to discover where he truly belonged, as he determines 
himself to preserve the cultural legacy of the Tritons; Sebastian's home-coming is 
manifested via the three-fold renewal of his identity as (1) a friend to Belle, (2) son to 
Isabel, and (3) part of the indigenous Romani-clan, as he recognises the essential 
significance of friendships, the courage to sacrifice, and the power of being hopeful. 
With Heidi, however, the paradigm of Smelser’s (2009) odyssey partially distorts to 
encapsulate her journey towards nature- the wilderness- as a neat and subtle example 
of a reverential, geopietic symbiosis with nature (Tuan, 1976). 
 
An interesting line of difference between the three journeys, here, is the fact that where 
Triton and Sebastian’s journeys covers both the physical and spiritual factors of 
Smelser’s (2009) odyssey-model, Heidi’s inward odyssey exclusively concentrates on 
the spiritual or emotional dimensions of the highlighted latter-model. However, this 
should not lead us to conclude that Heidi’s odyssey experience has been of a limited 
or minimal value to the protagonist (Heidi). Surprisingly, Heidi’s odyssey experience, 
unlike Triton’s or Sebastian’s, holds more emotional value as it becomes one of the 
strongest examples of the self-transformation phenomenon amongst the three 
animations analysed herein. Heidi’s spiritual relationship with nature is an enigmatic 
evidence of the transformative potentials of the odyssey experience, as the anime 
revisits and registers Miyazaki’s vision of “nature” 
 
as an image of sublime transcendence of the ‘civil’, and 
as an image of the harmony that would prevail in the 
absence of a civilized zeal to transcend a more animal 
state of being (Soper, 1995, p. 79). 
 
After having ‘read’ and analysed these three individual journeys, we can validate the 
odyssey experience as a pathway to uncover the hidden or lost elements of one’s self-
identity, alike the protagonists. It allows the audiences to translate the heroes’ journeys 
into opportunities for themselves to seek inspiration for a more personal, moral growth 
to occur within, as they look out onto the heroes’ venturing out to unknown places, 
reshaping their journeys to their advantage. Their odysseys become a symbol 
that “signifies that destiny has summoned the hero and transferred his spiritual centre 
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of gravity from within the pale of his society to a zone unknown” (Campbell, 1968, p. 
58). 
 
Speaking within the latter-context, involving the role of ‘destiny’, we may discover 
that destiny plays a stimulative function and adds an extra dimension to our heroes’ 
odyssey experiences. In a way, Campbell’s (1968) take on ‘destiny’ offers the viewers 
an understanding of destiny’s imperative role in introducing the heroes to the 
possibility of “growing-up” (Belle & Sebastian, 2014e) by moving beyond comfort 
zones and explore not only unknown places, but also unidentified, hidden aspects 
about one’s sense of identity (Morgan, 2010). This concept helps us perceive Heidi’s 
imposed journey to Frankfurt, and subsequent transformation, as, initially, a result of 
Aunt Dete’s prospects of working as a maidservant in an upper-class household in 
Frankfurt, to join which she had left Heidi under the care of Alm-Onji at the first place 
(in “To the Alm Mountain”); or Triton’s return to the sea, for example, would not have 
been possible had Ruka not been there in the narrative to disclose his history to Triton. 
All these instances help us appreciate the role and function that destiny entails in the 
hero’s journey and how it reshapes the ‘present’ and ‘future’ of the hero concerned. 
 
Additionally, the role of destiny stimulates the introduction of the functional ‘Other’ 
and its sense of ‘Otherness’ that facilitates the protagonists’ phase of regeneration and 
renewal (Clifford, 1988; Smelser, 2009). It helps them to recognise and appreciate the 
idea of difference, alongside developing insights about oneself and one’s place in 
society. As Galani-Moutafi (2000) argues, the presence of the ‘Other’ affects personal 
identity and one’s way of looking at the world, and, thereby, the sense of ‘Otherness’ 
comes out as a crucial component of the ‘Other’ to enable the hero’s or voyager’s 
recognition of what is different, uncanny, or unique in relation to their encounters with 
the ‘Other’. This could be best explained via Sebastian’s experience at the restaurant 
(in “The Runaway Car”) when one of the waiters shouts out to him: 
 
“This isn’t the kind the place for a kid like you to be in.” 





Sebastian’s encounter with the ‘Other’ extends when the former meets Benedict and 
fails to conform to the rules of sophistication at the dinner-table (in the same episode), 
inside an aristocratic household. This becomes one of the melting points for Sebastian 
as the anime awakens him to the ‘city-mountain’ dichotomy, allowing him to (1) 
internalise Benedict and his family’s mode of ‘othered’ difference and (2) accept and 
understand his cultural position as “the boy from the tiny mountain” (Belle & 
Sebastian, 2013b, 2:40). These encounters with the ‘Other’ help Sebastian discover his 
identity as a mountain boy against a wider socio-cultural panorama built upon 
geographical boundaries. This is precisely where the essence of the odyssey lies: in the 
recognition of the self against the ideological, cultural, socio-political, and moral limits 
of the ‘Other’ (Galani-Moutafi, 2000). 
 
The odyssey experience is a fresh avenue for self-rejuvenation. It allows the 
individuals to transcend the boundaries of the home and enter symbolic territories of 
selfhood and consciousness (Clifford, 1988; Smelser, 2009), returning to a sense of 
what was overlooked or unexplored. The respective animations pursue to achieve a 
somewhat similar outcome by dislocating, and later relocating, its protagonists outside 
their comfort zones and developing a space for existential self-transformations to occur 
(Morgan, 2010; Murray, 2009). Ahead of this, the animations tend to communicate to 
the audiences, inspiring them to visualise these journeys as a framework to identify, 
explore, and appreciate their own identities and that of others (Dietz, 2019; Stock, 
1993). The process of ‘moving across or beyond’ possesses the capacity to bring self-
empowering outcomes for the individual, only if the latter is determined to (1) cross 
the boundary of the ‘home’, one’s sense of comfort, socio-political limitations, and 
sense of fear and anxiety, and (2) plunge into the uncertain possibility of purgation. As 
Mezirow (2000) again re-echoes: 
 
The process of self-empowerment, acquiring greater 
control of one’s life as a liberated learner, is, of course, 
always limited by social, historical, and cultural 





Our protagonists overcome these conditions, in lesser or greater variations, converting 
their transformation-narratives into (1) archetypes of personal growth and 
independence, and (2) rich resources of inspiration and reformation for viewers. We 
learn from their adventures a gamut of thematic subjects- ranging from courage, 
sacrifice, friendship, geopiety, hope, independence, kindness, and love- which are 
gathered solely through their own experiences and, most important, through the 
downfalls and mistakes they make in the middle. Here, we may begin looking at the 
possibility of learning and reforming oneself through one’s mistakes, typically through 
the lens of tragedy, which shall become the locus of our attention in the next chapter, 
highlighting how a tragedy is reconceptualised within the framework of a Japanese 
animation to facilitate the representation of its protagonist’s morally-transgressive 
behaviour, and subsequent downfall, as a potential source for self-transformative 
learning. Coming back to our present argument, however, is the belief in the power of 
‘learning through mistakes’ which the odyssey also entails, encouraging the individual 




Chapter II  
 
Eroded Moralities: The Sins of Nobita, the Animated Tragic 
 
Not Funny, it’s Tragic! 
 
Robert Coles (1987) observed that children “summon language in the interests of 
retrospective reflection” (p. 3). It is here that Brownell (2021) emphasised the 
socialising significance of children’s “play as representative of children’s perception 
of the world and. . . as an invitation for others. . . to be a part of their world-making” 
(para. 4). In children’s participation in symbolic play, they are frequently exposed to 
deploy, appreciate, and perceive the vividness of language to be able to (1) express 
their individual anxieties about their social perceptions and (2) comprehend what Eden 
(2005) addresses as a narrative’s “psychagogic power” (p. 47). This type of power is 
treated- in psychology- as the capacity of art to elicit an appropriate balance of socio-
moral ethics about self-behaviour. Informed by this context, we may analyse how 
Doraemon (1979-2005) transforms the aesthetic, structural vocabulary of the 
Greek/Aristotelian tradition of ‘tragedy’ to (1) re-position its protagonist, Nobita Nobi, 
as the animated embodiment of the tragic-hero and (2) his morally-transgressive 
indulgence (in) and cultivation of the polysemic, once theology-entrenched, concept 
of ‘Seven Deadly Sins’ as examples of tragic hamartia. This tangible framework 
allows child-viewers to reassess themselves, socially and morally, after being 
subjected to Nobita’s tragic downfall due to his ethical blindness caused by his 
personal sense of hamartia. We pursue this to anticipate the potentials of animation in 
communicating wholesome values about morality, which further helps us defend our 
thesis about the possibilities of children’s socialisation through animations in 
particular and mass media in general. 
 
It should be noted that the plot(s) of Doraemon are unlike the plots we have so far 
analysed. They are non-episodic and each episode can survive separately as an 
autonomous, distinct unit. Nonetheless, the over-arching plot of Doraemon is based 
upon a tale of friendship/kinship that develops between Nobita and Doraemon, the 
latter being a 22nd century robotic cat that had been sent back into the past- by Nobita’s 
grandson, Sewashi- to help and reshape Nobita’s purportedly failing future. This 
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background offers us an overview of Doraemon’s primary tale that would help 
reposition our arguments about the anime’s framework as an Aristotelian tragedy. 
However, before we begin discussing further, it is imperative to acknowledge the 
concepts of ‘tragedy’ and the ‘Seven Deadly Sins’ as plausible products of “particular 
historical, social, and cultural contingencies” (Silverstone, 2007, p. 278) that have been 
constantly reshaped and adapted over centuries (Brown, 2007). Here, one may notice, 
for instance, the systematic and gradual hermeneutic philosophical transition of the 
traditional meanings of the seven sins from being religion-centred to ego-centred. This 
is sarcastically reiterated by Frank (2001), when she writes: 
 
. . . we no longer struggle to fight our natural tendency 
to commit these sins. Instead, we have chosen not only 
to accept them, but also to embrace them and even to 
use them to our advantage (p. 96). 
 
Frank’s (2001) argument helps testify the contemporary re-conceptualisation of 
historical culture (Silverstone, 2007). It refines our understandings of how these 
cultural artifacts (1) have been re-analysed and re-structured (2) to broaden the 
spectrum of human thought and life (Rorty, 1992). Undeniably, this has led to their 
recurrent deployment and dissemination in other literary and cultural discourses, like 
feminism (Wohl, 2005), decolonization and race (Reiss, 2005), and animation, as we 
shall discuss in this chapter. 
 
In this regard, Sourvinou-Inwood (2005) makes an interesting counterargument where 
she locates Greek tragedies at the centre of ritualistic practice and religious 
exploration, instead of treating them in terms of theatre, entertainment, or philosophy. 
She posits that the concept of a ‘tragedy’ was intrinsic to sixth-century Athens, where 
it was perceived as a culturally shaped artform that sought to accentuate and resolve 
the religious predicaments and anxieties of the then-modern polis. This perception, 
eventually, encourages her to debunk any prospects of ‘understanding the tragedy’ as 
a “literary genre”- but more as ritual- as nothing, but a “methodologically flawed 
procedure” (p. 10) that clouds scholars’ understandings of the socio-cultural realities 






The former argument- as much as it broadens our cultural appreciation of tragedy- 
could be, nonetheless, considered a critical limitation to how many may would like to 
‘understand’ tragedy as an artform that possesses self-revelatory attributes 
(Silverstone, 2007) and as an agent of moral and social reformation (Eden, 2005). 
Adding onto this, Wymer (2007) insightfully once remarked that “Greek tragedy 
enacts the paradoxical relationship between Being and Becoming” (p. 262).  
 
The interplay of ‘Being’ and ‘Becoming’, quite notoriously, has occupied the centre-
stage in the audiences’ understandings of tragedy as a gateway to moral awakening, 
something that, further, constitutes the psychology of Aristotelian tragedy (Rorty, 
1992). Within the vortex of a gamut of structural “‘zooming devices’” that help 
stimulate the audiences’ identification with the on-stage characters (Sourvinou-
Inwood, 2005, p. 9), tragedy encourages its subjects to move beyond the ‘Ego’, and 
into the ‘Self’. Some scholars address this phenomenon either (1) as “reflective 
identification” (Rorty, 1992, p. 13), as (2) “education of the emotions” (Lear, 1992, p. 
318), or (3) as what Hennegan (2007) meditatively defines the tragic recognition as 
“‘suffering into wisdom’” (p. 212). The latter-most argument is, indeed, a curious way 
to associate tragedy with its moral functions. It helps and encourages the audiences to 
understand a character’s suffering(s) as a cause-and-effect phenomenon, enabling 
them to retrospectively identify with the ‘sufferer’ and the sufferer’s moral 
waywardness as a lesson not to repeat in their private lives (Eden, 2005). 
 
The audiences’ identification with the suffering-character becomes plausible due to 
certain ethical affinities that Silverstone (2007) perceives between the tragic “subject 
and the other, an other which is partly self-same” (p. 281). Aristotle, in his Poetics, 
and a full range of scholars and philosophers often argue that the emotions of ‘pity and 
fear’ are inter-linked, and that we usually pity the unfortunate, while fear for ourselves, 
precisely, by virtue of those subjects that “remind us. . . of our own fallibility” and 
“blemishes of character” (Sherman, 1992, p. 182, 191; Eden, 2005; Lear, 1992). 
Typically, audience-identification is achieved by means of a few ‘zooming devices’ 
(Rorty, 1992) that not only serve as causal links within the plot, but also nourish the 
audiences’ capacities to understand the relationship between human action and 
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character (Eden, 2005; Sherman, 1992). These devices are designed in a way that (1) 
criticise wicked human action and (2) defines the latter within the paradigms of what 
Nussbaum (1992) labels as an "eroded character" (p. 284). Eden (2005) succinctly 
repeats this point by mentioning that “our decisions. . . are what they are because of 
our characters and thoughts; and our actions are what they are because of our 
decisions” (p. 45). 
 
One of the key devices for this purpose has been ‘hamartia’ that is frequently cited as 
one of the major highlights of a tragedy in the Aristotelian traditions. Sherman (1992) 
speaks about the principle of hamartia as “the causal [and logical] link that moves the 
protagonist from ignorance to recognition. . . [and] is the mechanism that initiates the 
movements of reversal and recognition” (p. 181). Hamartia is often treated as the 
‘seed’ of any tragedy that determines not only the tragic subject’s entry into the realms 
of disaster or misfortune, but also how this entrance stipulates recognition or a sense 
of moral awakening in the subject (Silverstone, 2007; Rorty, 1992). Normally, the role 
of hamartia is deemed irrevocable and is purported to reveal certain discrepancies 
about human character that further determine the nature of the tragic action a subject 
indulges in (Sherman, 1992). This is where the subject encounters two other co-related 
devices that slides a tragedy down to the final closure, as Eden (2005) reminds us of 
their inherent importance within the aesthetics of tragedy, with respect to their function 
in moral katharsis. Within this context, we can reflect over the features of ‘anagnōrisis’ 
(recognition) and ‘peripeteia’ (reversal) as the two defining aspects of a complex 
tragedy. They collectively (1) stimulate the tragic subject to move beyond the Ego- 
and into the Self- awakening them to the messy plethora of moral deflections their 
hamartia led them to (Rorty, 1992) and (2) moves the audiences to attain a ‘katharsis 
of emotions’- an intellectual cleansing within the Self, a drifting away from the Ego 
(Lear, 1992). 
 
Because anagnōrisis and peripeteia arrive swiftly and unexpectedly, the culmination 
of a tragedy (or tragic action) intersects with the audiences’ emotions that stir up to 
wonder and awe. Here, Eden (2005) offers us a comfortable conclusion by mentioning 
that one’s sense of “wonder, in turn, provokes the desire to understand. . . and both 
wondering and understanding cause pleasure” (p. 48). Ultimately, it is in “pleasure” 
that moral katharsis lingers (Golden, 1975, p. 48). Etymologically, there has always 
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been much critical dispute about the interpretation of the term (katharsis), particularly 
with respect to what Aristotle meant by this polysemic phrase (Lear, 1992). However, 
most generally, katharsis is identified to imply four “principal” meanings: 
 
(1) as a form of medical purgation in which the 
pathological elements of pity and fear are purged from 
the spectator; (2) as a form of moral purification in 
which the spectator achieves the proper mean between 
excess and deficiency in experiencing pity and fear; (3) 
as a structural process by which the tragic deed of the 
hero is. . . purified of its moral pollution; and (4) as the 
process of intellectual clarification by which the 
spectator comes to understand. . . the nature of the 
particular pitiable and fearful events that have been 
depicted (Golden, 1975, p. 48). 
 
It is interesting to note that if we speak from a moral perspective (which is also quite 
the foundational framework for this chapter to understand Doraemon), katharsis could 
be addressed as a connotative combination of Golden’s (1975) second and fourth 
clause to imply a process of retrospective self-retribution. Even though Sherman 
(1992) mentions retribution in terms of the character’s self, katharsis can invite the 
audiences’ sympathetic participation in the character’s moments of retribution through 
what Rorty (1992) had termed as “reflective identification” (p. 13). This involves not 
only understanding the character’s pain, but also educating one’s mind to not repeat 
the same errors as the tragic subject, else we may end up being in a similar situation 
as the subject. These concepts, indeed, help us understand Doraemon as a tragic 
narrative of an equally-tragic character whose shortcomings could remind young 
viewers of their own flawed selves, and whose indulgence in morally-transgressive 
actions- and subsequent downfall- becomes an interesting socialising framework to 
learn from Nobita’s errors and strive not to repeat them in our personal lives and 
imaginations. Such an understanding, subsequently, renders the framework of 
‘tragedy’ beneficial by internalising the moral outcome through the cognitive 
processes of “habituation” and positive repetition: 
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The central task of an ethical education is to train youths 
to take pleasure and pain at the right sort of objects: to 
feel pleasure in acting nobly and pain at the prospect of 
acting ignobly. This is accomplished by a process of 
habituation: by repeatedly encouraging youths to 
perform noble acts they come to take pleasure in (Lear, 
1992, p. 318). 
 
The principle of katharsis is grounded deep within the Self, where pity and fear 
transform into feelings of self-acknowledgment- bereft of self-obsession- increasing 
our abilities to understand human emotions (Eden, 2005), as tragedy opens to us the 
possibilities of recognising ourselves. In a way, tragedy could be considered to possess 
the same social and moral functions as an odyssey (Smelser, 2009). However, where, 
in an odyssey, ‘one’s own experiences’ tend to play an integral role, within a tragedy, 
we primarily focus and learn from ‘others’ experiences’. This encourages us to 
perceive tragedy more as a representation of a slice-of-life (Roberts, 1992). Wohl 
(2005) reiterates this sentiment by proposing an analogical relationship between 
“tragedy” and “life”, treating the two ideas as “semi-autonomous but mutually 
informing symbolic systems; tragedy incorporates and speaks to the lived experience 
of its [audience] without simply mirroring it” (p. 149). 
 
It is because tragedy speaks to us, to our shadowed selves, that we recognise the social 
benefits of tragedy- in its capacities to remind us of our inherent humanities and alter 
our biased perspectives about the world, others, but most important, ourselves; to 
attune us and refine our perceptions about emotions; and clarify our misconceptions 
about subjects, if we have any (Nussbaum; 1992; Rorty, 1992). However, tragedy’s 
emphasis upon individual error or private empathy, unsurprisingly, has been a subject 
of critical scrutiny and debate. Here, for example, Curran (2001) defends Bertolt 
Brecht’s ideas of epic-theatre as an attack on the Aristotelian tradition of tragedy which 
is philosophical by nature and focusses more on character, rather than projecting “the 





The 20th century epic-theatre is a more contemporary artform that, essentially, relies 
upon social contexts, and instead of concentrating upon individual error, strives to 
probe into the social circumstances that instigated any tragedy. The epic-theatre 
pursues this to imply that ‘tragedy’ is not caused due to an ‘eroded character’ 
(Nussbaum, 1992), but due to certain faults within the socio-political systems in which 
a character exists (Curran, 2001). It is here that Aristotelian tragedy fails to be read as 
a social critique, precisely due to its focus on the individual- and not on any socio-
political system that may operate outside the drama- rendering the epic-theatre more 
effective to capture collective social sentiments of a particular socio-cultural space. 
However, this does not imply that Aristotelian tragedy cannot be deemed any less 
effective or assertive. Contrarily, this form of tragedy has enabled us to read Doraemon 
critically as a narrative of tragic individual error or transgression, for Nobita’s tragedy 
is a result of hamartia and an evidence of an eroded character. To understand a tragedy 
of an ‘eroded character’ (Nussbaum, 1992), we find Aristotle’s ideas on drama, 
therefore, more applicable and helpful than Brecht’s critical thoughts on politicised 
drama (Curran, 2001), especially under the contextual reference to Doraemon.  
 
Re-mapping the Deadly Seven 
 
Nobita’s tragedy is informed by his transgressive or excessive indulgence in the five 
“sins of the spirit” (Frank, 2001, p. 96) that (1) constitute a part of the theologically 
informed Christian concept of the ‘Seven Deadly Sins’ and (2) make up for most of 
his hamartia. The concept of the seven deadly sins offers Doraemon its central subject-
matter for Nobita’s sense of moral deflection. It renews our understanding of a once 
‘strictly-Christian’ notion and provide a transitional re-stylisation of the sins by means 
of perceiving them not as acts against religion, but against modern humanity or social 
communities. This transitional shift becomes possible due to the ‘fluidity’ of such 
philosophical concepts, with their meanings being invariably subjected to negotiations 
 
within a cultural context as [they] change through time. 
. . [and] given constantly new shape and new definition 
by the cultural uses to which [they are] put by the 
members of a society who find that concept a living, that 
is communicating, idea (Newhauser, 2007, p. 2). 
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Most certainly, this implies that concepts are susceptible to interpretative alterations, 
and that their meanings (1) rely upon the existing historical culture's ideological 
vocabulary and (2) the ways in which its members decide on employing the prescribed 
meanings between and within their social contexts. Within these scenarios, if we look 
at the sin of ‘pride’ as an example, there has been a drastic transitional shift, one may 
notice, between the meaning and severity of committing pride. As a theological entity, 
one may view pride either as “the sin of rebellion against legitimate political authority” 
or as a “temptation... to ignore the common good” in favour of self-indulgence 
(Newhauser, 2007, p. 10). However, in contemporary times, pride is often connotative 
of a type of “self-love” that is “of absolute necessity” (Frank, 2001, p. 98) and is 
paradoxically deemed a positive habit/tendency to cultivate. 
 
Indeed, the concept of the seven deadly sins has been re-developed to reiterate not only 
the ethical values and tastes of a contemporary audience/public, but also its socio-
political environment within which they (the public) continually tend to exist. Tickle 
(2004) extends this point by asserting that “as an abstraction, sin. . . almost always 
requires an image to serve as its vehicle if it is to be entered into human conversation” 
(p. 30). Here, one may notice how Doraemon utilises Nobita’s hamartia as a 
springboard for the reaffirmation of socio-moral values and it achieves that by 
positioning Nobita within Tickle’s (2004) implications for the abstract, the very 
‘vehicle’ of disorder. It is through Nobita’s moral transgressions that we learn about 
the realities of exceeding the limits of morality and underlining moral boundaries for 
the Self. Nobita’s tragedy evolves into the canvas for self-regulation, self-critique, and 
self-awareness, which becomes the purpose of both Greek tragedy and Doraemon 
(Eden, 2005; Rorty, 1992; Silverstone, 2007). Supporting this argument, Jenks (2013), 
furthermore, expands on the idea of ‘transgression’. He defines a transgression as an 
anti-thesis to a ‘rule’, a form of “impulse to disobey”, which reverses and “prevents 
stagnation by breaking. . . [and] reaffirming the rule. Transgression is not the same as 
disorder; it reminds us of the necessity of order” (p. 21). 
 
The concept of transgression is extended by Dahl et al. (2014) who recognise three 
basic forms of child transgressions that are often typical to children’s phases of 
socialisation: “moral (harming others), prudential (harming oneself), and pragmatic 
(creating inconvenience) transgressions” (p. 651). Extensive research has been 
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conducted on children’s reactions to transgressive behaviours which supports the 
possibility of young viewers to react to, and learn [from], Nobita’s tragedy in more 
prosocial directions. Many qualitative studies have discovered that in comparison to 
3-or-4-year-olds, 8-to-12-year-old children tend to experience more intense 
‘negatively valenced moral emotions’ at the prospect of having indulged in a moral 
transgression, for they possess more sharply defined “facets of perspective-taking and 
self-regulation” (Malti et al., 2016, p. 373). By “negatively valenced moral emotions”, 
Malti et al. (2016) imply a set of “self-evaluative emotions in moral contexts [that] 
reflect an internalized understanding of moral rule validity and a willingness to assume 
responsibility for real or imagined wrongdoing” (p. 373). Cognitively, these emotions 
support children’s interpretation of the meaning and severity of a committed 
transgression, as they encourage children to take on others’ perspectives to perceive 
their actions as self-damaging or upsetting to others (Dahl & Kim, 2014; Yucel et al., 
2020). Researchers report that children understand the moral-norm dynamics and tend 
to abide, and act, by them in social and private settings, which increases by age (Nucci 
& Nucci, 1982) and highly depends on their cognitive and emotional development. 
 
These studies support our points about children’s understandings of tragedy and 
notions of unethical sins, and this is where Doraemon becomes a riveting link to 
discuss the significance of tragic narratives for children’s socialisation. Tragic 
narratives, as Coles (1987) has argued, in a way, cultivate 
 
a true measure of one’s alert responsiveness to this 
world, one’s growing mental acuity. . . [about] what 
might happen as well as what is- the tragedies that 
ultimately stalk all of us. . . as children surely do know, 
and keep telling themselves (p. 6). 
 
Doraemon is situated at the nexus of intersectionality that allows children the 
landscape to internalise the counter-effects of the five unethical sins that Nobita 
indulges in, thereby, enabling us to ‘read’ it as an animated manifestation of an 
Aristotelian tragedy. For our analysis, we focus on the five “sins of the spirit” (namely, 
pride, envy, wrath, sloth, and greed) as classified by Gregory I (cited in Frank, 2001, 
p. 96), while the other two sins (which Gregory I addressed as the ‘sins of the flesh’) 
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have not been considered. The sins of lust and gluttony are not central to the animation; 
even though the animation does project the latter-two in other representations, they are 
never centralised as agents of hamartia and, therefore, have been omitted from this 
discussion. The five ‘sins of the spirit’ are not only frequently repeated within the 
narrative, but also help us understand the multifaceted character of Nobita in diverse 
ways. On this note, we shall now turn to analyse the role of ‘sloth’ in Nobita’s tragic 
adventures to set forth our reading of Doraemon as a tragedy. 
 
Discussion1: Nobita’s Fives 
 
I. It’s all due to ‘Sloth’! 
 
As predominantly as it occupies the central character of Nobita, ‘Sloth’ (‘acedia’ in 
Latin) has equally remained a subject of misinterpretation and polysemy. As John 
Casey (2000) has summarized, it “has [naturally] passed, via seventeenth and 
eighteenth century ideas of melancholy, through Romanticism, to Symbolisme to 
become [a modern] allegory of the human condition” (p. 83). It implies that the history 
of sloth has been of contextual variation, which is where McMartin (2013) brings to 
us the medieval interpretation of sloth that differentiates the latter with the capital sin 
of acedia (p. 266). From a biblical viewpoint, the vice of ‘sloth’ and ‘acedia’ were 
inter-related, but not inter-changeably used: where the latter implied a “spiritual 
condition” emerging from an escapist disinclination from religious charity (McMartin, 
2013, p. 267); the former, as a form of acedia, was connected to more ‘physical’ 
manifestations of inactivity, including laziness, sleepiness, and languor (Kallendorf, 
2013). This can lead us to believe that sloth, as a moral transgression, is 
 
. . . a foolish, vile, infamous, and barbaric enemy which 
flees from work and must be fought. . . it is a base 
weakness or brutish negligence which must be 
overcome or left behind. It is a waste of time, a frivolous 
distraction. . . it delays both departures and arrivals and 
generally detains progress. . . it destroys people’s good 
 
1 Due to unavailability of the English version of the animation, the Hindi-dubbed versions were 
incorporated into the discussion and elsewhere and have been self-translated wherever required to the 
best of the author’s abilities. 
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intentions and reinforces their bad habits (Kallendorf, 
2013, p. 98). 
 
Adding to this body of conceptual knowledge is the common perspective that sloth is 
connected to ideas of ‘melancholy’ or ‘passive sadness’. This argument, further, 
stimulates the re-conceptualisation of sloth as an emotional state of mind (Casey, 
2000), which is linked with general hopelessness (Wasserstein, 2005). This point 
succinctly inter-relates to Casey’s (2000) argument that speaks of sloth “as a sort of 
constitutive despair. . . a characteristic. . . not only of civilization but of a culture that 
values and creates inwardness” (p. 88). The contemporary socio-cultural status of sloth 
as a ‘human condition’ performs a double-edged function: it reflects over the tendency 
of humanity to become self-contained and introverted by nature, which, in turn, has 
been the by-product of modernity symptomised by emotional unavailability, self-
indulgence, and indifference. This explains the centrality of sloth in the character of 
Nobita, and how sloth manifests itself as a major catalyst for the protagonist’s 
indulgence in the other four sins (like greed, anger, and pride) that are also indirectly 
inter-linked with Nobita’s indolence or lack of interest in self-reformation and self-
regulation (Rorty, 1992). However, we often fail to acknowledge the root of this 
intoxicating form of sloth that poisons the possibility of personal growth for Nobita, 
rendering him either angry or envious of qualities he ‘longs’ to possess.  
 
Informed by Casey’s (2000) recent-argument, Doraemon situates Nobita at the centre 
of social hopelessness and builds upon Nobita’s recurring tragedies as the outcome of 
‘a loss of hope’. The animation frequently represents its protagonist as a disillusioned 
member of society whose academic failures, casual disinterest (or clumsiness) in 
sports/outdoor activities, sad experiences (typically bullying) with Gian and Suneo, 
and feelings of worthlessness contribute to his general social hopelessness about 
human potential (Wasserstein, 2005), as he begins to ruminate the pointlessness of 
self-change. This is not to imply that social conditions serve as the only pre-requisite 
for Nobita’s sloth within the narrative. However, even though, they predominantly 
function as the inception of Nobita’s indulgence in sloth, the latter is chiefly worsened 
by Nobita’s callous ignorance and (ab)use of Doraemon’s technology that enables us 
to read sloth as a definitive feature of Nobita’s “eroded character” (Nussbaum, 1992, 
p. 284), rather than as a socio-cultural discrepancy (Curran, 2001). 
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For instance, in an episode, featuring a gadget called the ‘Human-Magnet Belt’, 
Nobita’s requirement for the belt is precipitated by his (1) knowledge of the fact about 
his weak soccer-playing abilities and (2) subsequent fear of Gian’s acrimony. Here, 
the audience may be able to sympathise with Nobita and support his decision to use 
the belt (as the name suggests, it can attract anything towards Nobita) for his 
advantage. However, the situation overturns when Nobita begins using the belt for the 
most trivial of purposes (like fetching a bowl of snacks or a comic book from the 
bookshelf). This is something that Doraemon consciously pursues to reflect/mirror 
Nobita’s sloth, as Doraemon warns him somewhere in between: 
  
“नोबिता, आलस के बलए इस गजैेट का इस्तमाल मत करो।” 
translated as: 
“Nobita, don’t use this gadget to serve your laziness!” 
(PureToons, 2019a, 09:27) 
 
Additionally, Nobita’s sloth is further associated with excessive sleepiness that 
contributes to another half of his tragic adventures. Here, McMartin’s (2013) account 
of “sleeplessness and excessive sleep” (p. 256) helps us locate Nobita within the 
context of our analysis of sloth. According to McMartin (2013), both these 
manifestations of sleep represent sloth: where sleeplessness could be associated with 
“workaholism”, excessive sleepiness may be linked with “laziness” (p. 268), however, 
both denote a sense of escapism from individual responsibility. Nobita’s sloth falls 
within the latter category, as is reiterated in an episode when Nobita uses a gadget 
called ‘Fairy House’ (PureToons, 2019b) to complete/fix certain tasks by the help of 
fairies who finish that task while Nobita is asleep. Unfortunately, Nobita preoccupies 
himself in finishing others’ tasks- thereby taking several micro naps throughout the 
evening- and completely forgets that the initial intention of having brought out this 
gadget was to let the fairies finish his homework, but to no avail. 
 
Quite comfortably, Doraemon allows peripeteia and anagnōrisis to enter the narrative 
and awaken Nobita to the repercussions of having indulged in unnecessary, self-
destructive sloth, as our tragic-hero (1) unconsciously maximises the magnetic power 
of the belt- thereby, stimulating a range of objects to cluster around him in an 
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uncomfortable position- or (2) ends up completing his homework by himself after 
having failed to eventually sleep at night (rendering the gadget ineffectual). The 
animation, therefore, manages to inform the viewers about the two most-common 
symptoms of contemporary sloth: laziness and excessive sleep (Wasserstein, 2005). 
Where the first instance reflects on laziness as a symbol of “stagnation and decay” 
(Kallendorf, 2013, p. 98), the second focusses on excessive sleep as “a means of 
distraction or escape” (McMartin, 2013, p. 271), but both collectively reflect and affect 
Nobita’s character, his decisions, and, subsequently, his actions (Eden, 2005). Using 
Nobita’s sloth as a springboard for his character-discrepancies, Doraemon stresses 
over the katharsis reinforced through Nobita’s tragedy resulting from unwanted, 
undesirable, and unnecessary forms of indolence. It apprises and reminds viewers of 
sloth as a habit that survives best in active avoidance and ethical/ideological distance. 
 
II. Work hard, swallow that ‘Greed’ 
 
As we remember, Newhauser (2007) had offered us a comprehensive understanding 
of the pliability of a ‘concept’, in the sense that any concept is (1) susceptible to 
ideological or contextual change which (2) mostly depends upon the social, cultural, 
and political inclinations of any society within which that concept exists as a “living 
idea” (p. 2). Naturally, the vocabulary of the ‘concept’, then, assimilates a broader 
range of interpretations within its conceptual reach to produce a more inclusive 
understanding about the subject. Like ‘sloth’, ‘greed’ has also been reconceptualised 
according to the contemporary needs of peoples to encapsulate- within its 
interpretative reach- a wider gamut of meanings and purposes (Seuntjens et al., 2015). 
Therefore, we may begin perceiving greed not only in negative terms of ‘self-
indulgence’ or ‘self-satisfaction’, but also under a surprising, beneficial light. 
 
In the corporate world, for example, greed is often upheld as a positive emotion, 
stimulating the rise of industries and economic prosperity (Melleuish, 2009); whereas 
many others understand greed as an evolutionary trait- endemic to humanity- that 
propels their welfare and social preservation (Cassill & Watkins, 2005; Robertson, 
2001). However, diverse as the interpretations may be, the core value of greed rests 
upon its cultural position as a sin of ‘excess’ (Suentjens et al., 2015; Tickle, 2004) 
which serves as its causal connection to the other two sins of lust and gluttony. The 
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latter-two are intricate manifestations of greed and connote to feelings of insatiable 
desire related to the body (Blackburn, 2004; Miller, 1997) and, therefore, have been 
tunnelled as ‘sins of the flesh’ or as what Epstein (2003) addresses them as “bodily 
sins” (p. 31). Greed, on the other hand, is a slightly ‘bigger’ emotion that is more 
related to the mind (Frank, 2001), affecting the mental faculties of thought and 
judgement. Denotative of ‘excess’, greed (1) has been rightly defined by Suentjens et 
al. (2015) as “the experience of desiring to acquire more and the dissatisfaction of 
never having enough”, and (2) is frequently linked with “materialism and feelings of 
envy. . . [leading] to self-interested behaviour and tunnel vision” (p. 518). 
 
It is a similar desire to have ‘more’ than required that tends to affect Nobita’s psyche 
and influence his indulgence in greed that is predominantly directed towards attaining 
a ‘sense of power’, which is, in turn, partly inspired by his own dissatisfaction at 
himself. As a character, Nobita is stricken with under-confidence that often becomes 
responsible for his greed for control that he could exercise over others like his 
intimidating peer, Gian Takeshi. Across narratives, Nobita is represented as ‘wanting’ 
to be like Gian- powerful, dominating, and intimidating- and it is this unhealthy desire 
for superficial values that determines his actions, driving Nobita’s character to its 
tragedy (Eden, 2005). Here, Nobita’s (mis)adventures with the “Ten Commandments 
Slate” can become a suitable example to explore the animation’s treatment of greed as 
tragic hamartia, and how hamartia (greed, in this context) becomes not a play of 
destiny, but a matter of conscious choice and “agency” (Sherman, 1992, p. 178). 
Nobita chooses to (ab)use the gadget to exercise control over the lives of others, as he 
not only allows greed to devour his moral sensibilities, but also mocks the significance 
of the original purpose of the ten commandments. It should be noted that even though 
the concept of the ten commandments is not central to this chapter, a brief account of 
its symbolism in modern philosophy may help us peruse Doraemon’s 
conceptualisation of greed. David Hazony’s (2010) intersection of modernity, classical 
philosophy, and the ten commandments serves as a testament to the self-renewing 
properties of the commandments. He speaks of the latter as a representation of “a 
whole attitude to life, one that recognises both the weaknesses and the unfathomable 




Nobita fails to realise that and, subsequently, commits a dual sin. Nobita’s initial 
purpose of using the gadget was to punish his mother for having introduced a set of 
domestic rules that Nobita was meant to follow, failing to abide by any would result 
in a penalty from Nobita’s pocket-money. The gadget reversed that rule implemented 
by his mother and, as a result, his mother was electrocuted- not lethally- for having 
threatened Nobita of a penalty when the latter breaks a rule. Hazony (2010) mentions 
that the fifth commandment was to “honor your father and your mother” (p. xiv), and 
it is here that Nobita’s intention to punish his mother appears more like sacrilege, 
particularly from the perspective of moral ethics (Dahl & Kim, 2014). In his mother 
being hurt by lightning (the gadget stimulates a lightning bolt to be directed at someone 
who breaks what has been written on the commandment-slate), Nobita subverts the 
original commandment, which is what later becomes his karma, as Nobita’s tenth 
commandment becomes: 
 
“कोई भी, कभी भी, फालतू रूल्स नही िना सकता।” 
translated as: 
“No body, never, can make any stupid rules!”  
(PureToons, 2019c, 21:59) 
 
The tenth commandment reverses (peripeteia) and ravages Nobita’s exercise of 
power/control; the lightning bolt awakens him (anagnōrisis) to the understanding of 
what he had committed in his maddening quest for power. The lightning bolt becomes 
a signifier of karma, as it not only avenges Nobita for his mother’s dishonour (Hazony, 
2010), but also for his moral blindness in the face of greed (Tickle, 2004). This episode 
on greed, certainly, becomes a pivotal block of recognition and appreciation. It focuses 
on the interplay of ‘action’ and ‘repercussion’, rendering Sherman’s (1992) argument 
effective and true about the nature of tragic hamartia. Hazony (2010) had mentioned 
that the ten commandments represent an “ignored or forgotten” (p. 7) ideal. The 
current episode strives to re-capture and re-instate that ideal by (1) fictionalising 
Nobita’s commandments as values epitomising naivety, ignorance, and unwanted 
desire (Suentjens et al., 2015) and (2) reiterating a public interest in moral ethics, 
encouraging critical thinking about ‘greed’ as both a moral transgression and a moral 
highlight, depending on the individual and their contextual needs (Tickle, 2004).  
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III. Blind, who? Ah, Anger!  
 
With respect to the sin of ‘anger’, a range of contextual perspectives arrest the 
contemporary imagination. Where some perceive anger as a source of creativity 
(Marcus, 1978, p. 94), some visualise the trait in terms of righteousness/justice 
(Barreca, 1995), whereas the remaining view it as a notoriously self-ravaging habit 
(Gordon, 1993). Here, Thurman’s (2005) reflection on anger provides us with an 
interesting account of anger. His account smoothly combines the above-mentioned 
ideas and offers an understanding of anger, its excesses and deficiencies, and their co-
related impact upon the ‘Self’, the ‘Ego’, and others:  
 
Anger is healthy. We need anger to right wrongs, 
overturn social evils, revolt against oppression. Anger is 
only deadly, sinful, or bad when it is unfair, excessive, 
or self-destructive (p. 4). 
 
Thurman’s (2005) statement strengthens our perceptions about the sin of anger, as the 
latter could be variously- distinctively- used within different contexts for a whole range 
of purposes and might serve as a productive source of reformation from both political 
and personal perspectives (Barreca, 1995). However, as it could be expected, 
Doraemon treats anger in the most destructive ways possible, locating Nobita’s anger 
within the spectrum of ‘deadly’ anger (Gordon, 1993, p. 3), as it emerges as one of the 
central sources of Nobita’s tragic misfortune and moral blindness. Anger (alongside 
greed) becomes one of the central moral transgressions in the narrative (Jenks, 2013), 
typically resulting from Nobita’s inability or passive disinterest to self-reform. 
Certainly here, anger reflects the influence of ‘sloth’ upon Nobita’s moral makeup (as 
we briefly discussed above). It is Nobita’s indolence that not only reflects his 
disinterest to reform himself, but also serves as the fountainhead of his angry 
disposition when either his sloth or any other causal action is criticised. As we pointed 
out, sloth becomes another problematic entity across the narrative. It complicates and 
affects the presence of other moral transgressions, rendering the tragedy more sloth-
affected/inspired. However, the animation somehow manages to explain Nobita’s 
tragedy as the causal product of an inter-related system of transgressions, amongst 
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which anger emerges as a “quintessential individual-signature emotion” (Barreca, 
1995, p. 1), alongside greed and sloth. 
 
The anger-led tragedy is often projected as a dangerous enterprise that not only 
damages the Self, but also prompts the subject’s entry into a morally eluded world 
where all senses and perceptive capacities are scarred (Nussbaum, 1992). Gordon 
(1993), here, has re-echoed this sentiment in a creative, but sharp and defined, fashion: 
 
. . . deadly anger actually forgets him, and is caried up 
in the black cloud of its own dominion. The country of 
deadly anger, with its own cultures, its own laws. A 
country ruled by a tyrant so obsessed with the fulfilment 
of his desire that all else is lost (p. 3). 
 
The above-cited lines function as a useful backdrop to not only explore Nobita’s 
indulgence in the sin of anger, but also highlight how anger fractures Nobita’s psyche 
and notions of morality. As Gordon (1993) equates anger to a ‘a country ruled by a 
tyrant’, it becomes necessary to highlight how Nobita’s anger ends up swallowing his 
sense of being, leaving him lost in the vortex of dilemma, inferiority, and an 
unwillingness to reform. It is here that Nobita’s deployment of a gadget called 
‘Opposite Pills’, at one instance, becomes an interesting platform to understand his 
character and how certain anger-led discrepancies in character erode his moral 
perception (Eden, 2005; Rorty, 1992). The pills were designed to make a person dream 
exactly the opposite of what they experience in reality and, naturally, these pills attract 
Nobita, as he frequently suggests displeasure in the way his real life goes on. Nobita’s 
fascination and preference for dreams over reality is punctuated by Doraemon, who 
advises Nobita: 
 
“तुम्ह ेअपनी असली बजिंदगी को भी अच्छा िनाना चाबहए।” 
translated as: 
“You should also improve your real life.” 
 
This is contested by Nobita, who retorts: 
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“मेरी असली बजिंदगी िहतु िेकार ह।ै” 
translated as: 
“My real life sucks!”  
(PureToons, 2019d, 17:54 – 18:00) 
 
Nobita’s preference for dreams reflects his indolence; but, most important, it reminds 
us of the fragility of Nobita’s character. Instead of awakening himself to self-
regulation, Nobita intends to remain as he is. He does not reflect any interest in 
reforming himself, rather he behaves in the tradition of an escapist. This instance 
triggers the occurrence of peripeteia in the middle of the episode, when Nobita’s day 
(in real life) does not go as bad as he had anticipated. Fearing that he would dream of 
nightmares, Nobita searches for trouble in the hope of reversing his future, but to no 
avail. The anagnōrisis is witnessed by Doraemon- and the audience- as Nobita twists 
in agony at the sight of nightmares in his sleep, where the episode concludes. From the 
outside, the episode may appear as ‘un-tragic’, for Nobita’s psychological suffering is 
not vividly presented in terms of extremes but is rather glanced through as a simple 
tale of misfortune. The tragedy might be understood if we, as viewers, collectively 
interpret Nobita’s anger as the causal result of his personal anxieties, disinterest, and 
sloth. At the threshold, anger, then, transforms into a volatile force that appears  
 
like a flaming boulder down a hill, gathering mass and 
speed until any thought of cessation is so far beside the 
point as to seem hopeless. . . but the causes are lost in 
the momentum of the anger itself, and in the insatiable 
compulsion to destroy everything so that the open maw 
of rage may be fed (Gordon, 1993, p. 5). 
 
It is anger that pushes Nobita to consume those pills, to drift away from self-correction 
and self-regulation, and to be, then, subjected to psychological suffering in the shape 
of nightmares. Doraemon, through this episode, displays a mild outcome of anger 
(nightmares), but, beneath those manifestations, it ensures that anger is not exploited 
(Thurman, 2005) and used when critically needed, unlike Nobita’s frequent outbursts 
that are often stimulated by his sense of incompleteness and lack of self-worth. The 
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katharsis, then, depends on the audiences’ imaginations, if they wish to regulate their 
anger and use it for a more compelling cause (Barreca, 1995). 
 
IV. Trapped in meaningless ‘Envy’ 
 
Epstein (2003) reflects over Aristotle and his meditative argument about a form of 
envy that has been considered a manifestation of imitation, and that Aristotle had 
labelled as “good envy, or envy ending in admiration” (p. 26). However, as Frank 
(2001) had suspected, this positivist cognate of envy seems unavailable or beyond the 
cognitive reach of modern humanity but, most essentially, this popular manifestation 
of envy tends to occupy the public imagination, often being spoken about with relation 
to negative phrases like “secret hostility”, “hidden rancor”, “spite”, or “malice” 
(Epstein, 2003, p. 30). Therefore, in more than one way, envy stands as one of the 
‘dirtiest’, if not the ‘deadliest’, sins to be studied in moral philosophy (Frank, 2001). 
As Epstein (2003) mentions, envy emerges as one of the most insatiable forms of 
human desires and, certainly, distant from how Aristotle had spoken about it in terms 
of self-improvement and self-criticism. It seems imperative to highlight that Aristotle’s 
moralistic concept of envy (as cited in Epstein, 2003), indeed, is the rightful way to 
approach this self-destructive trait and deploy it to our social benefits. However, as 
suggested above, this manifestation of envy is not generally entertained by many. 
Doraemon attempts to reiterate the counter-effects of exercising a much ‘negative’ 
form of envy by utilising Nobita’s envious experiences as a conceptual evidence of 
envy as a self-damaging trait (Capps & Haupt, 2011; Frank, 2001). 
 
The character of Nobita is often treated within the narrative as a middle ground for the 
exploration of what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ envy (Epstein, 2003). Nobita, in a 
way, cannot be addressed as an envious character in Epstein’s (2003) terminology, and 
even succumbs to derive any significant inspiration from his emotions of envy at 
others’ qualities he finds lacking in himself in the Aristotelian tradition of imitation 
and self-improvement. To understand Nobita’s indulgence in envy, Ben-Ze'ev’s 
(1990) reflections over the moral differences between ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ could be 




emotional attitude of wishing to have what someone else 
has. . . [while the latter as an] emotional attitude of 
wishing not to lose something (typically, a favorable 
human relationship), which is important for the 
subject’s self-definition, to someone else (p. 489).  
 
Ben-Ze’ev’s (1990) definition paves the way to our understanding of Nobita more as 
a ‘jealous character’ whose tragedy (within the context of this sub-analysis) usually 
stems from romantic jealousy. This form of jealousy is internalised to exclusively 
affect Shizuka Minamoto, as he strives on antagonising everyone who comes closer to 
Shizuka, and who Nobita takes as a possible threat between his and Shizuka’s bond of 
friendship. At one instance, Nobita uses a “Magic Handkerchief” to impress Shizuka 
by his magic tricks, more because he envies Dekisugi and his abilities to perform 
magic: 
 




“. . . but I cannot lose from Dekisugi”  
(PureToons, 2019e, 02:37). 
 
At another instance, Nobita uses a “Nostalgia Trunk”- that allows him to make others 
believe that they are meeting him exactly after the number of years he manually puts 
on the trunk- to ward off an old friend of Shizuka who she had met after four years, 
and, thereby, receive all of Shizuka’s attention: 
 




“Now, Shizuka will forget about her friend and talk to me instead”  




In both contexts, Doraemon re-defines the social positions of Nobita around Shizuka’s 
character and seeks to criticise his longings for the latter’s attention. As a result, the 
anime re-locates our protagonist in uncomfortable, embarrassing situations: instead of 
deploying the handkerchief to impress Shizuka, Nobita accidentally falls inside the 
four-dimensional gadget; and where, at the other episode, he struggles to achieve the 
attention of Shizuka, in a moment of anxiety, he scrolls down to twenty years, pushing 
the locus of his attention (Shizuka) to completely erase her memory of Nobita at the 
end of the narrative. These are, indeed, two pivotal instances of a combined anagnōrisis 
and peripeteia (Rorty, 1992) that awaken Nobita to his moral blindness and cheapening 
at the behest of jealousy (Frank, 2001). Nobita competes against his ‘rivals’ for 
Shizuka’s attention. These actions not only imply his distrust in Shizuka’s friendship, 
but also reiterate his inferiority complexes that often become the sources of his 
indulgence in moral transgressions (Jenks, 2013), as Ben-Ze'ev (1990) reminds us: 
 
Like envy, jealousy also involves competition. . . 
jealousy stems from the desire to be ‘favored’ in some 
respect and the belief- or suspicion, or fear- that one is 
not (p. 493-494). 
 
It is Nobita’s sense of distrust in himself and others that leads him to similar 
predicaments. It is this distrust that (1) adds to his inferiority complex and (2) which 
the animation exploits to communicate the repercussions of his emotional imbalances 
to the audiences, rendering the purpose of deploying a tragic narrative effectual and 
liberating. In Nobita’s indulgence in envy/jealousy, the moral katharsis arrives to 
inform us what Epstein (2003) had succinctly highlighted elsewhere: 
 
Envy clouds thought, clobbers generosity, precludes and 
hope of serenity, and ends in shriveling the heart- 
reasons enough to fight free of it with all one’s mental 
strength (p. 103). 
 
This statement is true to Nobita’s condition, precisely because his jealousy with his 
possible romantic rivals bears him no advantage but plunges him deeper to self-despair 
and pain. Doraemon tends to inform its viewers about the unfortunate outcomes of 
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exercising envy at others’ prospects/qualities/being, rather than becoming inspired 
from these latter aspects, which if Nobita had acted on, he would not have to go 
through all these self-deprecating emotions. Towards the end, the animation implicitly 
recommends the power of self-acceptance and “self-honesty” (Epstein, 2003, p. 103) 
which may act as stark contrasts to ‘envious wanting’. As a matter of choice, envy gets 
‘dangerously’ overshadowed by self-satisfaction and the willingness to improve. 
 
V. Confused to call it ‘Pride’ 
 
Michael E. Dyson (2006) provides us with an interesting paradigm to analyse Nobita’s 
sense of pride that often intersects with his ‘angry’ and ‘greedy’ dispositions. This may 
help us propose that Nobita’s pride is frequently informed by either of the latter-two 
sins within the anime, and that it is his failure to distinguish the natures of pride as (1) 
“a playful. . . self-indulgence” and (2) as “a moral beacon to warn. . . against the plague 
of untamed arrogance” (Dyson, 2006, p. 25) that the plunge into tragic discomfiture 
occurs. Within this context, we have already pointed out that the concept of the deadly 
sins has been exposed to cultural and ideological pliability, therefore, rendering the sin 
of pride, for instance, diversely connotative to a wider range of socio-cultural contexts 
and meanings (Frank, 2001; Newhauser, 2007)- both positive and negative examples 
of moral/ethical values. It is here that Nobita’s interest in cat’s cradle cultivates into a 
manifestation of obsession/selfishness that (1) stems from his anger at others’ active 
disinterest in the game, and a partial sense of unease for being associated with a symbol 
of femininity (the game of strings) and (2) thwarts Nobita’s understanding of nurturing 
this artform in a morally informed manner that could have invited the appreciation and 
respect from the audiences, thereby, protecting him from tragic and unfortunate 
moments of embarrassment.  
 
In one episode- featuring a gadget called the “Headmaster’s Name Plate”- Nobita 
decides upon opening a school, called Nobi’s School of Cat’s Cradle. This school 
would be founded upon the idea of preserving and promoting the art of cat’s cradle, as 
Nobita fears the death of this traditional artform if people ignore and undermine its 
cultural significance. Furthermore, Nobita raises a pertinent question that becomes a 




“आबिर ये लोग इस आटट को समझ क्यों नही पाते हैं?” 
translated as: 
“Why don't these people understand this art?”  
(PureToons, 2019g, 14:31) 
 
Initially, Nobita’s concern to preserve this art appears altruistic and innocent. He 
genuinely seeks to revitalise this art in the cultural domains of public imagination and 
aims to excite a gender-neutral interest in a social environment that labels cat’s cradle 
as a symbolic manifestation of femininity. For example, at one instance, outside the 
episode, Gain once spoke about Nobita and his interest in cat’s cradle as an aberration 
or transgression (Jenks, 2013): 
 
“नोबिता तो आबिर िसेिाल िलेने से रहा, उसे तो बसफट  लड़बकयों की तरह 
बस्रिंगस ्से ही िलेना पडे़गा।” 
translated as: 
“Nobita won't ever play baseball, so he has to resort to 
playing with strings like girls”  
(PureToons, 2019h, 19:57). 
 
In a way, one could ‘read’ and explain Nobita’s concern to remind people about the 
cultural history and significance of cat’s cradle as an attempt to absolve himself from 
accuses that question his masculinity and retain his hegemonic notions about what 
manly behaviour should be like. These readings could be, then, challenged by our 
interpretations of Nobita’s non-masculine interests as evidence of ‘subversive 
masculinity’ (Sales, 2019) that we have explored in Chapter IV. However, coming 
back to our discussion on pride, it soon gets poisoned by Nobita’s misconception about 
what constitutes “dignity” after Doraemon informs Nobita, who is now a headmaster, 
that ‘a headmaster should act with more dignity’ (PureToons, 2019g, 16:46). 
 
Here, Hutchinson (1995) passes an interesting point of intersection that looks at the 
differences between Aristotle’s perception over the “‘magnanimous’” man and the 
“vain” man (p. 227). Where the former “deserves what he claims. . . because [he] has 
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earned it through genuine merit, through moral superiority” (Dyson, 2006, p. 34), the 
latter “claims too much respect, but that he does not deserve it enough, and he tends to 
confuse the outward marks of dignity with dignity itself” (Hutchinson, 1995, p. 227). 
Nobi’s School, therefore, becomes a space of inquiry that clouds Nobita’s rationalities 
to view himself as conceited or vanity-inspired. Nobita’s conceited sense of pride 
makes him forget that the school is ‘only’ a result of a hypnosis induced by the gadget, 
and pushes him to confuse ‘dignity’ with what we may perceive as ‘pomposity’, as our 
hero dreams about establishing the Nobi’s School as a worldwide phenomenon: 
 
“. . . मैं अपन ेस्कूल की िािाएँ बिदिे में भी िोलुिंगा।” 
translated as: 
“. . . I will also open branches of my school overseas”  
(PureToons, 2019g, 20:35). 
 
As a self-imposed headmaster, Nobita tends to exercise, quantitatively, both greed and 
pride in his dreams which culminate into his desire to become famous (Dyson, 2006), 
but which soon collapses as soon as the hypnosis breaks- after Suneo replaces the 
nameplate with a more flamboyant version to impress Nobita- and the school is left 
bereft and disbanded. Rorty (1992) has explained the effectiveness of a combined 
result of the devices of peripeteia and anagnōrisis on a character, as they push the tragic 
subject to acknowledge their misfortune not as a matter of ill-luck, but an obvious 
result of a personal “waywardness that pervaded [their] actions” (p. 12). This further 
reminds us of Eden’s (2005) argument that equates character-discrepancy to 
subsequent error of judgement and damage (p. 45), which helps us understand Nobita 
and his wayward belief in a gadget to rejuvenate a forgotten artform; and even if we 
overlook the over-arching presence of technology in cultural revitalisation, Nobita’s 
contaminated ego-centeredness and want of fame or power spoils his interests- and the 
audiences’ support- in a game the anime positions him as quite passionate about. In 
the collapse of Nobi’s School, our tragic hero is awakened to self-knowledge about his 
ignorance of belief or knowledge about cultural restoration, and the necessity to keep 
welfare separate from profit (Silverstone, 2007), which we can read as a subtle 
manifestation of “‘suffering into wisdom’” (Hennegan, 2007, p. 212). 
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Nobita’s episode with the headmaster’s name plate brings the audiences closer to the 
notions of moral katharsis as they (1) might begin to understand the differences 
between the various forms of pride and which forms to variably cultivate or avoid and 
(2) are reinforced to not let pride assume the form of pomposity or egoism (Dyson, 
2006). In witnessing Nobita’s tragedy- related to the sin of pride- the audiences are 
subjected to the possibility of chancing upon internalising the counter-effects of 
exercising the negative facets of pride (Golden, 1975; Lear, 1992), as they are 
awakened to the reality of both positive and negative pride (Dyson, 2006). As Frank 
(2001) exclaims, the notion of pride is not exhausted, but remains a matter of 




In this chapter, we deployed a broad range of conceptual accounts to analyse the five 
‘sins of the spirit’ (Frank, 2001) and how each sin contributes to the morally-
transgressive makeup of Nobita’s personality, leading onto a tragic misfortune 
unfolding within the narrative. Besides, we consciously made the choice to leave the 
sins of lust and gluttony (the ‘sins of the flesh’) unattended due to their peripheral 
nature within the animation and their tangible cultural influence and association with 
a more bodily form of desire, and, therefore, have been relatively ignored by 
Doraemon itself. Their omission from our analysis, however, should not imply that the 
latter-two sins are any less significant than the remaining five within the contexts of 
morality and philosophy, or that the original concept of the ‘seven deadly sins’ has 
been, in any way, distorted or misconstrued for the interests of the chapter. What we 
instead wish to imply is their relationship with ideas of ‘bodily’ desires that drifts them 
away from our ethical consideration for the purpose of children’s moral education to 
focus more on classical ideas of a moral-Self (Naito, 1990). 
 
Moral education, according to Naito (1990), has become a pivotal element of 
children’s socialisation in post-war Japan that witnessed a pioneering transition from 
imperialism-driven ideologies to the rise of democratic ideals. Moral education sought 
to educate children through “moral heteronomy (dependence on authority figures such 
as teachers) to moral autonomy” (Naito, 1990, p. 30), rendering young students 
independent, self-reliant, and liberal. This social transition was predominantly (1) 
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reinforced by the abolishment of the imperialist and nationalist principles of “Shushin” 
and (2) a hybridisation of an “American-type democracy” with Japanese forms of 
thinking (Naito, 1990, p. 27). This sense of ‘hybridisation’, further, informs our 
understandings of the renowned chimera-like quality of Japanese culture to assimilate 
foreign cultures within its traditional aesthetics, crafting an altogether new-and-unique 
artistic artifact (Napier, 2005). 
 
No wonder how kabuki- as a Japanese theatrical artform- grafted elements off 
Shakespearean drama to innovate ‘difference’ on the kabuki stage (Kamachi, 2004), 
though at the cost of its own aesthetic individuality. Brandon (1999) argues that the 
symbiosis of Shakespeare and kabuki, pursued with positive intentions, was a failed 
enterprise from the perspective of kabuki and led to the partial dissolution of kabuki’s 
significance in modern-Japan, even though Shakespeare became a huge hit (and still 
is) in commercial mass-media. Unfortunately, the history of this artistic relationship 
and related vicissitudes falls outside our scope and interest and, thereby, would not be 
extended forward. However, this brief historical account of hybridisation helps us 
speculate the potential possibilities of Doraemon being a contemporary by-product of 
the ‘foreign-traditional juxtaposition’, precisely in its deployment of the traditional 
features of an Aristotelian tragedy to explore the repercussions of an abstract set of 
moral transgressions by encompassing the once ‘strictly-Christian’ concept of the 
‘seven deadly sins’ as possible sub-themes within the narrative. Most certainly, the 
animation manages to re-conceptualise the seven sins according to the 
‘contemporariness’ of its audiences and assimilate it with its Japanese social settings 
and scenarios (Naito, 1990), but, most important, it achieves to strike the purpose of 
‘using’ Nobita’s tragedy as a narrative space to transform his personal sufferings into 
perceptible moral lessons about self-regulation (Rorty, 1992; Silverstone, 2007).  
 
The present chapter reminds us about the potentials of Aristotelian tragedy, typically 
in its association with what Silverstone (2007) addresses as the “narratives of 
suffering” (p. 280) and the possibility of using the former as a medium of self-analysis. 
Similar to odyssey experiences, tragedy can also function as a potential platform to 
view oneself against multiple selves; to be morally-awakened and aware of one’s 
responsibility towards others’ welfare and sense of communal harmony; to learn from 
the mistakes of others to avoid repeating them in the future; and, most critically, to 
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understand, and acknowledge, one’s vulnerabilities to human problems (Sherman, 
1992). This could be achieved, in tragedy, by what Malti et al. (2016) calls 
“perspective-taking” (p. 373). Tragedy allows its audiences to step into the shoes of a 
suffering-character to not only understand the various causes of their tragedy, but also 
discover the multifaceted ways of avoiding it.  
 
For instance, Nobita’s self-glorified Nobi’s School of Cat’s Cradle, though functioning 
as a partial source of the tragedy, could be re-evaluated as a possible agent of cultural 
reformation via its position as a space of innovation, curiosity, and inquiry related to 
the cultural game of cat’s cradle. Because the school was contaminated by greed and 
futile demonstrations of pride that it collapses and bears no result; had Nobita used the 
gadget, as we had suggested above, for an altruistic purpose, the outcome would have 
been distinctively reformatory, as cat’s cradle might have re-gained its lost charm and 
re-captured the public interest, to Nobita’s surprise. The disbandment of Nobi’s School 
allows the audiences to reflect over (1) the futility of nurturing pride-instilled thoughts 
and (2) the possibility of overturning the bleakness of pride into a subject of self-worth 
and self-confidence, which Nobita is represented as lacking or, mostly, ‘wanting’.  
 
This sense of ‘want’ is the inceptive moment in the animation that stimulates our 
protagonist’s indulgence in the five unethical sins, and once ‘want’ is affected by a 
sense of abuse, it heralds Nobita’s anticipated susceptibility to err and fall (Sherman, 
1992). Another interesting factor about the unethical sins is their inter-relationship 
within the animation, where the sin of ‘sloth’ emerges and functions as the central-
most transgression and is, therefore, most frequently antagonised than the other four. 
Though the other sins are also entwined to each other (‘greed’ and ‘anger’ gives rise 
to ‘pride’, or ‘envy’ gives rise to ‘greed’), the sin of ‘sloth’ is manifested under such a 
complicated dynamic that it seems to be connected to all the other sins that constitute 
Nobita’s personality. Sloth contributes to the animation’s general definition of Nobita 
as a dissatisfied, disillusioned character, and it is dissatisfaction that poisons Nobita’s 
sense of acceptance for who and what he is. Additionally, Nobita’s dissatisfaction can 
be subtly twinned with personal disinterest to reform/change and even if he ‘seeks’ to 
reform himself, he wishes to be supported by a gadget, which, in return, he abuses 




Coming back to the social and psychological effects of Doraemon, Wymer (2007) had 
referred to a “paradoxical relationship between Being and Becoming” (p. 262) that 
explains much of the animation’s “psychagogic power” (Eden, 2005, p.47) that 
exposes the ‘other’ (witness/audience) to a potential self-transformation. Eden’s 
(2005) reference to ‘psychagogic power’ connotes to the animation’s cathartic abilities 
to apprise viewers and activate their mode of what Golden (1975) had called 
“intellectual clarification” (p. 48). In the various accounts of the five sins, we have 
been frequently repeating the apparent effects of Nobita’s tragedy on viewers, and 
what precisely can young children learn from the character-discrepancies of the 
protagonist. Despite having quite simple plotlines, Doraemon is covertly didactic. The 
animation does not analyse Nobita’s tragedies, nor does it reflect over the moral 
outcomes of the episodes, but it simply presents a narrative, leaving it to the audiences’ 
discretion to drive any lesson to their homes. In a way, the katharsis about Nobita’s 
condition remains subjective and dependent upon the interests of viewers if they intend 
to blur the line between ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ and identify (learn) with (from) 
Nobita’s tragedy (Wymer, 2007). 
 
Doraemon, therefore, stands out as an extraordinary exploration of an assembly of 
unethical sins (moral transgressions) that are collectively embodied in Nobita and how 
these sins propel an understanding of the feelings of ‘pity and fear’. As central 
emotions stimulated in tragedy, pity and fear are excavated and exploited in the 
animation by two major agents: Doraemon and the audiences. Without the intervention 
of these two agents, the animation may fail its purpose to be seen as a complete 
tragedy, as Eden (2005) speaks about the centrality of pity and fear in a tragedy. The 
animation deploys Doraemon as an active agent to serve the purpose of exciting pity 
and fear, whose comments at the conclusion of Nobita’s tragedies express his 
understandings of the repercussions of Nobita’s actions.  
 
Further, we can only speculate that Doraemon’s pity may intermix with the audiences’ 
sense of fear, as they internalise Nobita’s suffering to gain wisdom in thought 
(Hennegan, 2007), rendering the tragedy fulfilled and effectual. However, the extent 
of audiences’ participation is something that depends on personal subjectivity and 
inclinations, and we may not be able to concretise it at this point. Nonetheless, the 
latter-argument does not affect the current reading of Doraemon as a tragedy in the 
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Aristotelian tradition, as the animation opens to us about the endlessness of suffering 
and the thousand opportunities life may offer us to grow up from where those 
sufferings leave us. The animation positions Nobita as a vehicle to communicate its 
belief in human potential and strength; even though Nobita himself fails to 
acknowledge these human realities, Doraemon believes in our power and moral 
strengths that we are capable of “[coming] closer to fulfilling our natures- and virtues- 
as knowers and as citizens” (Rorty, 1992, p. 18). The animation is, undeniably, a 






S. for Hope: Superheroes, Utopianism, and the Interplay of Hope 
 
The Utopian Promise of Superheroes 
 
In the Afterword to his anthology of essays, connecting superheroes to therapy and 
psychology, entitled Using Superheroes in Counseling and Play Therapy, Lawrence 
C. Rubin (2007) argues: 
 
superheroes. . . satisfy deep existential needs, at both the 
personal and societal levels, to be stronger than we are, 
to break through barriers both external and internal, to 
connect with others (p. 320). 
 
Rubin’s (2007) reflection reminds us of Peterson and Park’s (2008) hypothesis that 
“superheroes allow us to see ourselves in stark and entertaining ways and to dream of 
what we might be” (p. 17). It is here that one may perceive Rubin’s (2007) reflection 
to be suggesting dual connotations: that (1) superheroes could function as how Loeb 
and Morris (2005) address them as “moral examples” (p. 30); and that (2) they possess 
the ability to inspire the envisioning of what Papastephanou (2008) calls “piecemeal 
pragmatist utopian change” (p. 91). It should be noted that by ‘piecemeal’, 
Papastephanou (2005) implies an unsystematic manner of implementation which 
departs from the blueprint-hypothesis that, further, becomes one of the primary reasons 
of anti-utopian criticism (Oudenamspen, 2016; Sargent, 1994, 1982), which we also 
aim to discuss ahead in the chapter. For now, it would be beneficial if we understand 
Papastephanou’s (2005) perception of ‘piecemeal change’ as encompassing “a 
possibility, felt through disconnected instances of the good” (p. 94) that does not 
involve only one strict method of approaching a goal, but a range of scattered 
alternatives (Sargent, 1982). These alternatives, basically, allow societies to pursue 





We may discuss the concept of utopianism in a full-fledged manner later in the chapter. 
However, before we progress onto that, it is imperative to shed some light upon how 
utopianism connects itself to the superhero-canon, and how superheroes manifest 
themselves as symbols of “utopian visions” and thought (Sargent, 2006, p. 11). These 
discussions would allow a general reconceptualization of animations’ plausible 
intervention in children’s socialisation, suggesting both the impact and influence of 
mass media in children’s popular culture and imagination. Superheroes occupy a 
massive position in children’s entertainment. Additionally, the most intriguing aspect 
about superhero narratives is not their representation of the superhero as a “larger-
than-life” character (Anderson & Cavallaro, 2002, p. 162), but their treatment of  
 
questions regarding ethics, personal and social 
responsibility, justice, crime and punishment, the mind 
and human emotions, personal identity, the soul, the 
notion of destiny, the meaning of our lives. . . the 
importance of friendship, what love really means, the 
nature of a family, [and] the classic virtues like courage, 
and many other important issues (Morris & Morris, 
2005, p. vii-viii). 
 
These highlighted aspects speak about the embedded nature of futuristic vision within 
superhero narratives in relation to children’s socialisation and introduction to Grusec’s 
(2002) “intrinsic” values (p. 144) that we had discussed earlier in our ‘Introduction’. 
These values are frequently communicated in superhero narratives through the 
framework of utopianism to inspire what Webb (2008) addresses as a “critical utopian 
hope” (p. 204). Superhero narratives deploy the ‘superhero’ as a symbol of utopian 
thought, envisioning a mode of hoping that (1) criticises the existing problems of 
human society and (2) aspires to resolve them and arrive at a future where these current 
‘negatives’ are negated, leading society towards social change that could be re-
reformed (where needed) in the future (Webb, 2008, p. 199). These superhero stories 
manifest utopianism as a collective metaphor “to focus and express ideals, carry hopes 




What implies here is that superheroes teach us to be positive of the future, to be 
hopeful. Here, we may be reminded of Polak’s (1961) assertion that humanity’s actual 
future relies upon the latter’s ability to imagine the “new images of the future” (p. 53). 
Polak’s opinion could be juxtaposed with Sargent’s (1982) assertion that if “people’s 
expectations are positive, if they believe that they can or will improve their lives, they 
are more likely to do so than if their expectations are negative” (p. 579). As beacons 
of hope, superheroes not only introduce us to the spectrum of intrinsic values (Grusec, 
2002), but also inform the development of a collective critical mode of hoping (Webb, 
2008, p. 204) that supports the viewers’ imaginations of “how good [they] could look” 
(Sargent, 1994, p. 25) as morally informed individuals or as members of what Elshtain 
(2005) calls a “minimally-decent” (p. 93) society which, inspired by utopian thought, 
can reshape itself as and when required. 
 
As Rubin (2007) had mentioned, superhero narratives “satisfy existential needs, at 
both the personal and societal levels” (p. 320). This allows us to perceive superheroes 
as purveyors of hope and social change who inspire children’s imagination of 
themselves as “potential superheroes” (Dyson, 1997, p. 1). Children frequently occupy 
our social psyche as the future citizens of (a) society and, thereby, to imagine them as 
‘potential superheroes’ is to believe that they possess the resources and agency to 
transform their respective societies in heroic/unusual ways like the superheroes from 
the world of mythology and fiction. It is here that superheroes guide the development 
of children’s moral perception (Martin, 2007, p. 240), refining their abilities to 
distinguish the ‘good’ and ‘bad’, that they can take ahead in the future as “history 
makers” (Thompson et al., 2019, p. 4) and transform society at both micro and macro 
levels. This is impossible to conceive, however, unless the collective emotional 
orientation of society is reformed, reconfigured, and redirected.  
 
Webb (2008) notes that for the critical mode of hope to function, it is vital that the 
“collective emotional orientation” (p. 200) of society is informed by the ‘desired’ 
mode of critical hoping. This is where superheroes attempt at shifting the 
configurations from less ‘individual’-oriented modes of hoping towards more 
‘community’-oriented ways of thinking and hoping. Needless to say, this does not 
imply that one cannot hope for oneself because then that sense of hope would also 
complement the transformation of society and humanity, at least, at micro levels 
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(Sargent, 1994). In a way, a collective self-transformation of individuals would pave 
the way to an aesthetic and philosophical transformation of society, thus, cultivating 
utopian envisioning. On this note, we may divert our attention towards a deeper 
understanding of ‘utopia’, ‘eutopia’, and ‘utopianism’, and how they (1) inform our 
contextual discourse about superheroes and (2) manifest themselves in superhero 
narratives as “a key conceit” (Murphy, 2017, p. 71) for cultivating a transitional 
“critical utopian mode of hoping” (Webb, 2008, p. 204) from anarchy towards 
harmony and peace. 
 
Some Reflections on Utopianism 
  
For the purpose of this chapter, it is important to understand (1) the difference between 
the words, ‘utopia’, ‘eutopia’, and ‘dystopia’, and (2) how they are connected to the 
idea of utopianism. The word utopia was coined by Thomas More as a pun on the 
Greek word eutopia (translated as ‘good place’) to imply the ‘non-existent’ nature of 
the island he describes in Utopia (1516). Here, it comes as no surprise that a quarter 
of the criticism levelled against utopian imagination sources out of utopia’s sense of 
‘fictionality’ and the boundaries it usually draws “between itself and actual 
experience” (Holquist, 1968, p. 111). These arguments are largely complicated 
through critics’ subjective misinterpretations of More’s understandings of the term. 
Many of them frequently refer to More’s play on the word ‘eutopia’ as the first 
validation of More’s own disbelief in such a society that further informs their 
distantiation from the philosophical and aesthetic interpretation of More’s ideologies 
and standpoints pertaining to the idea of ‘utopianism’ (Oudenamspen, 2016). 
 
From a political perspective, the concept of utopianism is further charged of cultivating 
totalitarian visions for the future (Kateb, 1963; Popper, 1962). This arises in light of 
non-compliance to the ‘blueprint-hypothesis’ that may trigger more violent means to 
establish the proposed ideals of the blueprint, leading society towards a fascist regime 
instead of pushing it towards a positive social change. The “antiutopians”, as Sargent 
(1982, p. 566) calls the critics of utopianism, are wedded to an absolute compliance to 
the ‘blueprint’ for utopia(s) to develop and believe that “there is one, and only one, 
right method of doing everything” (Beauchamp, 1974, p. 467). This perception leads 
them to conclude that if there is ‘only one’ method (the blueprint) for utopia to evolve, 
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then there would be ideological conflicts and disagreements amongst people, resulting 
in totalitarian doctrines to be implemented for society to abide by. This may further 
lead to the destruction of human individuality, for in a utopian universe all people are 
visualised as “uniform creatures with identical wants”, as Berneri (1950, p. 4) warns 
at one instance. The society, according to Beauchamp (1974), may transform in a 
positive way; however, this could be achieved only through the mediums of anarchy 
and fascism, leading several scholars to debunk the notions of utopian dreaming or 
imagination as implausible, impractical, or voids of existential nothingness. 
 
Antiutopians’ compliance to the ‘blueprint’ is, at the same time, criticised by virtue of 
their belief in an unpliable utopian ideology. These critics tend to overlook two distinct 
factors: (1) that utopia is about “imagining a better alternative” (Sargent, 2006, p. 12); 
and that (2) utopia stands as “a critique of ideology”, assuming its shape through 
“comparison against actual society” (Garlington, 2012, p. 69). It becomes clear that 
utopia contradicts the notion of ideology by presenting a fresh range of alternatives 
and, simultaneously, critiquing the very power structures that are embodied in an 
existing socio-political ideology.  
 
Another factor that appears on the surface considering the present criticism is the 
critics’ misguided opinion about utopia as a ‘perfect’ body or system of values, 
policies, or laws. This general misconception frequently re-directs antiutopians back 
to the ‘blueprint’, rendering utopia either as a diabolical manifestation of futuristic 
progress or an unattainable society deemed too ‘perfect’ for humanity to achieve 
(Holquist, 1968). It is here that the supporters of utopianism assume a philosophical 
standpoint to defend utopian imagination and thought by primarily rejecting the notion 
of ‘perfectionism’ that has been comfortably connected to utopian dreams. Sargent 
(1994) has been active in leading this discussion to clarify the critical position of utopia 
as a platform to present “alternatives colored to make them desirable... [catering] to 
our ability to dream, to recognize that things are not quite what they should be, and to 
assert that improvement is possible” (p. 26). To Sargent (1994), “perfection has never 
been a characteristic of utopian fiction” (p. 6) and has only been utilised as a political 
weapon by antiutopians to justify their point. Furthermore, he recognises that 
utopianism is not defined by a sense of certainty or fixity, but rather by a yearning to 
progress, transform, and improve according to societal needs and expectations. 
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When mixed with a “critical” mode of hoping (Webb, 2008, p. 204), utopianism could 
be “better conceptualized as a movement of hope”, as Fournier (2002, p. 192) 
highlights, and further establishes that  
 
utopianism is about movements and processes rather 
than ‘better states'; journeys rather than destinations; it 
is about opening up visions of alternatives. . . it is about 
what moves us to hope for, and to cultivate, alternative 
possibilities (p. 192). 
 
Even though Fournier (2002) is speaking in context of “grassroots movements” (p. 
191), the equation she draws between the latter and utopianism solidifies our 
understanding of how utopianism could be conceptualised as a “movement of hope” 
(p. 192). Fournier’s (2002) assertions help validate that utopian reality is boundless 
and always in the middle of transformation. Utopianism, then, is not only about what 
Sargent (2006) calls “social dreaming” (p. 15), but also our ability to seek 
‘alternatives’ or other, fresher possibilities to transform the present. This way, we may 
view utopianism as a timeless concept that envisions a human society that (1) 
recognises its sense of ‘incompleteness’ and (2) is ready to make progress by means 
of what Papastephanou (2008) had earlier mentioned as “piecemeal pragmatist utopian 
change” (p. 91). This idea of ‘piecemeal change’ manifests a utopian setting as a 
perpetually transformative- rather than as an immovable, albeit ‘perfect’- society. 
 
Corresponding with Fournier’s (2002) argument, utopianism is frequently perceived 
as a “tale of hope. . . hope deferred, and hope renewed” (Sargent, 1994, p. 1) and is 
connected to the idea of hoping (Webb, 2008). Without hope, utopian imaginations 
fail to grow. However, it should be noted, as discussed earlier, that the “collective 
emotional orientation” of society should be towards a ‘critical mode of hoping’ that 
stresses over negating the existing societal faults in the future as we progress towards 
utopia (Webb, 2008). Here, Webb (2008) is pertinent enough to mention that “hope 
needs to be educated, guided and directed” (p. 198). This is where our superheroes 
serve as significant lighthouses to guide us from darkness to light; hope lost to “hope 
renewed” (Sargent, 1994, p. 1). In doing so, superheroes represent a category of what 
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Webb (2008) addresses as “utopian clusters” (p. 200), typically in the sense that they 
may be collectively perceived as a site marked by “a proliferation of utopian ideas” (p. 
200). Although Webb’s (2008) perception of a ‘utopian cluster’ more strongly aligns 
with Sargisson and Sargent’s (2017) idea of ‘Lived Utopianism’- highlighting the 
existence of independent, intentional communities that dwell over shared utopian 
ideals for “a better life” (Sargisson & Sargent, 2017, p. 23)- the superhero canon could, 
nonetheless, be still safely perceived as representing a collective category which we 
may interpret as ‘a utopian cluster’ (Webb, 2008). 
 
Superheroes as Utopian Clusters 
 
As a collective category, superheroes come to represent Nietzsche’s (1883-1885/1969) 
notion of the übermensch, “whose purpose was to ‘go under,’ to bring humanity the 
lessons learned, metaphysical or otherwise, as post-humans, in an attempt to affect 
utopia...[and] radically affect humanity” (Wolf-Meyer, 2003, p. 501). Following 
Nietzsche (1883-1885/1969), superheroes are supposed to (1) reveal to humanity the 
many existent problems in society and (2) guide it onto the right track that leads to 
utopic dreaming. However, some critics argue that superhero narratives are 
“predicated on preserving the status quo” (Wolf-Meyer, 2003, p. 511) and, therefore, 
are frequently defined by a “narrative stasis” (Yockey, 2008, p. 26) that precludes 
superheroes from moving beyond the existing social, political, and power structures. 
 
In a way, supervillains damage the harmony of society (both social and political) and 
superheroes counter-fight to not progress society towards a ‘better’ state (Sargent, 
1994), but revert to a former state of normalcy. It is here that critics accuse the comic 
fandom of being in possession of an obsessive, ‘conservative’ ideology that 
discourages the imagination of any socio-political change to occur within a society 
(Wolf-Meyer, 2003). Another way to pursue this curtailment of utopian dreaming in 
superhero narratives happens by means of keeping the superhero preoccupied in other 
thought processes, which may include ‘nostalgia’ or similar feelings of guilt and 
identity-crisis (Murphy, 2017; Wolf-Meyer, 2003; Yockey, 2008). These feelings 
often populate most of the superheroes’ narrative-presence, digressing them away 
from their visions and promises of reshaping the future of their society in utopic ways. 
It is not that the ‘superhero’ is completely divorced from utopian imaginations- as 
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inactive in pursuing any utopian goals- but such existential dilemmas prevent them 
from justifying their ethical position as the “übermensch” (Nietzsche, 1883-
1885/1969), guiding humanity towards progress and fulfilment. 
 
In the middle of this, however, we usually overlook the superheroes’ ideological and 
moral impact that may help mould our (as viewers) vision or imagination of a utopian 
state. In context of children’s symbolic play, superheroes can significantly act as 
exceptional models to be imitated and acted upon by children. Symbolic play allows 
children to re-conceptualise the metaphors of utopianism, hope, and dreaming to not 
only “revisit past opportunities and problems” but also “venture into the future of 
possibilities” (Rubin, 2007, p. 5). Martin (2007) notes that children’s fantasy play is 
an intriguing platform that complements the development of ‘moral perception’, which 
not only helps children understand their social environment, but also opens doors for 
them to express their individual opinions about themselves, others, and the world 
around them (Hancock & Hancock, 2008; Irwin, 1983).  
 
However, in this case, superhero narratives are frequently criticised for fostering 
violence which children may be drawn to learn due to the fact that superheroes are 
‘rewarded’ for being violent (Boyatzis, 1997). Despite these criticisms, we may 
substantially agree with Hart (2005) who asserted that superheroes’ participation in 
violent activities is partly due to their social context and moral identity as protectors 
of humanity. Informed by a strong ‘moral perception’ (Martin, 2007), superheroes find 
themselves in possession of “conspicuous strengths of character” (Peterson & Park, 
2008, p. 19) that includes the ability to make morally rational judgements about the 
use of violence. As Loeb and Morris (2005) rightly mention, superheroes exert power 
(1) when necessary, and (2) in light of the common good, for everyone’s wellbeing 
and safety. This argument enables the perception of a transparent disparity between 
superheroes and supervillains. Additionally, researchers have found that violent 
fantasy plays amongst children is not detrimental, but rather an interesting medium to 
display anxiety-related issues, or even a “means of feeling stronger” (Rubin, 2007, p. 
6), paving the way to children’s physical, cognitive, and social development (Pena et 




Coming back to the differences between the superhero and the supervillain, and how 
the two characters complement each other, Verano (2013) observes that “the social 
identity of both heroes and villains is. . . informed by and defined by their opposition 
to each other, which justifies their very existence within the social fabric of the 
superhero story” (p. 83). This begins to make sense when we remind ourselves of how 
utopias are often positioned against dystopias, so that we may acknowledge hope that 
is often treasured within utopic images against the dystopian pictures of chaos 
(Papastephanou, 2008). In a similar fashion, the supervillain is situated as the antithesis 
to the superhero’s utopian values and symbols and is introduced for the sole purpose 
of lionising the superhero (Verano, 2013). This may have an additional benefit: it is 
through the supervillain that the superhero’s inherent goodness is appraised, 
strengthened, and legitimised. The former’s dark actions against humanity are 
criticised for the positivity that the latter illuminates, in the same way that utopias are 
positivised when viewed from/against a dystopian background. 
 
Therefore, superheroes inspire children to perceive their society as “incomplete” or 
“inadequate” (Sargent, 1994, p. 25)- in an urgent need of social growth- and attempt 
to guide them to be critically hopeful about its future (Webb, 2008, p. 204). Children 
have, lately, been addressed as superheroes in their own rights (Dyson, 1997), 
implying the possibility of change to occur through their actions as adults in the future. 
It is here that superheroes possess the ability to leave children inspired (1) by their 
actions, and (2) by suggesting that children, as members of society, are (and would be) 
responsible for both the progress that humanity makes and the moral decay it allows 
to fester. This idea is reverberated in the two superhero stories that we shall discuss 
here and argue how the notion of ‘utopianism’ grounds itself within the narratives as 
a metaphor for a mode of critical hoping (Webb, 2008), essential for envisioning 
humanity that is driven by ideals, altruism, moral agency, and happiness. 
 
Discussion: The Superhero Narratives 
 
I. The Freedom Force (1978) 
 
As “moral examples” (Loeb & Morris, 2005, p. 30), the five superheroes that make up 
‘the freedom force’ stand as representatives of utopian thought (Papastephanou, 2008), 
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and could be conceptualised as purveyors of what Webb (2008) had called “critical 
utopian hope” (p. 204). Throughout the five episodes that comprise the animation, the 
freedom force is projected as being involved in a full range of conflicts with different 
antagonists that they often identify, locate, and get ready to confront (typically, by the 
help of Merlin's magic). This ability could be perceived as a reflection of their 
‘character’ as informed by a sense of ‘moral perception’ that guides their actions and 
choices (Hancock & Hancock, 2008; Martin, 2007) and helps them qualify as symbols 
of utopian imagination and hope (Webb, 2008). 
 
However, this call to utopian imagination is constantly curtailed by the freedom force’s 
emphasis on returning to the same, old state of harmony, rendering Wolf-Meyer’s 
(2003) and Yockey’s (2008) criticisms as true. As mentioned earlier, superhero stories 
are often criticised for being “predicated on preserving the status quo” (Wolf-Meyer, 
2003, p. 511) and are, therefore, defined by an unusual “narrative stasis” (Yockey, 
2008, p. 26). We often perceive a similar dynamic unfolding in The Freedom Force, 
particularly in the episode called “The Dragon Riders”. In this episode, the heroes 
attempt to resolve an ideological conflict between two men who represent ‘science’ 
and ‘faith’. The episode is punctuated by (1) the freedom force’s preservation (or 
return to) of the old state of harmony and, further, (2) by Isis’ opinions about the 
matter. Where on one hand, the heroes insist upon preserving the state of things (Wolf-
Meyer, 2003), Isis, on the other, refutes our interpretation about the animation’s 
(anti)utopian set of ideology that might cancel out our opinion about the animation as 
belonging to the same category of superhero ‘texts’ criticised by Wolf-Meyer (2003) 
and Yockey (2008). 
 
Isis’ remarks about the predicament briefly remind us- as viewers- about the 
transparency in utopian beliefs, and the fact- as Beauchamp (1974) exclaims- that there 
is never “one, and only one, right method of doing everything” (p. 467). This may 
remind us of how utopian thought often debunks antiutopians’ critique of utopian 
dreaming as a source of violence and totalitarianism (Popper, 1962), as Isis asserts that 
the freedom force “cannot help one side win over the other” (interplanetarydream, 
2011a, 2:53). Her remark could be read as the force’s belief in utopian notions of free 
will, democracy, and liberty that stand against the dystopic or anarchic ideals of 
fascism and political superiority. As superheroes, they possess all means to favour one 
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side over the other, but they refrain from such totalitarian methods to confront this 
situation. Subsequently, they establish themselves as noble individuals of sterling 
“strengths of character” (Peterson & Park, 2008, p. 19), that includes their ability to 
use their sense-of-power towards the common good, rather than (ab)using it to 
capitalise on power dynamics (Loeb & Morris, 2005). 
 
Leading the previous argument is Isis’ claim that “there is [enough] room in this world 
for mistakes”, and there is always a possibility for “a fresh start”, as Isis comforts the 
two men in “The Dragon Riders” (interplanetarydream, 2011a, 10:20 - 10:25). This 
claim reminds us of how Fournier (2002) had conceptualised the idea of utopianism: 
as “a movement of hope. . . [of] alternative possibilities” (p. 192). Yet again, we may 
perceive Isis’ remarks as being charged with an unusual utopian agency that permits 
the possibility of committing and learning from instances of error (Sargisson & 
Sargent, 2006). Furthermore, Isis’ comments reverberate what Papastephanou (2008) 
had earlier mentioned as ‘piecemeal change’ (p. 91). It highlights the superheroes’ 
abilities to envision not only a range of “alternative possibilities” (Fournier, 2002, p. 
192) that the two conflicting sides may adopt for a productive collaboration in the 
future, but also believe in the method of seeking baby-steps towards accomplishing 
any dream driven by a utopian imagination, in the vein of Elshtain’s (2005) perception 
of a “minimally-decent” society (p. 93). 
 
However, it is equally interesting to note that where Isis establishes herself as an 
emblem of the freedom force’s utopian imaginations, at the same time, she is also 
potentially stereotyped and sexualised (Miller et al., 2016; Summers & Miller, 2014). 
Even though Isis negates a few of those allegations by not qualifying as a “non-
essential or passive” character (Miller et al., 2016, para. 6), much of the criticisms 
levelled against female superheroes reflect itself in the figure of Isis as a woman. As 
Summers and Miller (2014) mention, there has been a significant transition from 
projecting women as ‘objects’ of rescue to ‘subjects’ of freedom. Here, we also 
partially refer to Paul Wells’ (1998) concept of the ‘feminine aesthetic’- which we 
have discussed at length in the succeeding chapter on gender and feminism- that is 
defined by a social transition of ‘the animated woman’ from an ‘object’ of ridicule or 
spectacle to a speaking ‘subject’ (p. 200) and which was strongly governed by the 
second-wave of feminism in the 60/70s. 
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However, this transition was marked by a physical over-sexualisation of women 
characters who were, nonetheless, projected as level-headed superheroes and in a 
positive light (Summers & Miller, 2014). Unfortunately, Isis belongs to this category, 
as the animation constantly attempts to preserve her feminine side more than her super-
heroism. Furthermore, Miller et al. (2016) mention that female heroes are more likely 
to “work in a team” (para. 6). This could easily be seen in the structure of the freedom 
force as comprising four males and a single female (Isis) which, however, later finds 
a suitable negation of fact in the representation of Web Woman as working as a sole 
superhero within an animated narrative. In Isis as a member of a male-dominated team, 
Miller’s et al. (2016) statements justify themselves, but are, unequivocally, 
complicated in her development as an empathetic, “nurturing, and understanding” 
character/superhero (para. 4). 
 
It is intriguing to notice that Isis’ ‘empathetic’ character is not to be criticised but 
understood as a hallmark of utopianism. It is utopian agency that allows her, in “The 
Dragon Riders”, the wisdom to resolve the conflict between ideologies by some means 
“other than warfare” (interplanetarydream, 2011a, 9:43), and this is where Isis opens 
the possibility for the two men to seek new or different alternatives (Fournier, 2002). 
One may be bewildered by Isis’ rejection of violence as a means to resolve conflicts, 
but in her (and the freedom force’s) compliance to non-violence (unless absolute 
necessary), we may perceive what many had addressed as the responsibility of power 
(Hancock & Hancock, 2008; Loeb & Morris, 2005). It is considered a utopian quality 
to approach a situation through social or non-violent methods. Interestingly, this idea 
finds a powerful replication in The Freedom Force and in their abstinence from 
resorting to violence. 
 
This is reiterated in an episode, titled “The Scarlet Samurai”, when Toshi attempts at 
comforting a jealous Kiyoto (a boy who was jealous of Toshi’s magical powers), 
pointing out that his powers are “from the gods” and must be used “only for the good 
of others” (interplanetarydream, 2011b, 3:47 – 3:51). Here, we may clearly perceive 
that the group understands their super-heroic prowess and depart from the category of 
superhero animations that are constantly criticised for indulging in meaningless 
violence (Boyatzis, 1997; Huesmann & Miller, 1994), thereby, cultivating an interest 
amongst children in “violence as a problem-solving tool” (Anderson & Cavallaro, 
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2002, p. 162). However, as already pointed out earlier, if supervised, children’s violent 
play could be rendered (1) a positive outlet for unwanted anxieties and (2) a platform 
or space where they can frequently exercise a sense of power/control over themselves 
and others (Rubin, 2007) which can be helpful for their social and personal 
development and transition to adolescence/adulthood (Aldis, 1975; Pena et al., 1987). 
 
However, in the case of the freedom force, their disinterest in violence is partly driven 
by their status as utopian subjects (Fournier, 2002; Sargent, 1982). Such subjects are 
meant to inspire their audiences to seek ‘fresh’ alternatives for being critically hopeful 
(Webb, 2008), and identify the faults of the present social structures and not repeat 
them in the future. For young viewers, Webb’s (2008) concept of critical hoping could 
be evaluated from an ethical perspective to advise them on not being ‘jealous’- for 
instance, as Kiyoto- and progress ahead in their lives as satisfied and happy 
individuals. The Freedom Force motivates young viewers to view themselves against 
the images of ‘the supervillain’ to understand and appreciate themselves as Dyson’s 
(1997) “potential superheroes” (p. 1) who possess the ability to reform this world. 
 
As Papastephanou (2008) had brought to our attention, utopian visions could be best 
understood when viewed through the lens of dystopian reality. This ideology makes 
sense within the superhero-context when we begin realising the necessity of the 
supervillain. As a social model, the supervillain embodies the state of dystopian reality 
and features as the source of the superhero’s inherent goodness. Verano (2013) makes 
a poignant remark in this context to celebrate the supervillain as a necessity, when he 
writes, “the supervillain makes the superhero a superhero” (p. 86). This validates the 
point that the ‘supervillain’ could be treated as a “mirror” via which one may 
understand themselves, others, and the world around them (Sargent, 1994, p. 25). In 
the context of The Freedom Force, for example, the villains satisfy a similar purpose, 
as most of them are represented as critiques on ‘jealousy’ (“The Scarlet Samurai” and 
“Pegasus’ Odyssey”) or ‘arrogance’ (“The Robot”). The animation situates their 
selfishness or arrogance against the wisdom of the superheroes through which the 
audiences may be inspired to (1) unlearn the many morally-transgressive traits of the 
supervillains and (2) adopt a more utopian vision that is informed by our superheroes’ 




As exemplars of “critical hope” (Webb, 2008, p. 204), the freedom force recognises 
their responsibilities and potentials as symbols of utopian thinking and imagination, 
inspiring morally guided actions that are informed by a poignant sense of “moral 
perception” (Martin, 2007, p. 240). As a critic had once mentioned, utopian dreaming 
is persevered by the help of a guided perception (Sargent, 2006). This is where the 
present animation ensures that the conflict between the superhero and supervillain is 
not wasted but represented as a springboard for hope to re-emerge- new possibilities 
to be explored- leaving the audiences informed of the ‘goodness’ indispensable for any 
utopia to be achieved or imagined (Fournier, 2002; Sargent, 1994; Webb, 2008). 
 
Moreover, leading on from our discussion on the sexist representation of Isis (Miller 
et al., 2016; Summers & Miller, 2014), one may further perceive that the freedom 
force- as a team of an ethnically diverse range of legendary characters- has been 
“stripped of any meaningful sign of ethnicity” (Anderson & Cavallaro, 2002, p. 162). 
This suggests that except for their physical appearances, the animation fails to reflect 
any other distinct ethnic-feature of the group, like in the form of accent-variations. 
Throughout the narrative, all the five superheroes (irrespective of the ethnicity they 
represent) speak in a uniform American accent, whereas Isis- being an Egyptian 
goddess- is relatively presented as white-skinned. These aspects, certainly, 
problematise the aesthetics of the narrative and may invite considerable criticism from 
researchers. Nonetheless, these representational shortcomings hardly prevent us from 
perceiving the utopian imagination that informs the guided actions (Hancock & 
Hancock, 2008) of the freedom force.  
 
This becomes a striking quality of The Freedom Force that enables its survival in the 
public imagination as an example of utopian thought, inspiring the audiences to reflect 
upon themselves as responsible members of society and as crucial anchors of any 
progress our society makes. It is here that the superhero-animation has consistently 
attempted at informing us that we are, indeed, the ‘off-screen superheroes of 
humanity’, and that any utopian imagination is possible only through our visions and 





II. Web Woman (1978) 
 
In Web Woman, the sexualisation of women characters still pervades, typically via 
their uniformity in their physical appearances as “attractive, sexy, and feminine” 
(Miller et al., 2016, para. 7). This feminisation extends to the character of Kelly 
Webster (Web Woman) who, as Web Woman, is projected as being clad in 
“provocative clothing” (Miller et al., 2016, para. 7), as she could be seen wearing only 
a purple leotard, a pair of purple boots, and a black, antennae-like, "W" shaped mask. 
At this stage, if we compare Web Woman with Isis, one can hardly comprehend any 
considerable set of differences between the two female superheroes, because both are 
explicitly feminised or sexualised, particularly in the ways they are physically dressed 
(Miller et al., 2016). Moreover, like Isis, Web Woman is usually depicted as having “a 
[male] mentor”, if not a “team” of superheroes to work with (Miller et al., 2016, para. 
6). Here, it is necessary to highlight that even though the latter works alone, she is 
constantly accompanied by a friendly alien called Spinner who is more of a source of 
help (Anderson & Cavallaro, 2002), emerging as a ‘co-hero’ in her adventures 
(Campbell, 1968). In a way, therefore, one may keep both Isis and Web Woman on 
the same pedestal and treat them as mutually alike. 
  
Further, as we have mentioned earlier in our discussion on The Freedom Force, both 
our female superheroes negate much of the criticism that has been generally levelled 
against female superheroes. Neither Isis nor Web Woman could be deemed “passive” 
characters (Miller et al., 2016, para. 6) nor their empathetic personalities could be 
taken as reflections of their subordinate statuses within male-dominated narratives 
(para. 4). Their sense of empathy carries a backdrop of utopian imagination that (1) 
allows them to pursue fresh alternatives in terms of feminist emancipation (Fournier, 
2002) and (2) denies the necessity of violence or totalitarian doctrines to pervade the 
ethos of the superhero-narrative(s) for which they are often censored or criticised 
(Boyatzis, 1997; Huesmann & Miller, 1994). In Web Woman’s rejection of violence, 
for example, audiences may again perceive a recognition of ‘a utopian mode of critical 
hoping’ (Webb, 2008, p. 204). Critical hoping disavows the centralisation of power- 
which is a notion misinterpreted (and, thus, feared) by anti-utopians to support their 
criticism of utopian dreaming and hoping (Kateb, 1963; Popper, 1962)- but instead 
strives for introducing notions of freedom, free will, and peace. As in “The Eye of the 
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Fly”, Web Woman could be seen teaching a lesson to the evil Tsetse on the idea of 
greed: 
 
“Just remember that the greedy often lose more than 
they gain, especially when they strive after total power 
over their fellow creatures” (Creative Entertainment, 
2018a, 16:34). 
 
Most certainly, this statement validates Web Woman’s dismissal of anti-utopians’ 
purported fear of utopianism as the pathway to totalitarianism (Sargent, 1994), 
typically in the sense that Web Woman offers the viewer an understanding of what her 
functions are. Not only is she supposed to protect those in need, as she saves two men 
from a flood in “The Rainmaker”, but she is also required to inform the viewer about 
her responsibilities of being someone in possession of power (Loeb & Morris, 2005). 
Her statement about the repercussions of chasing ‘total power’ re-echoes Sargent’s 
(1982) affirmation that ‘utopianism’ is not about cultivating fascism, but about 
envisioning or hoping (for) positive socio-political changes which could be motivated 
by a critical mode of hoping (Webb, 2008). In Web Woman’s statement, we can 
identify her implied rejection of the idea of ‘absolute power’ that is neither a 
characteristic of the narrative nor of ‘utopianism’ as a philosophical concept. 
 
Moreover, as Webb (2008) had mentioned, the “collective emotional orientation” (p. 
200) of a society should be inclined towards any utopian mode of hoping that allows 
society to pursue fresh or different utopian visions (Sargent, 2006). Webb (2008) 
attempts to imply that for society to be able to make progress, a more ‘collective’ effort 
from citizens is deemed necessary for the utopian realisation of socio-political change. 
Web Woman perpetuates a similar ideology, promoting the power of united strength. 
As in “The World Within” (Creative Entertainment, 2018b, 14:41 – 15:00), the battle 
between the hypnotised bees and the ants is brought to a closure by Web Woman who 
asks the two sides to unite and fight the evil Dr. Abyss, who had stealthily manipulated 
the bees and the ants for his own selfish aim to exercise ‘total power’ over them. Here, 
the viewers may perceive Web Woman’s intentions to communicate the strength of 
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‘staying-united’ which could be treated more as a style of utopian envisioning that is 
attainable only through collective, altruistic efforts of any society (Webb, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to highlight that Web Woman stands as a representative 
of a feminist utopian imagination. This is typically pursued through her alignment with 
the trope of “woman-as-insect” (Wilcox, 2017, p. 26) and this is precisely where Web 
Woman takes a leap ahead of Isis in their representations of the ‘feminine superheroic’. 
Where Isis’ powers could be perceived as basic to the superhero canon, Web Woman’s 
strengths come from the insect-world that are often intertwined as threatening the 
pillars of patriarchal domination (Creed, 1993). As Wells (1998) notes of the ‘feminine 
aesthetic’, Web Woman emerges as a solid archetype of a speaking ‘subject’ not only 
in her exploits against supervillains, but also in her portrayal as a dynamic feminist 
symbol of courage, determination, and hope.  
 
The trope of ‘woman-as-insect’ is often deemed a bold symbol of feminist resistance 
against patriarchal power structures (Wilcox, 2017), which is clearly reflected in Web 
Woman. An intriguing point in the animation occurs when Kelly Webster speaks the 
classic line that first prompts her transformation to Web Woman: 
 
“Insects of the world. . . small creatures of the cosmos  
. . . lend me your powers – NOW!” (Creative 
Entertainment, 2018a, 3:58) 
 
This statement becomes one of the major highlights within the narrative, precisely 
because (1) it is one of the first instances that reflects Web Woman’s associations with 
the insect world and (2) paves the way to an introduction of the “small creatures of the 
cosmos” as saviours of Web Woman (when in need). Often, Web Woman introduces 
insects as a “swarm” that further complement the role of Web Woman as a model to 
envision “new possibilities for connection and world-building” (Wilcox, 2017, p. 41). 
Yet again, the swarm of insects offer Web Woman the strength to believe in what she 
is pursuing through her altruistic adventures to protect humanity from possible harm 
(Loeb & Morris, 2005) which is where the role of ‘insects as nature’ is equally 
recognised and perpetuated for mass-appreciation. 
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In Web Woman’s portrayals as (1) a superhero, and (2) woman-as-insect, one may 
note that she transforms into “a site of existential threat” to her male-dominated 
universe (Wilcox, 2017, p. 26), to an extent that her male enemies either attempt at 
killing (“Dr. Despair and the Mood Machine”) or controlling her (“Send in the 
Clones”). Web Woman, indeed, threatens the masculine and patriarchal order which 
is why her image as the ‘feminine superheroic’ serves as both a comfortable site for 
exploring the questions of womanhood and identity (Wells, 1998) and “an unbearable 
dystopia for the men, who cannot reconcile themselves to a life of equality with 
women” (Wilcox, 2017, p. 26). This justifies the male villains’ attempts to silence Web 
Woman in any way possible, more because they fail (1) to give up their dystopian 
dreams of absolute power and (2) accept a woman in a superhero’s clothes. It is here 
that Web Woman attempts unpacking the idea of feminist utopianism (1) via Kelly 
Webster’s transformation into Web Woman- a woman with powers gifted from the 
insect world- and (2) the intersection of her identity as woman-as-insect with the 
rejection of a patriarchal social system (embodied by the male super villains) to 
communicate a brighter portrait of utopian reformations marked by gender-equality, 
mutual respect (Murphy, 2008; Wilcox, 2017), and communal harmony. 
 
However, where on one hand, the animation stands as a powerful exploration of 
‘feminist utopianism’, on the other, it fails to completely protect itself from the features 
of mainstream superhero canon that are criticised and treated as impediments within 
the narrative that preclude the superhero(es) from pursuing their utopian dreams to ‘go 
under’ (Nietzsche, 1883-1885/1969) and affect society in radical ways (Wolf-Meyer, 
2003). This way Web Woman paves the way to the arrival of what Yockey (2008) had 
criticised in similar superhero-narratives as “narrative stasis” (p.26) which is often 
introduced to preclude an acknowledgment of utopian alternatives (Fournier, 2002). 
This stasis is introduced distinctively in two separate instances: (1) in “Send in the 
Clones” (Creative Entertainment, 2018c, 9:53 – 10:00), when Kelly Webster gets 
concerned about the revelation of her identity as Web Woman, after Dr. Frankenstein 
creates her clone and hypnotises the ‘real’ Web Woman as his housemaid; and (2) 
when, in “The Lady in the Lamp”, Ashta’s proposal to take the convict (who had, 
accidentally, released her from Scarab's magical lamp) to “another world, a much 
better world” (Creative Entertainment, 2018d, 6:55) is strongly rejected by his desire 
to stay in the same, ‘old’ world. 
101 
 
In both the instances, we can perceive how the animation attempts to restrict the 
utopian attitudes of the superhero form by either (1) entangling Web Woman in the 
unnecessary vortex of identity-protection or (2) imposing the audiences with the 
thought of utopian impossibility, respectively. Via these means, Web Woman attempts 
to not only curb the utopian intentions of the ‘feminine-superheroic’, but also 
complicate the narrative-aesthetics by enforcing the superhero cloistered within the 
inability to move beyond the status quo (Wolf-Meyer, 2003). It is here that may begin 
wondering that in Web Woman’s exploits with supervillains and their journey to 
imprisonment(s), the animation reiterates this conservative ideology to keep the state 
protected from outside forces that may be defined by the concept of piecemeal utopian 
change (Wolf-Meyer, 2003), and that may be able to modify the ability of humanity to 
envision hope-induced alternatives (Fournier, 2002; Webb, 2008). The animation 
makes it explicitly obvious that Web Woman’s tasks are solely to dominate the 
supervillains, and capture them, before handing them over to the political systems she 
herself is a part of but has no apparent control over it. Essentially, Web Woman neither 
allows Kelly Webster to leave the territory of the superhero where they are monitored 
as “moral examples” (Loeb & Morris, 2005, p. 30) or inherent role-models to the 
young, nor treats her as a social pioneer (Verano, 2013) who can bring about a certain 
change that is both empowering and necessary. In the animation, the audience can 
perceive the containment of utopian imagination, but that should not discourage the 
viewership of an unusually different ‘feminine aesthetic’ at play which is combined 
with the ‘feminine-superheroic’ that endures and celebrates the possibility of utopian 
dreaming, now-refined by a feminist thought (Wells, 1998; Wilcox, 2017). 
 
This is precisely the very quality that enables Web Woman to depart from the category 
of superhero-narratives to which The Freedom Force belongs to, typically in its 
treatment of the ‘feminine-superheroic’- in the form of Web Woman- as a symbol of 
resistance, intellect, and perseverance (Wells, 1998). In Webster’s portrayal as Web 
Woman- as an illustration of a feminist utopian tradition- we might significantly note 
striking dissimilarities between Web Woman and Isis. However, it does not imply that 
Isis’ character cannot be deemed any less inspirational than Web Woman’s, or that Isis 
fails to embody any emancipatory, feminist qualities. What we want to argue is that 
where Isis’ empowered ‘Self’ is usually subtly overshadowed by the presence of the 
male superheroes (Miller et al., 2016, para. 4), Web Woman’s feminist self is protected 
102 
 
by her frequent assimilation with the world of insects (Wilcox, 2017) that uphold her 
as an archetype of radicalised utopian difference (Murphy, 2008). 
 
Despite having a few problems, Web Woman manages to blossom its links with 
utopianism (Fournier, 2002; Sargent, 2006) and feminism (Wells, 1998; Wilcox, 2017) 
and, therefore, emerges as an extraordinary archetype for what superhero narratives 
could be like, and should be able to inform their audiences. As a utopian subject, Web 
Woman succeeds to not only preserve the possibility of the development of fresh 
alternatives for both major and minor socio-political change, but also advocate the rise 
of feminist utopian traditions. Certainly, the links between utopianism and feminism 
become milestones in the animation to recognise its strengths to (1) become one of 
Loeb and Morris’ (2005) ‘moral examples’, (2) encouraging more individual thoughts 





This chapter has significantly tried to connect the world of superheroes with three key 
concepts of ‘utopianism’ (Fournier, 2002; Sargent, 2006), ‘feminism’ (Wells, 1998), 
and ‘critical hoping’ (Webb, 2008). We aimed to analyse and understand the formation 
of the superhero canon as what Webb (2008) calls a “utopian cluster” (p. 200), as to 
how superheroes could be (re)imagined as torch bearers of a retrieved form of hoping 
(Sargent, 1994). As symbols of a collective utopian category, superheroes could be 
studied as icons of a socio-political kind of piecemeal change (Papastephanou, 2008) 
that is not only informed by a utopian dimension of communal peace, harmony, or 
world-building, but also triggered by contemporary waves of feminist thought, as we 
visualise (briefly) in Isis and (strongly) in Web Woman. In a way, superheroes embody 
the shifting social paradigms within society and are strongly fuelled (1) with utopian 
imagination, (2) desire to view their worlds differently, and (3) inclination to bring a 
difference in the vein of Nietzsche’s (1883-1885/1969) ūbermensch.  
 
For the same reason, superheroes are upheld, or labelled, as inspirational models, 
particularly to young children who are often thought to exercise a pathological interest 
in superheroes or figures from mythology and folklore (Rubin, 2007). Adding another 
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point to this argument is that superheroes’ inherent utopianism is usually treated as an 
encouraging medium to inspire children to understand their social roles as potential 
“history makers” who may be able to replicate the superheroes’ utopian visions 
(Thompson et al., 2019, p. 4; Dyson, 1997) and help society pursue the notion of 
piecemeal change in a more progressive sense. Superheroes are fashioned to not only 
reveal a gamut of inherently intrinsic values (Grusec, 2002) that viewers may adopt to 
refine their utopian imagination, but also exercise society’s interests in changing itself 
from hopelessness, darkness, to being filled with hope and inspiration (Webb, 2008). 
 
This is precisely what is achieved by the above-discussed animations, specifically in 
their treatment(s) of the superheroes as unusual models for utopian thinking. Here, we 
have addressed them as ‘unusual’ due to two key reasons which are frequently 
reflected over to understand the two animations as utopian subjects. Firstly, they 
potentially attempt to depart from the ‘usual’ type of superhero narratives that often 
preserve the status quo (Wolf-Meyer, 2003) and, secondly, however, their methods of 
‘going under’ are implicit and, at times, too subtle to catch (Nietzsche, 1883-
1885/1969). This clearly means that both the animations feature instances where they 
have attempted to preclude the realisation of utopian dreaming by either diverting the 
superheroes’ attention to issues of identity (as in what we saw in Web Woman) or 
keeping them toward the periphery of power/political control. 
 
It is here that one of Verano’s (2013) poignant observations may help us justify the 
animations’ attempts to restrict their superheroes’ capacities to introduce utopian 
imagination onto mainstream thought. Reflecting on why supervillains are imperative 
within superhero narratives, he mentions that a “progressive superhero is inevitably a 
problematic figure”, and “when a powerful figure forces societal change without the 
right to do so, he or she [enters] supervillain territory” (p. 86). In more than one way, 
a superhero may be branded an offender of communal harmony if they attempt to 
exercise control over any kind of political authority or pursue any activity that falls 
outside their political agency. It is here that critics have often highlighted that due to 
the same reasons supervillains are brought into play (1) to satisfy superheroes’ sense 
of purpose or social function and (2) keep the status quo balanced and preserved 




In light of the recent argument, one would be able to understand more clearly why, in 
Web Woman, Kelly Webster is often depicted as taking the villains to the police or any 
other local authority. This massively suggests that her ultimate purpose is to “offer 
optimism in the uncomplicated dispensing of justice” (Murphy, 2017, p. 71) and that 
she has no significant role to play in the antagonists’ social futures. In a way, we might 
visualise Web Woman as a “moral example” (Loeb & Morris, 2005, p. 30) who may 
not be divorced from utopian thought, but implicitly ‘controlled’ in how she attempts 
to envision utopian dreams (Sargent, 2006), but who still manages or, at least, strives 
to communicate those utopian visions and ideals to young viewers who can ‘rehearse’ 
them in real socio-political settings and backdrops (Dyson, 1997). 
 
This may, further, help us analyse the social positions of superheroes as role models 
or icons of admiration (Elkin, 1960). As icons, they are responsible to (1) share their 
utopian visions with the audiences and (2) inspire them to understand and rehearse 
similar visions in their social settings. Here, we may notice that superheroes’ 
utopianism may fail to reproduce any affects unless we, as viewers, strive on 
transforming the world by seeking inspiration from the utopian value of superhero-
narratives and superheroes as moral symbols (Hancock & Hancock, 2008). 
 
Superheroes speak to our inherent humanity- that is often embedded within us- and 
ability to transform our world in enrapturing ways, more because they have faith in the 
powers of peoples (Fradkin, 2016, Dik, 2008). As Web Woman implicitly emphasises, 
there is much strength, that is unidentified, in unity. Ahead of this comment is Webb’s 
(2008) idea of a “collective emotional orientation” (p. 200) that accentuates that for 
society to progress towards utopian change, it should possess a collective configuration 
that is aimed at a particular utopian mode of hoping. This idea clearly resonates with 
Web Woman’s opinion and calls for individuals to unite, if they wish to experience 
the utopian visions of superhero-narratives. In a way, one could lead and argue that 
utopias are inconceivable without collective social endeavours of any involved society 
(Oudenamspen, 2016; Webb, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, an interesting aspect unpacks in Web Woman which is the idea of 
feminist utopianism (Wilcox, 2017) that is attached with the representation of Web 
Woman as “woman-as-insect” (p. 26). This factor offers Web Woman to emerge as an 
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archetype for patriarchal resistance and retaliation, enabling her to stand away from a 
one-way representation as Isis’ in The Freedom Force. From a general perspective, the 
‘insect-trope’ is described, and treated, as uncanny (Shaviro, 1995) and often viewed 
from an abject lens, typically in form. In a way, insects are ‘othered’ and embody a 
radicalised form of difference that catapults them to be viewed as a threat to hegemony 
or the social order of things (Wilcox, 2017). However, Web Woman combines this 
trope to an equally powerful notion of the ‘feminine superheroic’ that takes much of 
its formative thoughts from Wells’ (1998) reflections on the feminine aesthetic. 
 
The ‘feminine aesthetic’ partly discusses the transition of animated women’s 
representation from ‘objects’ of patriarchal ridicule or gaze to their evolution into 
independent, speaking ‘subjects’. It is here that Web Woman assimilates this ideology 
with the ‘insect-trope’ to re-modify the concept; to accommodate feminism with the 
‘uncanny’ to develop the trope of “woman-as-insect” as what Wilcox (2017) had 
addressed as “a site of existential threat” (p. 26) to a patriarchal social order or space. 
This relationship helps Web Woman redefine herself as an archetype of the ‘feminine-
superheroic’, reasserting Web Woman’s position as more of a feminist tale following 
a utopian tradition of hoping for a more gender-equal society (Murphy, 2008). 
 
It is here that we might, yet again, recall how Isis struggles to radiate her sense of 
‘feminine-superheroic’ which mostly relies on the fact that The Freedom Force 
accommodates four other male superheroes within its narrative, affecting- and 
eclipsing- Isis’ overall potential as a feminist symbol. Having said that, it is quite 
imperative if we remind ourselves about the fact that Isis’ inability to emerge- like 
Web Woman- as a symbol of feminist agency should not affect our interpretation of 
Isis as one of the most central, affirmative members of the freedom force. Despite the 
physical sexism that pervades across the narrative (Miller et al., 2016), one may not 
feel that Isis is being either overpowered or dominated by her male peers or silenced 
by the animation. Contrary to how some might feel, Isis is often treated with respect, 
and her opinions are constantly valued and never resisted or demeaned by a male-
dominated universe. In a way, Isis could be equated with Web Woman in terms of the 
utopian values both radiate, but where Web Woman moves beyond to inculcate 
feminist traditions of dreaming, Isis’ character stays within the boundaries of the 
traditional canon of superheroes. 
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In an attempt to consolidate all the proposed arguments that we have discussed across 
this chapter, one might be able to understand, and visualise, the superhero as an 
archetype of morally informed utopian visions of social change (Sargent, 1982). 
Throughout this chapter, we have attempted to focus precisely as to how superheroes 
could be treated as utopian models of inspiration for the implementation of pragmatic 
changes to occur at macro and micro levels by peoples of a society, guiding humanity 
about not only the faces of moral perception (Martin, 2007), but also how this 
perception would help individuals envision a clearer image of utopia. Here, we can 
treat ‘moral perception’ as the ability to identify transgressive modes of moral 
behaviour and rectify the same if internalised. Furthermore, Martin (2007) highlights 
that an individual’s moral perception is a part of their “moral imagination” (p. 240) 
that informs a person’s moral understanding of their social roles as members of a 
community.  
 
It is here that, yet again, we begin addressing the role of superheroes into (re)shaping 
the ways their audiences might see themselves, others, and the world around them. As 
utopian symbols, superheroes are often burdened by the task of epitomosing 
Nietzsche’s (1883-1885/1969) ūbermensch and, therefore, are most often blamed for 
society’s own failures, or reluctance, to progress. This corresponds with Wolf-Meyer’s 
(2003) critique of comic fandom that (1) revels in its subcultural level of ‘difference’ 
and, subsequently, (2) is never ready or interested to embrace any change in or within 
society that may pose a significant threat to their subcultural differences. This may 
lead us to reflect over the ‘actual’ purpose of superheroes and what they are meant to 
‘perform or pursue’ as utopian examples. 
  
Based on our analyses of the two superhero-narratives, (1) we might be clear in our 
approach towards the figure of the ‘superhero’ from the perspective of utopianism, and 
(2) how this approach may help us perceive the superhero as a shaper of one’s moral 
identity and moral imagination (Martin, 2007), and, lastly, their roles in refining 
society’s vision of a critical mode of hoping (Webb, 2008). However, we fail to 
remember the highlight when Dyson (1997) speaks of children as ‘heroes of the 
future’, as the real shapers and purveyors of hope, harmony, and happiness, who are 
just inspired by our superheroes. Here, we may curiously recall Webb’s (2008) 
assertion that “hope needs to be educated, guided and directed” (p. 198). It is here that 
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superheroes serve this function by renewing our senses of lost hope (Sargent, 1994) 
and ensuring that their utopian visions are communicated well to the audiences.  
 
What is left, partly, is our responsibility to transform their visions to our present-day 
reality. Utopian imagination is conceived as a movement of “alternative possibilities” 
(Fournier, 2002, p. 192) which is where our superheroes attempt at suggesting the 
incorporation of alternative ways of thinking to be able to hope both critically and 
socially (Webb, 2008). However, the last step is ours to take, for utopias are possible, 
but, as Sargent (1994) hints, only through dedication, proactivity, and a collective kind 






‘Can I not get angry?’ Shifting Gender Dynamics in Children’s 
Animations 
 
Stories, Gender, and Misrepresentation 
 
In the preface to his first edition of The Empire’s Old Clothes, Ariel Dorfman (2010) 
had remarked: 
 
Industrially produced fiction has become one of the 
primary shapers of our emotions and our intellect in the 
twentieth century. Although these stories are supposed 
merely to entertain us, they constantly give us a secret 
education. We are not only taught certain styles of 
violence, the latest fashions, and sex roles by TV, 
movies, magazines, and comic strips; we are also taught 
how to succeed, how to love, how to buy, how to 
conquer, how to forget the past and suppress the future. 
We are taught, more than anything else, how not to rebel 
(p. xxi). 
 
Earlier in the “Introduction”, we had skimmed through Gerbner’s (2004) thoughts 
about the socialising function of a certain type of ‘stories’ that possess the ability to 
(1) awaken individuals to the existing socio-political problems and (2) inspire them to 
do something about it. It is interesting to note how Gerbner’s (2004) accounts 
contradict Dorfman’s (2010) in their opinions about stories’ potential(s) to instigate 
human action. However, where Gerbner’s optimism could be supported by media-texts 
that are marked by profundity, Dorfman’s arguments cannot be deemed completely 
untrue and does convey significant rationalism. 
 
Dorfman’s (2010) critique perfectly fits into the descriptions of contemporary 
animations’ stereotypical representations of gender. It poignantly recollects from 
Carter and Steiner’s (2004) assertions about media-texts’ tendency to “socialize 
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people, especially children, into thinking that dichotomized and hierarchical sex-role 
stereotypes were ‘natural’ and ‘normal’” (p. 2). Their statements capitalise on media-
texts’ purported intention to leave no room for change, retracing the Gramscian 
philosophy of hegemony that paves the way to the ‘naturalisation’ and ‘normalisation’ 
of not only stereotypes, but also a gamut of other serious issues about gender, 
sexuality, and women’s lives. Hegemony survives through the principles of 
ideological supremacy and is considered dangerous due to its natural inclination (1) 
towards the normalisation of what it deems acceptable/favourable and (2) the rejection 
of what it deems unconventional/non-conformist. 
 
Furthermore, the misrepresentation of women characters is often inter-twined with 
male subjectivity that partakes in their on-screen characterization. This highlights 
another reason behind their misrepresentation, which was an abnormal preponderance 
of men occupying positions as content-creators (Perea, 2018), relegating women to 
more laborious tasks like “painting” or inking (Bell, 1995, p. 107). This professional 
imbalance instigated two discrepancies: (1) zero involvement of women in the 
ideological development of any animation (Bell, 1995); and (2) the creation of 
animated women characters that passively mirrored “men’s beliefs [and fantasies] 
about women” that were, conversely, inspired by the then-cultural positions of women 
in society (Wosk, 2015, p. 10). 
 
However, with the advent of second-wave feminism during the 1960-70s, the media-
industry witnessed a subtle change that manifested as an alarming upsurge in women 
cartoonists and animators, who were able to touch upon issues/subjects that centred 
more closely around womanhood and the woman’s body (Montresor, 2004; Wells, 
1998). Although Montresor (2004) addresses many of these women’s cartoons as 
“exaggerations” (p. 335)- in a vein similar to the ones created by men- she maintains 
that these cartoons were charged with “a sense of community” (p. 336) that built itself 
on freedom of expressions, female agency, and togetherness. To Wells (1998), this 




Understanding the ‘Feminine Aesthetic’ 
 
The ‘feminine aesthetic’, according to Wells (1998), is more of a political expression 
of a feminine consciousness that departs from “male representations of women” and 
indulges in serious debates about women’s lives and issues that often spring as 
reactions against patriarchy and masculinist authority. It could be perceived as a 
gateway for women animators/cartoonists to lay open their insecurities/vulnerabilities 
and inspire discussions about personal, biological, social, or cultural issues that “male 
animators could not deal with” (Wells, 1998, p. 199).  
 
The concept of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ is multifaceted. It allows animators to explore 
a broad spectrum of women’s issues, including language, desire, the female ‘body’, 
and other tabooed topics- like incest or menstruation- that are either negligibly 
discussed in men’s fantasies (Wosk, 2015) or are manipulated/mocked by a patriarchal 
discourse and intellect. As a reactionary movement to such representational 
inequalities, the ‘feminine aesthetic’ foregrounds the interplay of subjectivity and 
feminism, highlighting what has been ignored, misrepresented, or satirised. 
 
Wells (1998) notes that one defining aspect of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ is its 
acknowledgment of “the shift from the representation of woman as object, to the 
representation of woman as subject” (p. 200). This solidifies itself in the representation 
of female characters in Josie and the Pussycats (1971-72) and Doraemon (1979-2005), 
wherein female characters are attributed with a sense of individuality and feminist 
agency. These animations become staples of an evolving consciousness that no longer 
positions women as “erotic spectacles or of marginal narrational interest” (Wells, 
1998, p. 200) but reimagines them as active, “speaking subjects” (Sells, 1995, p. 177). 
 
However, prior discussing these animations, we would be looking at Triton of the Sea 
(1972) as a counterexample to help us situate a disempowered-Pipiko against the 
images of much-empowered women from the other two animations and vice-e-versa. 
This may help us analyse the women from the latter two animations as unique 
precursors to a trend that occurred between the 80/90s, defined by the hashtags of ‘Girl 
Power’ (Perea, 2015). So many animations have since emerged that have passionately 
conveyed feminist messages. However, by discussing these children’s animations of 
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the 70s, we attempt to align their productions with the growth of the ‘feminine 
aesthetic’ (Wells, 1998) and recognise them as fresh products of a changing 
consciousness that was influenced by the women’s movements of the 60/70s. Through 
these analyses, we ultimately aim to highlight how these animations provide the 
impetus to reinstate society’s perceptions about gender and sexuality through a 
pioneering range of human characters that defy stereotypes and conventionalisms. This 
helps us appreciate animations’ burgeoning importance in children’s socialisation, and 
how mass media is attempting to disseminate positivity about diversity and otherness. 
 
Woman as ‘Object’  
 
At this juncture, it is beneficial if we throw some light on how women were/are framed 
in children’s cultural products. Elkin (1960) points out that mass media is known to 
offer “a wider range of role-taking models” (p. 73). However, this may become a 
subject of immediate concern if children are made to dwell over distorted and 
stereotyped representations of things which could, further, lead to the development of 
children’s perceptions about the world around them from a ‘gender-schematic’ lens 
(Bem, 1983; Walsh & Leaper, 2020).  
 
One such dangerous representation in children’s entertainment and media belongs to 
the ‘animated woman’ (Layng, 2001). Within this context, de Lauretis (1984) 
poignantly remarks that “the dominant cinema specifies woman in a particular social 
and natural order, sets her up in certain positions of meaning, fixes her in a certain 
identification” (p. 15). This status of fixity corresponds to what Tuchman (1978) had 
addressed as the “symbolic annihilation” (p. 8) of women in media-representations 
that capitalises on women’s media-image as non-speaking and monotonous subjects 
(McCabe et al., 2011). Here, it should be noted that by ‘non-speaking’, we connote 
animated women’s on-screen persona as being devoid of individuality, unlike Walsh 
and Leaper’s (2020) research that deduces that women talk more than men (p. 22). By 
‘non-speaking’, we do not imply an individual’s physical ability to communicate, but 





It does not surprise us that women’s portrayal- and position- in animation, and other 
related products, over the years has been consistently bleak, limited, and aimed at 
naturalising a discomforting patriarchal sentiment (Gwynne, 2015; Lugo-Lugo & 
Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009). Contemporary animation has been accused of polarising 
women characters across stringent dichotomies between (1) ‘beauty/good’ and 
‘ugly/bad’ (Bazzini et al., 2010) or (2) ‘passive/good’ and ‘powerful/bad’ (Burguera, 
2011). 
 
This implies that women characters were framed in two ways. Either they were 
beautiful and morally-virtuous or unattractive and morally-corrupt, or they were 
projected as passive subjects but morally-virtuous or as authoritative figures but 
morally-corrupt. Particularly, in terms of displaying power, animation movies (the 
ones by Disney, for instance) have been infamous for projecting powerful women in 
strictly “negative terms” (Burguera, 2011, p. 69). It reminds us of Layng’s (2001) 
remark, wherein she notes that Disney propagates an ideology that approves women’s 
sense of control only when it is practiced within the boundaries of the ‘home’. The 
possibility of power being practiced by women beyond-the-home is either ridiculed 
(Gwynne, 2015) or suggested to bring massive repercussions for women (Ross, 2004). 
 
Disney has been considered a staple in children’s animation, a major influence on other 
animators, and, undeniably, the locus of extreme media-criticism. Though some critics 
appreciate Disney’s endeavours in creating memorable and complex women characters 
over the years (Schiele et al., 2020; Davis, 2006), many have offered equally immense 
backlash (Giroux, 1999; Layng, 2001; Ross, 2004; Whitley, 2013). Ross (2004) went 
ahead to argue that in the process of naturalising gender/racial stereotypes, Disney 
distorts and silences the “fairy tales’ originally female voice” (p. 63) to accommodate 
the values of what Schiele et al. (2020) have addressed as “‘soft feminism’” (p. 667). 
 
This approach towards ‘soft feminism’ transpires “a complex blend of progressive and 
traditional attitudes” (Henry, 2007, p. 274) which is even reflected in the most-recent 
enterprises of Disney in the 21st century (England et al., 2011, p. 564), an age attended 
by the philosophies of post-feminism. With respect to contemporary Disney 
princesses, Wilde (2014) argues that they are allowed to “skim the surfaces of post-
113 
 
femininity”, asserting power and free will, before they are pulled back “to the 
traditional resolution of romantic love and true loves kiss” (p. 147). 
 
This predicament even applies to several other present-day animations that represent 
gender in a way that does not align with the shifting and progressive socio-political 
paradigms and developing male-female relationships (Pila et al., 2018). These 
concerns are being answered, albeit positively, by researchers who argue that gender-
representations have substantially improved in children’s media products, which has 
been possible due to a smooth influx of women animators and content-creators into 
the media-industry who are actively contributing to a developing body of animations 
that are feminist, diverse, inclusive, and ‘agendered’ (Mihailova, 2019; Potter, 2017). 
 
Woman as ‘Subject’ 
 
These animations are critically informed by the three under-represented, or over-
looked, aspects of female/feminine experience (Montresor, 2004, p. 337), the queer 
identity (Mihailova, 2019), and cultural invisibility (Potter, 2017). Women animators 
have attacked this media-discrepancy by redressing “gender imbalance” (Potter, 2017, 
p. 65) in animations through three methods: ‘subversion’, ‘minimisation’ and 
‘diversification’. This implies that they have attempted to re-modify the cultural 
demographics by subverting traditional gender roles (placing women in non-
traditional/unexpected roles); minimising (or, at extreme cases, avoiding) stereotypical 
representations of gender; and incorporating an ethnically and sexually diverse range 
of characters (Potter, 2017). By the latter-most point, we hint at the recent introduction 
of an assemble of sexualities (Mihailova, 2019), masculinities (Sales, 2019), and 
female minorities (Keys, 2014) that have begun receiving an unbiased share in 
animated representation. 
 
The ‘improved’ animated representations of women, in particular, could be felt 
through their emancipated outlook, as they are often attributed the quality of what 
Neira-Piñeiro et al. (2021) address as ‘transformational leadership’ (p. 616). Such 
representations bestow women characters with an individuality to evolve as “speaking 
subjects” (Sells, 1995, p. 177), exercise control and freedom, and “achieve dreams and 
self-discovery” (Schiele et al., 2020, p. 666). This paves the way to accomplishing 
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what Lemish (2010) implicitly suggests as ‘numerical equality’ that proposes a faithful 
treatment of gender across genres and an equal sex-preponderance. Even though this 
feminist trend is yet to solidify itself in contemporary animation (Spark, 2016), it is 
worth reflecting on how the animated representation of women have substantially 
enhanced since the advent of the second-wave of feminism in the 60/70s. If today’s 
‘nuanced’ animated woman is perceived as possessing “depth, emotion, strength, 
vulnerability, courage and ambition” (Hughes, 2016, as cited in Potter, 2017, p. 68), it 
is largely because of the popular feminist imaginations of the 60/70s that helped shape 
and inform the shifting aesthetics in animated narratives (Burguera, 2011, p. 65).  
 
Perea (2015) addresses the rise of cartoons that revolve(d) around the themes of ‘Girl 
Power’, reflecting a “cartoon renaissance in the 1990s” (p. 191). This stream of 
cartoons became famous for their representation of animated girls who embodied what 
Perea (2015) labels as the “feminine triptych” (p. 194), as beautifully captured in The 
Powerpuff Girls (1998). Perea’s (2015) feminine triptych comprised three intrinsic 
qualities that were repeated in the portrayal of many of 90s’ girl cartoons: “beauty, 
brains, and brawn” (p. 191). The triptych exemplified modern ‘girlhood’ that was 
perceived as an inspirational icon for young females (Schiele et al., 2020). It 
epitomised a kind of feminism that departed from the conventionalisms of female 
‘symbolic annihilation’ (Tuchman, 1978) and opened avenues for ideological change.  
 
Quite surprisingly, this ‘change’ began occurring way back in the 80s (Perea, 2015) 
and was even reflected, for instance, in many of Sweden’s feminist comics of the 
70/80s. According to Nordenstam and Wictorin (2019), comics became an unusual 
platform for artists- inspired by the women’s liberation movement- to critically discuss 
women’s issues and re-locate women’s positions in private and public domains. These 
feminist comics were driven by the political agenda of the second-wave (the ‘personal 
being political’) and shifted the attention of the public eye to a massive range of female 
subjects, including “women’s history and culture, lesbianism, sexuality, the body, 
consumerism and environmental issues” (Nordenstam & Wictorin, 2019, p. 79). As 
Keys (2014) addresses cartoons as “a form of cultural pedagogy” (p. 357), the 
exploration of women’s issues through comics in the 70/80s suggests two crucial 
points of arrival: (1) that the significance of cartoon or animation to discuss more 
serious concerns (Wells, 2009) started receiving more critical thought/recognition; and 
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(2) that the effects of the women’s liberation movements began reflecting itself in the 
social vocabulary of animations/cartoons of the 70s. 
 
We identify a similar fashion formulating in Josie and the Pussycats (1971) and 
Doraemon (1979) in their treatments of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ (Wells, 1998) as 
argued above. Most important, that way these animations could be upheld as pioneers 
of a feminist trend in animations that later had its breakthrough in the ‘Girl Power’ 
renaissance of the 80/90s (Perea, 2015). These two animations departed from the usual, 
orthodox, conservative portrayal of women (albeit subtly) and introduced themselves 
to fresh avenues of feminist approach that upholds women as “speaking subjects” 
(Sells, 1995, p. 177), rather than diminishing them to voicelessness (Tuchman, 1978). 
The latter point, as we had mentioned in the beginning, about ‘voicelessness’ finds a 
discomforting illustration in the first animation discussed herein, Triton of the Sea 
(1972), and towards which we now should drive our attention to.  
 
Discussion: From Objectification to Emancipation  
 
I. Triton of the Sea (1972) 
 
In Chapter I, we have already discussed the transformative factor about Triton’s 
‘odyssey’ and how the odyssey has been incorporated within the plot-aesthetics to 
inspire viewers about feelings of courage, self-reliance, and responsibility. Within that 
context, the anime manages to endure its socialising factor, but somehow dramatically 
fails in its portrayal of women characters, particularly Pipiko and Siren’s. In their 
representations, the audiences might visualise an orthodox duality that critics like 
Perea (2018) and Burguera (2011) have pointed out in their critiques of the 
animations/cartoons of the 50/60s.  
 
As discussed above, women characters were often segregated according to a rigorous 
dichotomy that positioned them as either ‘docile/sassy’ (Perea, 2018) or ‘good/bad’ 
(Burguera, 2011). A similar paradigm could also be perceived in Triton of the Sea, 
considering how Pipiko emerges as the voiceless, but naive, companion in Triton’s 
enterprise; whereas Siren is depicted as an authoritative, but exclusively ‘evil’, 
member of the Poseidon clan, committed to killing Triton. This dichotomy, 
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conclusively, corresponds with the ‘symbolic annihilation’ of women in children’s 
media (Tuchman, 1978) that either denies them agency or reflects that same agency 
negatively (Layng, 2001, p. 204) as possessing self-damaging traits, as we can, here, 
perceive being reproduced through Siren’s character. 
 
If we first speak about Pipiko, it should be mentioned that she represents the figure of 
a ‘mermaid’, and it is in her portrayal as a ‘mermaid’ that an issue of representation 
could be easily located. Speaking exclusively in terms of The Little Mermaid (1989), 
Sells (1995) argues that the image of the ‘mermaid’ could be viewed as a “liberatory” 
symbol (p. 176). Although Triton of the Sea (1972) predates The Little Mermaid 
(1989), Sells’ arguments could be still employed to support and defend our critique of 
Pipiko as a female character, devoid of all values of Wells’ (1998) ‘feminine aesthetic’. 
 
To Wells (1998), this feminine consciousness is vastly represented through the images 
of “woman as subject” (p. 200), in the sense that it reconceptualises women as assertive 
entities (Sells, 1995). This hopelessly fails to be reflected in the image of Pipiko, who 
is constantly portrayed as materialistic, irascible, impulsive, ignorant, and voiceless. 
Triton of the Sea either limits her within a relegated status or thoroughly (ab)uses her 
ignorance and impulsivity to put Triton and the accompanying dolphins in danger. This 
implies the restrictions within which the anime has created Pipiko, leaving no room 
for her sense of individuality to develop. Consequently, the anime traps Pipiko by 
positioning her as an “object” (Wells, 1998, p. 200). Her portrayal is not constructive 
for her(self) and gets overtly swallowed by the centrality that Triton receives (Aley & 
Hahn, 2020), as she succumbs to the fictional position of either a “silent or 
unopinionated consort” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 4). 
 
At one surprising instance, in “Episode-IV”, during a dinosaur-attack, Pipiko loses her 
“hair accessory” (Triton of the Sea, 2018b) and- despite escaping to safety with Ruka 
and the other dolphins- decides on going back to retrieve the lost hair-necklace. It 
might seem that the anime is trying to mock her womanly attributes, when she goes to 
the extent of labelling the accessory as her “everything” (Triton of the Sea, 2018b, 
18:04). This episode could be interpreted as a re-enactment of the same ‘symbolic 
annihilation’ of women (Tuchman, 1978) by imagining a woman’s world strictly 
within the realms of physical beauty, cosmetics, and fashion (Pila et al., 2018). 
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Furthermore, the status of centrality that Pipiko bestows upon her hair-necklace 
validates her position within the anime as that of an ‘object’: a worthless entity and a 
source of patriarchal laughter (Wells, 1998, p. 200). 
 
Although Pipiko retrieves her necklace, her actions fuel Triton’s anger. Throughout 
the anime, Triton is portrayed as the most pivotal character (it is, indeed, Triton’s own 
journey), but there seems to be a constant imbalance between Triton and Pipiko’s 
representations. Both epitomise the sole surviving members of the Triton clan, 
mutually experiencing feelings of homelessness and nostalgia. Yet, the anime 
overshadows Pipiko’s longing for home (embodied in Proteus, a walrus and Pipiko’s 
guardian-figure) by the anxiety and identity-crisis that Triton often feels towards his 
role as the messiah of the Triton-clan. In multiple ways, Triton of the Sea liberates the 
stereotype of male-superiority by (1) overlooking Pipiko’s private anxieties (which are 
rarely attended by the three dolphins) and (2) yielding all sense of control to Triton 
(Sales, 2019). 
 
This domineering factor about Triton allows him, at one instance (in “Episode-X”), to 
slap Pipiko when she disappears momentarily. This instance could be severely 
criticised as a hallmark in the anime, wherein male aggression on a woman is neither 
questioned nor ridiculed. More surprising is the fact that the anime projects Triton to 
be most-triggered (that he raises his hand on her) after Pipiko asserts that she “has 
[her] own will to go anywhere” (Triton of the Sea, 2018c, 19:54). It is here that one 
could easily perceive how the anime quickly snaps out Pipiko’s sense of self-
liberation, pulling her back to her subjugated position.  
 
In this context, we can recall Ross’ (2004) critique of Disney ‘girl’ movies that play 
with the “originally female voice” (p. 63) of the tales the movies are adapted from for 
two purposes: (1) to highlight the ‘repercussions’ of female 
emancipation/independence; and (2) curb feminine imagination. To Ross (2004), 
Disney manipulates the original tales (that could be deemed more progressive (in 
thought) than the films) to project its female protagonists’ ‘solo’ adventures as having 
negative consequences for themselves and, thereby, warning its female consumers to 




Unfortunately, Triton of the Sea puts Pipiko on a similar tangent that disapproves of 
her as having a “will” of her own, reminding her of some patriarchy-imposed limits. 
This is re-echoed when Triton classifies her behaviour as a “bad manner” (Triton of 
the Sea, 2018c, 20:03). It is quite discomforting how the anime treats Pipiko, mocks 
her, silences her, ignores her personal growth as a woman, and resorts to violence if 
she tries to put her ‘own will’ on display. Sells (1995) interprets the mermaid-figure 
as a “critique [against] the narrow range of options that constrain women’s lives” (p. 
176), visualising the ‘mermaid’ as a symbol of emancipation, change, and agency. 
Sadly, these critical opinions do not match with the animated-portrayal of Pipiko, who 
is either projected in gendered ways or often kept at narrative-margins (Wells, 1998, 
p. 200). The anime decentralises Pipiko towards absolute docility and passivity, 
precluding her to demonstrate any kind of power like her antithesis: the ‘evil’ Siren. 
 
If we were to compare Siren with Pipiko, we may positively witness a massive 
difference: where Pipiko represents voicelessness, Siren embodies unbridled power, 
chaos, and audacity, to an extent that we can define her as one of Sells’ (1995) 
“speaking subjects” (p. 177). However, the anime reproduces our re-imaginations 
about Siren as a ‘speaking’ agent in a negative manner, leading her to be more hated 
than cherished by the audiences.  
 
It is interesting to perceive how the anime has endured the binaries of ‘ugly/bad’ 
(Burguera, 2011) in the image of Siren, who appears to share an unusual similarity to 
the figure of Gorgon Medusa (from Greek mythology). Although this similarity is not 
physical (Siren neither has snakes in place of hair nor does her gaze can turn anything 
to stone), her stone-converting whip might evidence a relationship between her and 
Medusa. Yet again, in feminist criticism, the figure of Medusa has often been cited as 
a symbol of feminist defiance and resilience (Cixous, 1975/1976). However, in Siren’s 
resemblance to Medusa, this relationship has been primarily used to vindicate the 
depictions of physically unattractive females as morally-corrupt (Bazzini et al., 2010). 
 
Furthermore, it could be suggested that the anime presents a ‘powerful/unattractive’ 
female largely for satirical purposes. Triton of the Sea opens the possibility for Siren 
to express herself in assertive ways- constantly displaying authority and audacity (for 
example, during her confrontation with the Shark Commander (a male character) in 
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“Episode-XI”) (Triton of the Sea, 2018d, 9:48 – 10:40) - yet regresses her before the 
audience by means of her unpleasant appearance and essentially negative character. In 
Siren’s character-formation, neither combinations of ‘powerful’ and ‘pretty’ (Fischer, 
2010) nor of ‘powerful’ and ‘positive’ (Burguera, 2011) seem to apply. 
 
Here, Siren’s character-development as both ‘powerful’ and ‘negative’ may socialise 
viewers into thinking that powerful women are morally corrupt individuals, and that 
‘good girls’ (Pila et al., 2018)- the female viewers, in this case- should not exercise 
any sense of control or power, considering the consequence that Siren’s character 
eventually faces. Siren’s death, in “Episode-XI” (20:15), at the hands of Triton, could 
be seen from two perspectives: where the (1) moral perspective may approach her 
death as justified (socialising viewers about the message of ‘goodness over evil’ that 
often perpetuates across several media-genres); the (2) feminist perspective may view 
her death as a reminder to young female consumers about exercising their sense of 
power exclusively within the limits of domesticity/home (Gwynne, 2015; Layng, 
2001; Ross, 2004). 
 
In this respect, the anime deploys Siren’s sense of agency to criticise the same 
‘feminine aesthetic’ that demands critical attention towards women’ dreams for self-
discovery and liberation (Wells, 1998) and maintains Pipiko’s docility to both ridicule 
and reinforce the societal positions of women. In doing so, the anime reproduces the 
same, old, traditional gender-stereotypes in its portrayal of either ‘subjugated’ or 
‘overshadowed’ (Pipiko) or ‘hated’ or ‘authoritative’ (Siren) women, who are 
frequently driven a disturbing sense of masculinist control (Sales, 2019). 
 
For all these reasons, Triton of the Sea could be perceived as a striking contrast to our 
other two animations in context to its approach towards female- and gender- portrayal. 
The anime reproduces a shallow, conservative, and gendered range of women 
characters who are constantly reminded, either overtly or covertly, of their 
powerlessness (Layng, 2001) against an ‘exalted’ male. Rather than subverting or 
challenging patriarchal control, the anime, as de Lauretis (1984) had argued, ‘fixes’ its 
animated women to specific social dynamics- operating outside the animation- that 
were often fabricated by the forces of sexism and patriarchy and that considerably 
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denied women social visibility (Potter, 2017, p. 67), mobility, and vocality, which we 
may perceive as substantially improving in the succeeding two animations.  
 
II. Josie and the Pussycats (1971-72) 
 
Unlike the above-discussed anime, Josie and the Pussycats emerges, albeit subtly, as 
a buoyant example of Wells’ (1998) idea of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ in its 
representation of two female characters: Valerie Smith/Brown and Alexandra Cabot. 
Even though there are two more female protagonists (Josie McCoy and Melody 
Valentine) within the narrative, the former two more closely fit within Wells’ (1998) 
paradigm and, therefore, would be the centre of our critical attention, though we may 
occasionally run into the other two females for comparative/critical purposes. 
However, before we move onto analyse the animations’ representations of its women, 
it seems necessary to shed some light on the backdrop that informs this animation, for 
this is the only animation that has not been analysed elsewhere in the dissertation.  
 
Josie and the Pussycats involves a three-girl pop music band- comprising Josie (the 
band’s lead-singer), Valerie, and Melody- as they travel and perform across the world 
alongside Alexander Cabot III (their manager), his sister, Alexandra, and Alan 
Mayberry (their technician, and Josie and Alexandra's mutual love interest). Across its 
sixteen, ‘simple’ episodes, the animation features the band’s adventures and their 
subsequent entanglement into strange crime mysteries that they try resolving before 
successfully performing at their destined musical-venue, where the episode ends. 
However, where the episodes have been crafted with unwavering simplicity, the 
animation’s representations of gender are covertly progressive and, thus, often not ‘too 
simple’ to perceive. 
 
As Gwynne (2015) once noted, “domesticity, it appears, must be left behind if women 
are to become emancipated subjects” (p. 56). This sense of ‘domesticity’ significantly 
may imply dual connotations: (1) women’s departure from the constraints of the 
‘home’ towards industry and employment; and (2) women’s rejection of their 
patriarchal subjugation as ‘voiceless’ objects (Wells, 1998). Quite interestingly, both 
the meanings perfectly fit the ‘emancipatory’ paradigm (Gwynne, 2015) within which 
the pussycats are positioned. Precisely, in their representation as travelling musicians, 
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the animation manages to project the transition of its women from being a voiceless 
“object” to being a liberated, speaking “subject” (Wells, 1998, p. 200; Sells, 1995). 
 
Unlike Pipiko’s, Josie and the Pussycats attempts to depart from the frequent symbolic 
destruction of women characters (Tuchman, 1978) by bestowing them with 
individuality and independence that they exercise in their roles as ‘travelling 
musicians’. This clause may break into two segments and can define the pussycats’ 
positions as (1) travellers and (2) musicians, suggesting their feminist emancipation 
out of domesticity (Gwynne, 2015; Sells, 1995). This way the animation displays a 
brave feminine aesthetic (Wells, 1998) and effaces gender and social boundaries by 
featuring independent, liberated, unsilenced animated women (Layng, 2001; 
Tuchman, 1978). Amongst the pussycats, the portrayal of Valerie Smith seems the 
strongest, wherein Josie and the Pussycats answers critics’ rising concerns pertaining 
to ‘diversity’ (Pila et al., 2018) and ‘equality’ (Potter, 2017). By depicting Valerie as 
an (1) Afro-American, (2) mechanical engineer, the animation offers freshness in its 
representation of members from other groups (Keys, 2014) and re-positions Valerie in 
a non-traditional role that has been often ‘stereotypically’ attributed to male characters 
(Potter, 2017). 
 
Klein and Shiffman (2006) had pointed out that animated African-American characters 
have been systematically projected under the stereotypical limits of a “‘singer’, 
‘dancer’, or ‘musician’” (Keys, 2014, p. 364). This opinion does apply to the social 
position of Valerie as an Afro-American member of an all-girls’ music band; however, 
the animation pushes her representation beyond the ‘stereotype’ that Klein and 
Shiffman (2006) speak of by re-positioning Valerie as a mechanical genius. Her 
mechanical feats are usually strewn across the narrative but are most evident in two 
respective episodes (entitled “Strangemoon Over Miami” and “X Marks the Spot”) 
when (1) she alters the wiring system of a space-capsule (bringing Alexandra, 
Alexander and Melody back to Earth) (WatchCartoonOnline.bz, 2020d, 15:08) and (2) 
repairs the brakes of an uncontrollable bus (thus, regaining the bus’s control) 
(WatchCartoonOnline.bz, 2020c, 10:28). In a way, one can perceive that Valerie is 
‘doubly emancipated’: (1) as an Afro-American musician signifying the growing trend 
in animation about diversity and inclusivity (Keys, 2014); and (2) as an expert of 
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mechanics, signifying not only women’s arrival onto fresh, non-conservative social 
roles, but also women’s evolution as Wells’ (1998) ‘speaking subject archetype’. 
 
However, where the animation may uphold the empowered character of Valerie, it 
could become a subject of equally severe criticism for its implicit indoctrination of the 
prototype of the hourglass female figure (Sá & Tavares, 2017) and partial rejection of 
other female body types. Josie and the Pussycats, as Sá and Tavares (2017) highlight, 
only features women characters as having “slim (or even extremely thin) hourglass 
figures, long legs and pretty faces” (p. 351). It uses instances of the portrayal of ‘non-
slim’ women for the purpose of either implicit “denigration” or “trivialization” 
(Tuchman, 1978, p. 13), wherein it projects only chubby, unattractive females. Here, 
it should be pointed out that these women are not featured as sentient entities, like the 
pussycats, but have been depicted either in a street-banner, in “Spy School Spoof” 
(WatchCartoonOnline.bz, 2020e, 04:43), or as balloon-dummies, in “Swap Plot Flop” 
(WatchCartoonOnline, 2020b, 14:18), which further suggests a discomforting 
philosophy that the animation attempts to disseminate (Burguera, 2011).  
 
By projecting these women within 'non-alive' dimensions, Josie and the Pussycats 
cleverly accomplishes two purposes. Firstly, it reiterates the traditional ‘beauty 
stereotype’ that is connected to female body shapes (Rowe, 2019), and that frequently 
extols the hourglass figure as the most ideal and desirable (Sá & Tavares, 2017). 
Secondly, the animation reproduces a dominant ideology- that denunciates women 
(Tuchman, 1978) who possess other body-types, particularly ‘pear’ or ‘round’ shapes- 
without explicitly portraying a ‘physically-alive’ female character of a similar body 
shape that may attract similar aligning criticism, thereby, manipulatively guarding 
itself from the latter criticism. In “Swap Plot Flop”, for example, the animation places 
the two balloon-dummies against the bodies of Josie and Melody, as they are projected 
as holding the dummies, for (1) satirising the bodies of the dummies (and, in doing so, 
mocking their media-consumers who share the bodies as the dummies) and (2) offering 
an attractive-scale for the audience to compare the physical appearances of the 





These occasional, covert, and satirical representations of ‘non-alive’ and ‘chubby’ 
females regresses the animation back to the league of gendered animations like Triton 
of the Sea that are infamous for their voiceless female characters. Through these 
representations, the animation not only implicitly body shames young female 
consumers, but also contributes to the cultivation of low levels of self-confidence and 
optimism in women about their private and public identities (Bazzini et al., 2010). 
However, where the animation could be accused of developing a discomforting form 
of body-consciousness amongst young women (in particular), it could still be 
appreciated, as already-mentioned, for its innovative approach towards the ‘feminine 
aesthetic’ (Wells, 1998). We have already discovered how this aesthetic develops in 
Valerie, but of special interest is the character of Alexandra, who- despite not being a 
member of the girls’ band- occupies the centre-stage throughout the episodes, to an 
extent that she could be deemed ‘more’ central to the animation than the pussycats.  
 
Where Valerie’s depictions are the strongest, Alexandra’s appear the boldest. The 
animation constructs her as the most expressive amongst all characters, hinting at a 
volcanic manifestation of the feminine aesthetic at display. Wells (1998) had 
poignantly remarked that this aesthetic could be revealed through several means, 
including a woman’s “interaction with men and other women, her perception of her 
private and public role” (p. 200), and the recognition of her feminine desire. These 
three aspects intertwine in Alexandra and are usually observed in her relationships 
with others, particularly Alan and Josie. 
 
Josie and the Pussycats offers shades of progressive thoughts when it allows 
Alexandra (1) to suggest her romantic desire for Alan to the audiences and (2) pull 
Josie away from Alan’s constant attention. It is worth mentioning that where 
Alexandra’s romantic, yet unfruitful, chase for Alan may be interpreted as a 
reproduction of the stereotypical belief that men frequently occupy the centre in 
women’s worlds (Davis, 2006)- and her constant attempts to embarrass Josie as a 
manifestation of romantic jealousy- her sense of control and detailed construction as a 
“speaking subject” (Sells, 1995, p. 177) eclipses her failed attempts in romance. As a 
woman, Alexandra is gifted with all the agency to express her sense of desire (Wells, 
1998), unlike Pipiko who endures Triton’s dominance and, finally, resorts to 
‘voicelessness’ (Tuchman, 1978). This is where Alexandra’s character arrives as a 
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milestone in the historical evolution of animated women characters as “emancipated 
subjects” (Gwynne, 2015, p. 56; Perea, 2015). 
 
Additionally, Alexandra’s sense of emancipation is subtly informed by her complete 
rejection of domestic roles (Giles, 2004). For instance, in “The Nemo’s a No No 
Affair” (WatchCartoonOnline.bz, 2020a, 03:05), the group is asked to “work [their] 
way over” the cruise trip for they did not have enough money, and so, in the kitchen, 
when Valerie asks Alexandra if she wants to “wash or dry” the dishes, she answers her 
back by stating that she would do “neither”, but “supervise” (03:42). Being the first 
episode of the series, it affixes Alexandra with assertiveness, self-liberation, and an 
uncompromising sense of radical agency, all of which the animation preserves across 
its sixteen episodes. 
 
Another point worth remembering about Alexandra is that she is offered the most 
dialogues within the series, which is a factor often reported as another example of 
female-stereotyping (Walsh & Leaper, 2020, p. 22). Despite this finding, we perceive 
that the animation situates her dialogues- like her conversation with Valerie- as 
validations of her sense of authority that she exercises over others. Her statements 
stimulate her evolution as a more nuanced and complex character than the three 
pussycats. Where Valerie emerges as another empowered staple, she never manages 
to surpass Alexandra in terms of exerting power or authority. Alexandra’s character 
steps into an unexplored, unseen chasm of womanhood and self-liberation (Sells, 
1995). Collectively, the characters of Valerie and Alexandra connote to a critical 
transition of female representation from objectification towards emancipation that 
witnessed its culmination and further movements in the cartoons of the 80s/90s (Perea, 
2015). Their characters embody the spirit of the second-wave of feminism and take it 
forward to inspire viewers, especially women, to be independent, assertive, brave, and, 
most significantly, the “subject” that knows ‘how to speak’ (Sells, 1995, p. 177). 
 
Josie and the Pussycats becomes a pioneering example in the animation world by 
virtue of its on-screen implementation of changing gender and social values, 
(re)modifying the public image of women as self-possessed, liberated, powerful 
individuals who do not need what Aley and Hahn (2020) address as the “masculine 
touch” (p. 7) to help them pave their ways. Rather, the women in Josie and the 
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Pussycats seek absolute control without requiring male intervention, as it happens, for 
example, when Josie drives a bus in “X Marks the Spot” even when Alan (a male 
character) was already present in the bus. This sense of patriarchal defiance 
reverberates in the pussycats’ public image as musicians and successful position within 
the music industry- which is often attributed as sexist and male-dominated (Davies, 
2004)- as they are make frequent travels across the world to perform in their global 
musical concerts. For its time of production, Josie and the Pussycats heralds the 
maturity of Pipiko, as she now holds her ‘own will’ to transform as a speaking subject, 
unafraid of Triton or his ruthless kind (Wells, 1998; Sells, 1994). 
 
III. Doraemon (1979-2005) 
 
What distinguishes Doraemon (1979-2005) from Josie and the Pussycats (1971-72) 
are two transparent strands of critical thought. Firstly, the former’s partial rejection of 
what Connell (1987) had called “hegemonic masculinity” and, subsequent, 
mainstream introduction of what Beynon (2004) defines as the “new man” (p. 200). 
Secondly, its incorporation of the philosophy of the ūman ribu (women’s liberation 
movement(s) in Japan) in the character-developments of Jaiko Goda and Shizuka 
Minamoto. In doing so, Doraemon (1979-2005) takes a leap ahead of other animated 
works of its time by offering viewers a critical mode of change that aligns with both 
women’s and men’s changing social dynamics, emerging as a trailblazer in the 
dissemination of ūman ribu’s feminist philosophy in post-war Japan and beyond.  
 
Shigematsu (2018) speaks of the ūman ribu as “characterized by its militancy against 
Japanese patriarchy, [and] emphasis on. . . women-centered cultural transformation” 
(p. 206), amongst other aspects, including the movement’s “connection with, and a 
desire to be part of, a broader range of liberation movements that extended beyond 
Japan” (p. 206). The latter-point may confirm ūman ribu’s growth out of the US-led 
feminist movements of the 60s/70s that were known for their global influence and 
appreciation. In the world of Doraemon, this treatment of the ūman ribu on the cultural 
transformation of women is, firstly, subtly embodied in the character of Jaiko Goda, 
Gian’s younger sister, who often makes recurring on-screen appearances as a 




Ebihara (2002) mentions that manga/comic became an interesting form of expression 
for women to, typically, confront women’s issues in Japan during the rise of the ūman 
ribu, reminding us of how feminist cartoons became a weapon at the hands of women 
in Sweden to discuss issues related to women’s lives (Nordenstam & Wictorin, 2019), 
as revealed earlier in the chapter. It is interesting to note how comics (or manga in 
Japan), during the wake of the second-wave of feminism, began (1) defining a new 
trend in the entertainment industry that stimulated an influx of women 
artists/cartoonists (Nordenstam & Wictorin, 2019) which was (2) punctuated by an 
urgent recognition of women’s issues and experiences as women (Montresor, 2004). 
 
Even though Doraemon never discloses the content of any of Jaiko’s comics, it, 
nevertheless, situates Jaiko’s strength in her role as an author, allowing her to ‘write’ 
her destiny as a future comic artist. Additionally, the anime never employs Jaiko’s 
dreams as sources of ridicule but, instead, offers her all the support and love that she 
needs through her on-screen co-characters. Through Jaiko’s position as an author, 
Doraemon revolutionises the portrayals of women from being passive “objects” 
(Wells, 1998, p. 200) to becoming active “subjects” (p. 200), that further widens in the 
character of Shizuka Minamoto. 
 
In Shizuka’s portrayal as a ‘schoolgirl’, many viewers’ opinions would align with 
Western thought that perceives “the Japanese girl as charming, shy, obedient, hard-
working, deferential and uncomplaining” (Hinton, 2013, para. 6). Additionally, the 
Japanese meaning of ‘Shizuka’ as ‘Quiet’ strengthens her representation as an 
archetype of the Japanese schoolgirl- raising doubts if Shizuka possesses any elements 
of the feminine aesthetic (Wells, 1998)- who is only a “naïve, child-like character” 
(Hinton, 2013, para. 29) often employed as an erotic spectacle in animation (Wells, 
1998, p. 200). At a closer look, however, one may realise that Shizuka is, indeed, a 
nuanced character, being in possession of not only the traditional ‘Japanese girl’ 
attributes, but also a modern range of other qualities like “strength, vulnerability, 
courage and ambition” (Hughes, 2016, as cited in Potter, 2017, p. 68). At one instance, 
Shizuka becomes a magical, charming fairy (PureToons, 2019i), fulfilling wishes or 
saving others from harm (as she saves Gian and Suneo from a dog attack); whereas, in 
the other, she expresses deep anger at Doraemon and Nobita, as she runs after them, 
with a broomstick, yelling:  
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“गसु्सा क्या मझेु नही आ सकता?” 
translated as 
"Can I not get angry?"  
(PureToons, 2019j, 12:16) 
 
At both instances, we may come across the level of centrality that Shizuka receives in 
the narratives, and the sense of agency that is offered to her character. These instances 
allow her to develop as an individual and woman, becoming the first milestones in 
Shizuka’s representation as Wells’ (1998) “subject” (p. 200). As a magical fairy, for 
example, the anime ‘dresses’ her up to exercise the power of believing in one’s 
dreams- as it was Shizuka’s dream to become a fairy, inspiring young girls to be 
aspirational/dreamful. However, one may severely criticise the nature of Shizuka’s 
dream to be a conventional, feminine ‘fairy’ as limited and sexist (Walsh & Leaper, 
2020). 
 
Here, it would be worth remembering that her portrayal as a ‘fairy’ or ‘saviour’- noting 
how she saves Gian and Suneo- functions as a reflection of what Neira-Piñeiro et al. 
(2021) call “a transformational kind of leadership” paradigm (p. 616). This fresh 
paradigm situates Shizuka within the spectrum of altruism and self-liberation. It is 
through Shizuka’s altruistic actions that the anime (1) reminds her of her individuality 
and independence and (2) celebrates her character as a woman who is “determined, 
brave, and capable of making decisions” (Neira-Piñeiro et al. 2021, p. 616). 
 
Furthermore, it could be argued that a similar fashion may be felt in Shizuka’s angry 
demeanour, in the other instance, as she is seen running after (and yelling at) our two 
male protagonists. Firstly, Shizuka’s rhetorical question, “Can I not get angry?”, is a 
striking departure from the usual symbolic annihilation of women characters 
(Tuchman, 1978), and an enduring arrival at multiple points of female emancipation 
that could not be silenced, ridiculed, or ignored (Wells, 1998). Secondly, Shizuka’s 
apparent attack on Doraemon and Nobita is projected to serve dual-purposes: (1) to 
establish it as an archetype of feminist retaliation against the agents of patriarchal 
oppression, in the spirit of the ūman ribu (Shigematsu, 2018); and (2) re-confirm 
128 
 
Shizuka’s narrative-position as a “speaking subject” (Wells, 1998, p. 200) who exerts 
an assertive ‘control’ over not only others, but also her ‘self’ and ‘body’. 
 
The ‘feminine aesthetic’ deepens in this context, which is reiterated by Shizuka’s 
refusal to get her private-self exposed before Nobita. At one instance, to figure out 
which sex is better, Shizuka and Nobita exchange their skins (and get into each other’s 
bodies) with the help of a gadget called the “Replacement Rope” (PureToons, 2019k). 
Though Nobita miserably fails to pull-off his new identity, Shizuka, as Nobita, 
becomes quite comfortable in this identity until she finally realises that her ‘body’ 
belongs to Nobita, and quickly asks Doraemon to return her to her own(self) before 
her body gets exposed to Nobita’s ‘male gaze’.  
 
The question about women’s ‘control’ over their bodies and the male gaze has 
consistently been a topic of critical discussion amongst a whole range of scholars 
(Wells, 1998). One may perceive Shizuka’s anxious return to her ‘body’ as the anime’s 
symbolic celebration of women’s growing status as self-liberated agents who exercise, 
and possess, absolute authority and control over their private selves (Sells, 1995). 
Moreover, via Shizuka’s success as a male (Nobita), we may also argue that Doraemon 
attempts to imply the possibility of women’s success if gender roles are jettisoned. 
These transformations encourage a subtle introduction of women in masculine, “non-
traditional roles” (Potter, 2017, p. 70) and a re-establishment of women like Shizuka 
as modern, post-war symbols of what ūman ribu stands for (Shigematsu, 2018). 
 
Subsequently, Shizuka emerges as “a symbolic representation of young Japan” 
(Hinton, 2013, para. 5), reflecting the recovered and modern values of ūman ribu. In 
Shizuka, the audience may discover brief pockets of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ (though 
not as strongly as Alexandra’s) but, as a whole, Doraemon embodies in her the shifting 
social definitions of a ‘woman’ as an emancipated “subject” (Gwynne, 2015, p. 56; 
Wells, 1998, p. 200). It maintains Shizuka’s cultural preservation as a favourable role 
model for young viewers. 
 
Apart from the anime’s attempts to align its aesthetics with the values of the ūman ribu 
(Shigematsu, 2018) through the images of Shizuka and Jaiko, its most intriguing aspect 
rests in the character-portrayal of Nobita Nobi as the “new man” (Beynon, 2004, p. 
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200), as he becomes the anti-thesis to the hetero-normative codes of what Connell 
(1987) discusses as “hegemonic masculinity”. It should be noted that the ‘new man’ is 
considered as one of the three standard manifestations of the emergent, subversive 
masculinities (Sales, 2019) of the 70s/80s that arose, partly, due to the concurrent 
feminist movements’ impacts on men’s social and private lives (Beynon, 2004).  
 
Amongst the other two were the ‘anti-sexist man’ (Christian, 1994) and the ‘new lad’ 
(Beynon, 2004, p. 210). The former was defined by (1) his pro-feminist attitudes about 
issues as central as sexual autonomy, education, equal division of domestic labour, 
equal pay scale, amongst many others and (2) his sense of solidarity and cooperation 
with the feminist movements (Segal, 1990). The latter, on the other hand, became a 
flagrant opposer of (1) women’s “growing assertiveness” (Beynon, 2004, p. 210) and 
sense of control over society and polity and (2) the rise of what Connell and 
Messerschmidt (2005) call as “subordinated masculinities” (p. 832) which can include, 
but not limited to, the above-mentioned two types of subversive masculinities. 
 
It would be worth noting that in the representations of the ‘new man’, we may perceive 
a complicated juxtaposition of what the ‘anti-sexist man’ and the ‘new lad’ represent. 
The ‘new man’ is widely advertised as “a narcissistic man portrayed as macho with a 
‘soft centre'’, a man who takes an active part in childcare, at least when the cameras 
are about” (Christian, 1994, p. 11). Though the ‘new man’ has been immensely 
criticised as a projection of double standards, Chapman (1988) notes that the ‘new 
man’ may still provide some “useful role models for those redefining their 
masculinity” (p. 226). 
 
Likewise, in Nobita, we may visualise similar glimpses of the ‘new man’, with an 
exception that he is not portrayed as “narcissistic” or “macho” (Christian, 1994, p. 11). 
The anime often pictures Nobita as a soft young boy with an incessant longing to 
become a ‘new lad’, at least in front of his peers. Here, we can interpret his inclination 
towards cat’s cradle (a game of strings), preferences for girls’ company, disinterest in 
sports/any other physical activity as symptoms of his subversive masculinity (Sales, 
2019). While, at the same time, Nobita’s constant yearnings to become both physically 
powerful as Gian and intellectually capable as Dekisugi takes him back, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to the image of the ‘new lad’ that he desperately wishes to possess. In 
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doing so, Nobita usually swings between being the ‘soft man’ and the ‘new lad’ before 
returning to his original masculinity. 
 
At few instances, the anime reminds Nobita of his different masculinity, encouraging 
him to accept himself, and often comforting him by suggesting that there is nothing 
wrong with his choices and preferences. Though this task is usually performed by 
Doraemon, one episode features a sympathising robot that reiterates similar 
motivational words to a distressed Nobita. For example, when Gian pokes fun at 
Nobita by asserting that Nobita would have to “play with strings” all his life, the robot 
comforts an embarrassed Nobita: 
 
“िेसिोल कोई िास स्पोटट नही ह,ै और तुम्हारे बलए ये नही िना ह।ै“ 
translated as: 
"Baseball is not such a great sport, and it is not made for you"  
(PureToons, 2019h, 18:50). 
 
Even though the robot is talked of as an unreliable source of comfort and was solely 
manufactured to speak sugar-coated words of comfort- and, thereby, is more 
destructive than inspirational- its conversations with Nobita and, subsequent, rejection 
of gender codes and norms could be perceived as Doraemon’s appreciation of modern 
society’s transition from ‘conventional masculinity’ to ‘subversive masculinity’ 
(Sales, 2019), which is epitomised through the character of Nobita and prompted by 
the growing influence of the ūman ribu in the 70s. In Nobita, we may discover 
glimpses of a fresh type of masculinity that resembles Beynon’s (2004) ‘new man’, 
who is both traditional and unconventional, masculine and feminine, but who later 
accepts his different identity, albeit unwillingly than happily. 
 
Such fresh portrayals of masculinity and femininity help Doraemon underpin its links 
with the liberation movements of its times, which is reverberated in the image of 
Shizuka, Jaiko, and Nobita. While the former two represent an outgrowing 
manifestation of the feminine aesthetic (Wells, 1998) in post-war Japan, rejuvenating 
the position of the ‘Japanese girl’ misconstrued (by) in the West (Hinton, 2013), the 
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latter represents a shift towards the emotional emancipation of a once-tight form of 
masculinity. Here, one may compare Nobita to Alexander (from Josie and the 
Pussycats) considering their feeble physical makeups. However, where Josie and the 
Pussycats only presents a single side of Alexander’s personality, Doraemon projects 
Nobita as a nuanced protagonist with all his strengths, vulnerabilities, and insecurities.  
 
These intricacies in characterisation makes Doraemon an outstanding illustration of 
the feminist philosophy of the ūman ribu, wherein both the genders are represented in 
non-stereotypical fashions, levitating both men and women in the anime as archetypes 
of Sells’ (1995) “speaking subjects” (p. 177). Though Nobita often problematises this 
notion through his purported laddism (Beynon, 2004), we may still perceive his 
representation as a pioneering example of an emergent form of masculinity that 
combines elements of both hegemonic and subversive masculinity. As a ‘new man’, 
Nobita stands way better than Triton and, consequently, a more suitable role model for 
audiences who struggle with gender-codes. Doraemon’s emancipatory representations 
of Jaiko and Shizuka- paired with its sympathetic treatment of Nobita- highlights the 
anime’s progressive vision and its interests in departing from stereotypical 




Critics like Perea (2015) and Burguera (2011) have been invaluable in our crucial 
understandings of the evolution of girl cartoons during the 80s/90s. These productions 
were potentially infused with the philosophy of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ (Wells, 1998) 
that emerged in the 70s as a form of aesthetic and artistic expression, informed by an 
evolving feminine consciousness. We argued that this feminist renaissance (Perea, 
2015) in animations- that witnessed its breakthrough during the 80s/90s- began 
displaying its first signs of change in the animations of the 70s, namely Josie and the 
Pussycats (1971-72) and Doraemon (1979-2005).  
 
These two animations could be perceived as pioneers, representing a fresh, new dawn 
for feminism. In these two texts, we have perceived a significant development in the 
representations of women characters, in particular, and gender, in general, as they 
detach themselves from what we had discussed as the “symbolic annihilation” of 
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women (Tuchman, 1978, p. 8) and progress towards a more emancipated manifestation 
of character-representation that is marked by diversity (Keys, 2014), equality 
(Mihailova, 2019; Potter, 2017), and mutual respect. These animations break away 
from a wide category of animations that are often accused of gender-stereotyping (Pila 
et al., 2018; England et al., 2011) or reinforcing ethnic and sexual prejudice (Lugo-
Lugo & Bloodsworth-Lugo, 2009).  
 
It is here that we had discussed Triton of the Sea (1972) as an example to archetype 
the latter-mentioned category and deploy it as a comparative model for feminist 
critique while approaching the other two animations. In the character of Pipiko, we 
had visualised a concerning picture of patriarchal subordination that (1) makes its way 
through “victimization” and “trivialization” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 13) and (2) is 
frequently repeated by means of aggression, domination, or authority, as we had 
perceived in the sense of control that Triton exercises over Pipiko (Sales, 2019, p. 16). 
 
Against this gendered dynamic, we perceive how refreshing the feminist imaginations 
in Josie and the Pussycats and Doraemon are. By characters like Valerie, Shizuka or 
Alexandra, the audiences may discover an unanticipated rise of ‘animated women’ 
(Layng, 2001) who embody the strengths and vulnerabilities of womanhood (Potter, 
2017), combined with the urgency to acknowledge and appreciate the female 
experience (Montresor, 2004). As these animations intertwine themselves with the 
notion of the ‘feminine aesthetic’ (Wells, 1998), they begin introducing their women 
characters as less in a vacuum-like state (Tuchman, 1978) and more as what Wells’ 
(1998) had called a “subject” (p. 200), attributing them with everything that Pipiko 
had been denied: feminist agency, individuality, and, most importantly, the ability to 
speak (Sells, 1995, p. 177).  
 
As speaking subjects, these women demonstrate three vital aspects: (1) the validation 
of female potential in both social and private spaces; (2) their value as inspirational 
icons to young female viewers; and (3) their contribution into the making of the often-
celebrated animated girl characters of the 80s/90s (Perea, 2015). These women 
characters display signs of non-conformity, authority, liberty, and an unfamiliar sense 
of leadership capacity (Neira-Piñeiro et al., 2021). By ‘unfamiliar’, we imply a 
developing tendency in animation to portray gender in non-stereotypical fashions that 
133 
 
was unsurprisingly absent in animations made before the 70s, but ultimately released 
as a new, different wave of social and critical thought through these animations. 
 
This tendency towards an unorthodox, and more progressive, treatment of gender is, 
further, expanded over through the image of Nobita as the ‘new man’ (Beynon, 2004) 
and the transitions his character makes from the hegemonic strand of masculinity 
(Connell, 1987) towards the more subversive form (Sales, 2019). In one sense, 
Doraemon could be lauded for its inclusive treatment of the three forms of 
masculinities that Beynon (2004) highlights, all subtly represented through different 
male characters spread across the anime.  
 
Where Nobita is the ‘new man’ (trying to ‘fit-in’, while preserving his softness), Gian 
and Suneo epitomise the ‘new lad’ in their usual disapproval of Nobita’s non-
masculine preferences and their covert abhorrence towards anything that is ‘feminine’. 
However, while the ‘new lad’, as Beynon (2004) notes, despises the “growing 
assertiveness of women” (p. 210), Doraemon never positions Gian and Suneo as 
disrespectful towards Shizuka or any other female character. This may lead us to re-
think that the anime precisely offers glimpses of the developing laddism in small 
quantities that would still not appear as challenging the liberation movements. 
Although they do not want themselves to be identified with traditionally feminine 
aspects of private/public life (as, sometimes, Nobita is), but they always display signs 
of respect for their female peers and are generally not positioned as ever voicing any 
anti-feminist or sexist opinions.  
 
The third strand of masculinity that surfaces the narratives of Doraemon is represented 
by the recurring character of Hidetoshi Dekisugi who emerges as an example of the 
‘anti-sexist man’ (Christian, 1994), by virtue of his chivalrous attitude towards both 
male and female characters. Although Dekisugi plays no leading role, his portrayal is 
the most positive amongst all other male characters, as he may epitomise the notion of 
male solidarity with feminist thought (Segal, 1990), emerging as a suitable, ‘gender-
aschematic’ figure to be used by feminist parents for the gender socialisation of their 
children (Bem, 1983). However, his anti-sexism is never explicitly stated in Doraemon 




Josie and the Pussycats and Doraemon pioneer a fresh range of characters that do not 
shy away from being different and offer a transforming, progressive picture that aligns 
with the values of second-wave feminism. For example, in terms of female invisibility 
in animations (Potter, 2017) or the fixation of women to a single, outdated, gendered 
form of identification (de Lauretis, 1984), these animations depart from such orthodox 
practices and introduce their women characters to previously unexplored avenues of 
feminine representation as authoritative, liberated, individual subjects (Wells, 1998). 
 
It is worth highlighting that these two animations were both directed and created by 
male artists and animators: Josie and the Pussycats by Dan DeCarlo (creator), William 
Hanna, and Joseph Barbera (directors), and Doraemon by the celebrated Japanese duo, 
Fujiko Fujio (creators). Unlike the traditional, fabricated portrayal of animated women 
that is often informed by the socio-cultural attitudes of men towards women (Wosk, 
2015, p. 10), these male artists apparently exemplified a developing male 
consciousness that was inspired by the feminine consciousness of the 60/70s. Through 
these male artists, we may again perceive glimpses of the different masculinities that 
detached themselves from the normative form (Sales, 2019), and which later reflected 
in their respective productions, and that, further, became largely responsible for 
reshaping the feminist thought that later surfaced in contemporary animations 
(Burguera, 2011; Perea, 2015). 
 
Here, it would be helpful if we return to Dorfman’s (2010) intriguing remarks about 
media’s purported intention to teach viewers "how not to rebel" (p. xxi). However, 
despite being undoubtedly true, his remarks cannot be applied to Josie and the 
Pussycats and Doraemon. Contrary to what he believes, these animations “rebel” 
against conventional representations of gender, represent self-liberated and 
opinionated women characters, and, therefore, motivate viewers to rid themselves off 
the voicelessness of Pipiko and instead embrace Alexandra’s authority, Shizuka’s 






The Fish, the Ant, and the Bull: Instances of the ‘Autobiographical 
Animal’ 
 
Introduction to Anthropomorphism 
 
Across the dissertation, we have been trying to understand animations as symbolic, 
independent abstractions of the real world by analysing them from multiple 
perspectives (Wells, 1998). Jardim (2013) extends this critical viewpoint by reflecting 
over the significance of anthropomorphic animals that have extensively occupied the 
centre-stage in the animation industry since the first decade of the twentieth century. 
Controversial as it appears, the phenomenon of anthropomorphism, nonetheless, has 
been argued as a poignant catalyst for the process of identity-construction as the former 
stimulates our understandings of the social positions of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ 
(Gebhard et al., 2003). Searles (1960) discusses the inter-relationship between 
individuals and the “nonhuman environment” (p. 6) to recognise the role of the latter 
in the emotional and psychological development of humans. Although however, 
Searles (1960) is speaking in the context of schizophrenia, his argument helps us 
concretize the importance of the ‘animate’ nonhuman ‘Other’ (including all forms of 
flora and fauna) in humans’ perceptions about their and others social positions and 
how this sense of affinity becomes the locus of human-animal relations (DeMello, 
2012; Wilson, 1984), re-capturing a bigger portrait of compassion, dissonance, and 
identification. 
 
In the wake of the Anthropocene, the practice of anthropomorphism allows us, as the 
human-race, to reconsider our opinions and approaches towards the nonhuman 
‘Other’. It allows us to re-develop the avenues of human-centred interests into more 
inclusive spaces of moral consideration, and recognise the gravity of the Anthropocene 
(You, 2021). Anthropomorphism helps the nonhuman ‘Other’ re-discover its moral 
status as what Regan (1988) had beautifully expressed as “subjects-of-a-life” (p. 243). 
It repositions the ‘nonhuman’ by the pedestal of ‘othered’ centrality to recognise that 
“they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future. . . an 
emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain. . . the ability to initiate action 
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in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time” (Regan, 
1988, p. 243). 
 
If we strictly speak in context to ‘nonhuman’ animals (our analytical focus in this 
chapter), Anderson and Henderson’s (2005) scientific counterargument about animals 
as being incapable of “reflective consciousness” (p. 298)- which they argue as animals’ 
ineptitude to realise their self-awareness- may decapitate Regan’s (1988) account that 
is more engraved in moral ethics; but it is Regan’s (1988) argument that skyrockets 
the philosophical undertones of animal-sympathy and inter-species harmony. This 
may become the foundation of anthropomorphic animals-representations that explains 
the vitality of human-animal kinship (You, 2021). Such representations not only 
impart traditional human values, but also raises our awareness about animal rights, 
animal agency (DeMello, 2012; Regan, 1988), and what You (2021) has labelled as 
“creaturely consciousness” (p. 183).  
 
In relation to human values being imparted via using human-like animals, it is crucial 
to highlight that this feature of anthropomorphism has been severely criticised by 
critics like Hübben (2016) and Bone (2013). They argue that animals’ deployment as 
“conduits[s] for learning to be human” (Bone, 2013, p. 61) blurs our moral 
understanding of animals as co-inhabitants of the same ecosystem (You, 2021) and 
precludes us to deeply appreciate their significance and centrality within humans’ 
socio-cultural contexts. The latter criticism informs us about the urgency in 
introducing what Gebhard et al. (2003) have addressed as a “kind of ‘enlightened’ 
anthropomorphism” (p. 92-93). Such a manifestation of anthropomorphism, while 
apprising us of some human values, does not overlook the distinct ‘otherness’ of 
nonhumans and the various facets of their sense of ‘being’ and ‘existence’. 
 
This style of approaching anthropomorphism can become a bedrock to a genre of 
children’s literature that You (2021) calls “animal autobiography” (p. 190). It may be 
deployed as “an apt form for de-familiarizing human-centred territory” (p. 190) and 
which shall become the intersectional nexus of our understanding of the three animated 
movies we would be analysing in this chapter: Finding Nemo (2003), The Ant Bully 
(2006), and Ferdinand (2017). This framework would further support our general 
understanding of animations and their significance in the processes of children’s 
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socialisation. Moreover, it would help us acknowledge these narratives’ contributions 
to children’s understanding of human-animal relationships, creaturely consciousness, 
and the necessity of kindness and reverence. Exhibiting subtle features of the ‘animal 
autobiography’, the three movies transform into symbolic narratives of animal agency.  
 
These narratives probe into the human-animal dynamics to renew the audiences’ 
understandings of the dichotomies between the ‘human’ (Self) and the ‘animal’ 
(Other), their inter-relatedness and the importance of being aligned with the natural 
world (Wilson, 1984). In an attempt to inspire a ‘creaturely consciousness’, these 
movies validate the practice of anthropomorphism as a healthy, eco-centred 
exploration that aims at strengthening the ‘human-animal bond’ instead of damaging 
it, as many scholars claim, debate, and scrutinise (McFarland, 2009) which now brings 
us closer to perceive how anthropomorphism is misinterpreted as a complicated 
exercise that is both governed and driven by human interests and human selfishness. 
 
But is it ‘that’ Innocent? 
 
Hübben (2016) makes a pertinent observation by equating anthropomorphism to the 
phenomenon of ‘speciesism’ that is frequently debunked by animal rights activists as 
a thoroughly unfair, ‘evil’ illustration of human selfishness, and is closely related to 
the ‘sociozoologic scale’. As a form of ideological suppression, speciesism- as 
reflected in children’s animal picture-books- socialises children “into a tradition of 
thinking that systematically values humanity over animality and naturalises the 
domination of animals by humans” (Hübben, 2016, p. 50) and implicitly deploys the 
sociozoologic scale to determine animals’ relationships with humans and subsequent 
categorisation (as ‘harmful’, ‘beneficial’, etc.) based upon those relationships and 
inherent interests to humans. Following the same trajectory, de Waal (2001) notes that 
the purpose of anthropomorphism is more human- than animal- centred: that animals 
are exclusively used to “mock, educate, moralize, and entertain” (p. 73); and that 
anthropomorphism tells us nothing about ‘the animal’, but about how it has been 
culturally re-constructed by humans (Baker, 2001). This heavily implies that 
anthropomorphism misrepresents the natural kingdom and presents animals in 
“unrealistic and deceitful ways”, and, furthermore, as active agents within many 
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“pseudo-environmentalist films” like Happy Feet (2006) and Over the Hedge (2006) 
(McFarland, 2009, p. 94, 103).  
 
McFarland (2009) is sceptical about animals’ sense of agency. She believes this sense 
of ‘agency’ brings more detriment than benefit if the purpose of environmentalist 
narratives is to spark collective awareness about the natural world, more because such 
anthropomorphic narratives allow animals to confront and resolve (by themselves) the 
environmental issues the film propagates. In doing so, these narratives invite negligible 
audience participation precisely because these narratives imply that the ‘problem no 
longer exists’, and that human-intervention and thought are not deemed necessary. 
Even though this critique might discomfort You’s (2021) optimism about animal 
agency, we can still assume that anthropomorphic agency is meant to inspire human-
intervention and is based upon the idea of human-and audience- participation in 
understanding the environmental problems. Because, as Anderson and Henderson 
(2005) have pointed out, while animals possess “phenomenal consciousness”- 
awareness about their environment- they do not possess “relative consciousness” (p. 
298), where it becomes our responsibility- as relatively more conscious humans- to 
protect, preserve, and maintain the ecosystem and every entity that constitutes the 
nonhuman environment. In a way, such narratives are built upon the notion of 
retrospective analysis, sympathy, and an outward interest in the revival of what we 
have spoken about as “creaturely consciousness” (You, 2021, p. 183). 
 
Animal misrepresentation, however, becomes a major source of concern for Anderson 
and Henderson (2005). They believe that fantastical representations of animals 
aggravate children’s unnatural expectancy from real-life counterparts of these 
animated, talking animals that often act as children’s caregivers during childhood. 
Their arguments are theoretically based upon Bowlby’s (1979) attachment theory and 
the interplay of “representational models of attachment figures” (p. 141). One part of 
Bowlby’s (1979) attachment theory argues that children’s sense of attachment with- 
or perception towards- companion animals (caregivers) may  
 
persist relatively unchanged into and throughout adult 
life. . . often to continue. . . despite repeated evidence 
that the model is inappropriate. . . Such biased 
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perceptions and expectations lead to various 
misconceived beliefs about. . . false expectations about 
the way [animals/people] will behave (p. 141-142). 
 
These ‘false expectations’ are fuelled by anthropomorphic/fantastical representations 
of animals. These may cultivate unnatural wants- within an individual- out of a 
companion animal, rendering a “‘real’” animal (Baker, 2001, p. 10) in danger, and may 
even affect (and severe) children’s later experiences with animals if their wants remain 
unfulfilled. Therefore, Anderson and Henderson (2005) argue that anthropomorphism 
morphs natural reality and distances animals from what they are. The deployment of 
animals in children’s stories dealing with a ‘real’ human issue may simplify (or 
decorate) the narrative but is achieved at the cost of cultural sacrifice(s) of animals 
whose stories are being marginalised, manipulated, and, sometimes, scarred.  
 
Another point that Anderson and Henderson (2005) refer to pertains to the idea of 
‘moral vegetarianism’. This point emerges from their critique of Simons’ (2002) 
opinion that anthropomorphic representations may bear a positivist function by 
stimulating kindness towards animals. They contest Simon’s (2002) argument by 
seeking justifications for the scarcity of people practicing moral vegetarianism, which 
is where Singer’s (1980) utilitarianist ideology might be able to provide us with a 
rhetorical counter-stance. According to Singer (1980), the theory of utilitarianism 
relates to notions of “minimizing pain and maximizing pleasure” (p. 328), and, 
naturally, perceives animals as worthy of equal moral consideration, precisely due to 
their sentient natures. Utilitarianism is, then, connected to vegetarianism which Singer 
(1980) perceives as “a way of attesting to the depth and sincerity of one’s belief in the 
wrongness of what we are doing to animals” (p. 337). And it is this moral awakening 
that is heightened by the anthropomorphism represented in the three narratives we are 
about to discuss, one that ‘enlightens’ and renews the relationship between humanity 
and animality (Gebhard et al., 2003). Anthropomorphism offers a more utilitarian 
understanding of the ‘nonhuman-sentience’, awakening the audiences not only to the 
horrors of the Anthropocene but also how the Anthropocene ravages the human-animal 




The ‘Real’ Purpose of Anthropomorphic Art 
 
The misrepresentation of animals often becomes one of the primary sources of 
criticism levelled against anthropomorphism. Several critics maintain that 
anthropomorphism either forms a “corrupting” influence on children’s psychological 
growth (Fisher, 1964, p. 51) or completely fails to maintain children’s identification 
with nonhuman characters, for it is improbable for children to imagine human-like 
states in nonhuman-entities (Larsen et al., 2018; Russell & Cain, 2020). This growing 
section of criticism launches against the adoption of anthropomorphic picture-books 
in schools, as these arguments connect with children’s increasing anthropocentric 
reasoning, and decreasing scientific knowledge, after being exposed to 
anthropomorphic representations (Ganea et al., 2014). Anthropomorphism, it is feared, 
communicates scientifically inaccurate knowledge about the nonhuman ‘other’ and, 
thereby, affects children’s factual knowledge. This leads us to dwell over two 
counterarguments that may help us maintain a valid case in favour of 
anthropomorphism. 
 
Geerdts et al. (2016) have contested that the ‘real’ purpose of anthropomorphism is 
not to impart scientific knowledge but raise ethical awareness about humanities and 
animalities, and that children prefer animal characters over human-counterparts 
(Severson & Woodard, 2018). This links to the second argument that, even though 
sceptical about anthropomorphism, defends the practice of anthropomorphism if the 
representations are subtle or mild (in terms of degree), and if language is not paired 
with imagery (Conrad et al., 2021; Geerdts, 2016). The latter-most critics suspect that 
anthropomorphic language alone is potentially harmless for children’s factual learning 
processes and a balance between language and imagery may rather complement 
children’s knowledge about the nonhuman others and the perceptions they develop 
about their socio-cultural ecosystems. This brings us to a realisation about 
anthropomorphism as more of a “mentalizing” phenomenon than a framework for 
formal education (Severson & Woodard, 2018, para. 8) that aims at imparting 
scientific knowledge. This line of countercriticism argues for the deployment of the 
phenomenon to raise more ethically grounded questions related to human-animal 
studies, where many speak in favour of the “talking animal” (Dunn, 2011, p. 2), and 
how the latter can re-define relations between the ‘Human’ and the ‘Other’. 
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De Waal (2001) and Baker (2001) have expressed concern over the socio-cultural 
manipulation of the nonhuman environment via anthropomorphic means, which leads 
us to connect their critique to the plausibility of outraging the human-animal dynamic 
through anthropomorphism. Wells (2009) argues in The Animated Bestiary that 
nonhuman-entities invite polysemic narrative interpretations of human-related issues 
that are difficult/sensitive to express in normal conditions as he observes that 
anthropomorphism “embodies the openness of debate and not the fixedness of 
conclusion” (p. 5). This observation has been supported by Burke and Copenhaver 
(2004) who extend this knowledge to political animal-cartoons that they believe 
enables cartoonists to “provide intellectual and psychological distance and allows 
[them] to critically explore that which we would not be comfortable exploring directly” 
(p. 207). Indeed, this practice bears a political function, giving credibility to Hübben’s 
(2016) above-cited argument. However, the ‘real’ purpose of anthropomorphism has 
usually been to strike a balance between being utilized to discuss both human- and 
animal- centred issues. And while the phenomenon is deployed to tackle human-
related problems, its intrinsic purpose has mostly been to serve as the “epistemological 
pathway by which emotional relationships with objects are established that allows 
them to be invested with individual meaning” (Gebhard et al., 2003, p. 105). 
 
Anthropomorphism permits the identification of the nonhuman environment within a 
moral context. It disavows medical claims that the ‘animate nonhuman’ lacks moral 
status (Fox, 1986) and is unentitled to moral consideration. Anthropomorphism 
attempts to subvert this systematic unfairness by re-positioning the nonhuman in terms 
of ethics and morality and introduces them to the human imagination as a pedagogical 
force. This argument (1) corresponds to Malaguzzi’s (2012) hypothesis about the 
‘environment’ being the ‘third educator’ (Gandini, 2012, p. 339) which (2) later 
became the foundation for Bone’s (2013) acknowledgment of “the animal” as the 
“fourth educator” (p. 62). Bone (2013) criticises the human-driven atrocities on 
animals (Luk et al., 1999), and deploys this criticism as a springboard for her 
understanding of the pedagogical influence of animals on children’s socialisation. 
Many of these arguments have encouraged the incorporation of anthropomorphism in 
children’s media and education, for they realise its potential as a subversive eye-opener 
to the young and adults alike, and this unabashed belief stems from the phenomenon’s 
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capacities to build itself on ethical values that respond to both the interests of humanity 
and animality. 
 
This explains the stylisation of these animated movies as ‘animal autobiographies’ 
(You, 2021), for the genre invests the protagonists with what You (2021) addresses as 
a “co-constitutive agency” (p. 193). This type of agency enables the ‘autobiographical 
animal’ to stimulate subjective interpretations about its ‘othered’ nature, catapulting 
the animal to exert absolute control over itself with individuality and meaningfulness 
that is respected by others (including the ‘other’ humans). By re-locating the ‘human’ 
outside- and into- the dimensions of ‘Other’, the genre subverts the eco-hierarchy and 
equals humans with their nonhuman partners of the same planet/co-inhabitants. There 
have been instances where the genre dismantles the eco-hierarchy to subjugate ‘the 
human’ over ‘nonhuman’ domination. Such representations, while functioning as 
animal autobiographies, communicate an imperialistic ideology that stands against the 
peace-oriented demands of the genre that, however, easily suffice in the movies we 
aim to discuss here. The Ant Bully (2006), for instance, becomes a significant example 
to vindicate this case. In Lucas’ transformation into a human-ant, the narrative blurs 
the ‘human/animal’ dichotomies not to depict the ants’ colonization over Lucas’ 
‘human’ self, but re-locate the ‘human’ and the ‘animal’ within the plethora of co-
existence, mutual respect, and harmony (You, 2021). 
 
It is by virtue of these examples that we collectively aim to understand the genre of 
‘animal autobiography’ as an extraordinary manifestation of anthropomorphism that 
triggers the moral re-evaluation of human/nonhuman boundaries and opens a space of 
inquiry to question the ethical relationships between humans and nonhumans and how 
these relationships may sterilise the effects of an otherwise ravaging Anthropocene. 
The genre, as You (2021) proposes, allows us to perceive the animal-character as a 
‘subject-of-a-life’ (Regan, 1988) and not as an “object for human utility” (Tipper, 
2011, p. 149), for the genre re-designs the ‘animal’ with a distinctive individuality and 
as a maker-of-its-own-destiny (as in Ferdinand). As for the practice of 
anthropomorphism, its innovative re-conceptualisations, as we are to witness, speak 





Discussion: Animal Autobiographies 
 
I. Finding Nemo (2003) 
 
As we have elucidated, the phenomenon of anthropomorphism is often subjected to 
criticism or triviality (Simons, 2002) more frequently because it represents scientific 
or factual distortions, thereby, leading the form to being dismissed as transgressive. 
This is even true to Finding Nemo which finds itself abundant with a broad range of 
unbelievable anthropomorphic examples that may provide significant volume and 
plausibility to the criticism of anthropomorphism and derail our understandings of the 
phenomenon as an enriching source of human-animal relations. Dory’s ‘human’-
problem of amnesia, or her abilities to read the English alphabet; the aquarium fish 
and sea gulls’ comprehensions and conversations about complex dental procedures; 
the school of Mr. Ray (a spotted eagle ray); or the ‘socially-heterosexual’ clownfish 
become a few major examples, within the narrative, that can attract widespread 
criticism from pragmatic critics of the anthropomorphic form.  
 
These concerned critics may argue about (1) the dissemination of scientifically-
inaccurate knowledge to a general audience and (2) the loss of the intrinsic identity of 
animals as ‘animals’ (Anderson & Henderson, 2005; Baker, 2001). For example, the 
sequential hermaphroditism of clownfish is left unexplored by the narrative and both 
Marlin and Coral are depicted as a traditional, heterosexual mating pair in the image 
of a ‘normal human’ family. Such misrepresentations, then, potentially affect the 
identity of the ‘anthropomorphised animal’. In the middle of identity-deconstruction, 
it bestows the subject with a recognisable human-demeanour (You, 2021) that the 
audiences can ‘comfortably’ relate to without having to step into a critical space of the 
nonhuman ‘Other’ (Gebhard et al., 2003). 
 
However, instead of reading these instances as detrimental to scientific discourse, they 
should be interpreted as a “revisionist reinvention of the human experience” (Wells, 
2009, p. 60) that offers us a deeper understanding of abstract human values. While, at 
the same time, this style of approach- despite its partial re-designing of animal identity- 




a tool by which a variety of discourses are 
simultaneously called into the interpretation of the 
animal and operate as a way in which any potential 
anxiety about animal otherness and difference might be 
potentially reconciled (Wells, 2009, p. 98). 
 
Wells’ (2009) understanding of anthropomorphism may serve as a favourable starting 
point for developing our discussion about Finding Nemo as both (1) a tale of emotional 
maturity and (2) critique of unwanted human-invasiveness onto nonhuman territories. 
Wells’ (2009) conception raises awareness about unwanted human invasiveness, to 
confront which anthropomorphism re-dresses the animal with a re-constitutive agency 
and self-control “in a world that, arguably, in itself is increasingly distantiated from 
the animal as a co-inhabitee” (p. 98). In its re-formation, the animal is connected with 
its self-identity that, furthermore, allows the animal to blatantly address issues of co-
existence and “creaturely consciousness” (You, 2021, p. 183). Even though this form 
of representation can be encountered in its highest degree in Ferdinand (2017), the 
present narrative yet manages to elicit a significant public exploration of nonhuman 
‘otherness’ through its most pivotal characters of Marlin, Dory, and Darla.  
 
The element of nonhuman-individuality has often been cited as a crucial feature of the 
‘animal autobiography’ (You, 2021) that permits the subject to emerge as a self-
embodied voice fighting for its own cause. It opens a critical avenue for the ‘other’ to 
remind humans about their coercive and ruthless cruelty upon nonhuman subjects (Luk 
et al., 1999) and assume power over their lives without any outside human 
control/influence. As we mentioned, this is vividly explored in Ferdinand; however, 
in Finding Nemo, the latter-half is minimalistic in approach. This means that while the 
narrative criticises human intervention in nonhuman territory/habitats, it keeps the 
criticism controlled and implicit, and outside of the ‘control’ of the animals (which we 
shall explore shortly). Meanwhile, Marlin and Dory are bestowed with a distinct 
individuality and co-independently have been established as embodiments of what 
Markowsky (1975) had called a “good ‘dressed animal’” (p. 461). This connotes that 
even though the characters possess the emotional qualities of humans, they still 
manage to preserve their natural, outward manifestation of an ‘animal’ (Jardim, 2013, 
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p. 15). By natural outlook, these characters ‘are’ animals, but act ‘as’ humans 
(Markowsky, 1975). 
 
Nonetheless, to read Finding Nemo as a tale of emotional maturity, we may step back 
to re-position Marlin’s insecurities and fear for Nemo within a personally historical 
context and perceive his ‘fear of the ocean’ as a result of the barracuda attack that had 
ravaged his entire family earlier. Marlin’s imposing belief that the ocean is “not safe” 
(Stanton, 2003, 6:57) is, further, strengthened by Nemo’s handicapped fin (“the lucky 
fin” (Stanton, 2003, 9:19)), as the former constantly over-protects Nemo from all 
possible harm, contrary to Nemo’s pleasure. It is, after all, Marlin’s fragile attitude 
towards Nemo that creates a fissure between the father and the son, which is ultimately 
resolved after Nemo is reunited with Marlin towards the conclusion, more because 
Nemo acknowledges Marlin’s parental love after Nigel, an Australian pelican, narrates 
Marlin’s adventures of the ocean to the aquarium fish (one of them being Nemo). It is 
these adventures that reshape and re-structure Marlin’s view of his life in the ocean, 
paving the way to his transformed outlook towards the future in the end. Undoubtedly, 
Marlin’s adventures- during his quest to find Nemo- are self-emancipatory and take us 
back to Smelser’s (2009) odyssey experience by virtue of how his independent quest 
re-modified his ‘Self’, diverted him from his fears, and re-introduced him as a 
“transformed home comer” (Morgan, 2010, p. 252). This could be viewed when the 
narrative reverses the opening scene in the end by depicting Marlin as being excited 
about Nemo’s school and looking forward to exploring the reef with Mr. Ray, 
connoting Marlin’s self-transformation as a carefree, unafraid, and ‘happier’ character. 
 
Marlin’s journey to emotional maturity, however, seems incomplete without Dory, and 
it is through the ‘Marlin-Dory dynamic’ that the audiences come to acknowledge 
Dory’s role in the transformation of Marlin. One may mention that Marlin’s 
transformation is more self-inspired, but it is Dory that preserves his inspiration to 
grow; it is Dory that pushes him to take risks, to “keep swimming” (Stanton, 2003, 
32:41) and enjoy life as it comes. Wells (2009) makes a noticeable point about “cross-
species coupling [as] an endemic and unnoticed currency of the animated form- 
innocent, innocuous, banal- or looked at another way, shocking, boundary-pushing, 




In no way ‘innocuous’ or ‘banal’, the Marlin-Dory relationship, on the contrary, 
assumes a polarising outlook to embody two completely opposite personalities, but 
strongly inter-connected to serve mutual purposes: where Dory inspires Marlin’s 
personal growth; Marlin manifests a sense of ‘home’ for Dory, a ‘home’ that Dory was 
devoid of. In Marlin, Dory discovers a friend and an answer to her loneliness. This 
factor about their relationship, further, re-echoes within Dory to understand the 
position Marlin shares in her life, as she once remarks after Marlin confuses a death-
impersonating Nemo to be really dead and plans to travel back: 
 
“No one’s ever stuck with me for so long before. . . I 
remember things better with you” (Stanton, 2003, 
1:23:12 – 1:23:20). 
 
Indeed, Dory’s friendship is shared by Marlin, who recognises her intrinsic role in his 
journey toward emotional maturity; though, largely, it is depicted in Finding Dory 
(2016) where the audience realise how much Dory is valued by Marlin as a companion. 
In Finding Nemo, however, their relationship is not outwardly explored, more because 
the narrative concentrates upon Nemo’s discovery and Marlin’s personal growth. 
Nonetheless, what the narrative explicitly does represent are the aquatic adventures of 
Marlin-Dory and how these adventures reframe Marlin’s approach of perceiving the 
ocean and its ‘co-inhabitees’ (Wells, 2009, p. 98). 
 
Of particular interest is their humorous encounter with the three sharks (Bruce, a Great 
White; Anchor, a Hammerhead, and Chum, a Mako shark) who pledge ‘vegetarianism’ 
and re-assure Dory and Marlin that they have been practicing “self-control” and should 
not be considered as “mindless eating machine[s]”. One of their most controversial 
statements- “Fish are friends, not food” (Stanton, 2003, 20:47)- possess the potential 
to spark ample criticism for implying plausible harm to the food chain and lead the 
phenomenon of anthropomorphism to yet another trail of scrutinisation and 
problematics. However, if the statement is hypothetically probed, then it may introduce 
several issues about moral vegetarianism, coexistence, and animal security (You, 
2021). Within this context, Singer’s (1980) philosophy of utilitarianism encourages us 
to perceive the sharks’ vegetarianism not as an ecological travesty, but as a moral 
initiative to exert inter-species harmony and mutual respect/care. The sharks’ 
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utilitarian approach signals their self-recognition about their higher position in the food 
chain- and occupation as a hunter- and the urgency to guard entities who may be at the 
bottom of the food chain (or ecological system that the sharks relatively reign).  
 
Of course, these animated sharks cannot be compared to real sharks. The entire 
purpose of introducing ‘vegetarian’ sharks is to re-awaken the audiences’ recognition 
of their standings within the ecosystem, and the responsibility they have towards 
protecting the nonhuman ‘others’ from ecological degradation (Singer, 1980; You, 
2021). It is in understanding the ‘pain’ of the ‘other’ that we may be able to act like 
the three sharks, and it is in self-realisation that one of the primary purposes of animal 
autobiography rests. The sharks push us to interrogate ourselves about our treatment 
of, and respect for, other natural entities who share our environmental space and while 
the sharks bestow the ‘fish’ with distinctive agencies, they help answer our moral 
culpabilities of having wronged the nonhuman ‘other’, having disrespected its 
territorial spaces, and having misunderstood its value as a ‘subject-of-a-life’ (Regan, 
1988). This, furthermore, leads us to interrogate and analyse the selfish human-
invasiveness onto nonhuman territory that contaminates the present narrative. 
 
It is intriguing to note that Finding Nemo positions the scuba-divers- and their invasive 
action of capturing Nemo- as the inceptive cause behind the entire plot, as they serve 
as the focal point of the narrative’s criticism of human invasiveness and disrespect for 
the natural habitat. This criticism connects to the image of Darla (the dentist’s niece) 
who is addressed as a “fish killer” (Stanton, 2003, 29:34), and it is Darla’s narrative 
construction as a potential threat to the aquarium fish that the audience comes to 
understand the ruthless cruelty that is inflicted on animals by children (Luk et al., 
1999). Darla’s image as a “fish killer”, surprisingly, contrasts that of the sharks who 
are culturally located as bigger threats to other aquatic creatures, and, therefore, the 
attribution of this title (‘fish killer’) suits favourably more to the description of the 
sharks. But the narrative reverses this analogy and places Darla at a position of 
criticism and reserves a rather sympathetic treatment for the sharks. In doing so, the 
narrative encourages the audience to view a self-alike individual (Darla) from a self-
critical lens to retrospect about their treatment of the nonhuman ‘other’ and re-evaluate 
the consideration of nonhuman territories. 
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As an example of the ‘animal autobiography’, Finding Nemo’s manner of approaching 
Darla is both critical and satirical (You, 2021). While it is critical because through 
Darla the narrative raises some ethical questions about ‘nonhuman-sentience’, 
‘nonhuman-space’, and ‘human indifference’, it is satirical in its representation of 
Darla as an impatient and rambunctious child. Darla’s satirical representation enables 
the narrative to implicitly pass a subtle remark about contemporary humanity’s 
impatience to discuss issues about ‘otherness’ and animality (Hübben, 2016), or rather 
its unwillingness to re-consider the ethical grounds of human-animal relationships that, 
if considered, would only help us poignantly deal with the influences of the 
Anthropocene. However, Darla’s position is of crucial significance. She pushes the 
narrative to a dénouement, for Nemo would never have been taken out of the aquarium 
had Darla not visiting; though, ultimately, it was Gill (a Moorish idol) who sets Nemo 
free through the drainage system. 
 
Here, we come to an acknowledgment about inter-species togetherness and mutual 
harmony. Finding Nemo approaches these notions with subtle ingenuity to push its 
human viewers to reflect over their social position(s) as ‘co-inhabitees’ rather than as 
the sole receivers of the planet’s resources and value ‘nonhuman otherness-and-space’ 
(You, 2021). In Marlin’s quest to trace Nemo, the viewers are subjected to another 
thematic, but, human, dimension that captures Marlin’s agency to reshape his 
individuality and perception about the ocean, while, at the same time, healing the 
wounded selves of both Marlin and Nemo as they are reconciled- both physically and 
emotionally- to the promise of a mutual sense of value/worth. The narrative vindicates 
its cultural and literary position as an illustrative example of anthropomorphic 
imagination that not only disavows human-centrism, but also re-conceptualises 
animal-centrism to encompass a riveting gamut of concerns pertaining to the 
environment, human-animal relations, and the nonhuman-sentience. It achieves that 
via employing the medium of ‘animal autobiography’ which locates the animal as a 
vehicle to communicate ethical and environmental concerns (You, 2021; Wells, 2009), 
left to be reflected by the general independence of the public and its inherent 




II. The Ant Bully (2006) 
 
An intrinsic aspect in Gebhard’s et al. (2003) arguments about identity-formation has 
been the presence of a nonhuman ‘Other’ to serve as a cognitive and psychological 
mirror for “making comparisons, assessing sameness and difference. . . and identifying 
with others” (p. 91). We have previously mentioned the role that the ‘nonhuman 
environment’ extensively plays in the nourishment of our identities as individuals and 
parts of a larger community (Searles, 1960). This is what The Ant Bully (2006) attempts 
to bring to our forefront. Unlike the mainstream aesthetics of anthropomorphic 
narratives, like Finding Nemo or Ferdinand, that deploy the ‘autobiographical animal’ 
as a metaphorical self-embodiment to exert a conscious animal-agency (You, 2021), 
The Ant Bully separates from the traditional paradigms of animal autobiography to re-
create the aesthetic of the latter-genre by re-positioning both the ‘animal’ and ‘human’ 
at the polar edges of narrative centrality. This implies that while narrative remains 
‘animal’-centric, the typical effects of the animal autobiography are brought over by 
the introduction of a ‘human’ character whose moral transformation- and change of 
perception towards ants- becomes the locus of the audiences’ understandings about 
human-animal relations. It is through the human character that the narrative probes 
into the ethical issues of ecological hegemony, human-invasiveness, and nonhuman 
conservation and compassion. 
 
As Bone (2013) notes about the animal as “a conduit for learning to be human” (p. 61), 
The Ant Bully re-constructs the colony of ants as a critical space of retribution and 
enlightenment for Lucas Nickle (the ten-year-old protagonist), as he strives to 
assimilate himself with the ants. Lucas’ arrival into the colony is instigated by his 
“barbaric” and “mindless” (Davis, 2006, 21:59) destruction of the ant-mound in his 
front-yard, following which he is miniaturised by Zoc (a wizard ant) and brought to 
the colony to be charged with 
 
“. . . wilfully and with malice. . . [crushing] the food 
storage chambers, [flooding] all the lower hatching 
chambers, and [dousing] the colony with the dreaded 
yellow rain” (Davis, 2006, 20:56 – 21:10). 
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These charges symbolically awaken Lucas to the ant’s point-of-view. They encourage 
him (1) to understand his ignorance towards a ‘lesser’ species (ants) as a symptom of 
his indifference and (2) redeem himself by re-conceptualising an emotional framework 
that values the nonhuman ‘other’, its territorial space, and its nature as a living entity 
(Gebhard et al., 2003). Ideally, the Queen’s suggestion to “change the nature of this 
human” (Davis, 2006, 22:25) serves as a morally uplifting manifestation of retribution 
that disavows the notion of cruelty and rather values an experience of what Jonathan 
Lear (1992) had called an “education of the emotions” (p. 318) that an individual can 
take ahead in their life. Even though Lear’s (1992) argument relates to katharsis (from 
Chapter II), his phrase helps us situate Lucas’ moral transformation and his journey to 
“discover the ant within” (Davis, 2006, 30:35) within the functions of the animal 
autobiography. In Lucas’ discovery of “the ant within”, the narrative indirectly implies 
the triumph of the ants as Lucas’ understandings of the ant-world possesses a double 
connotation. This duality concentrates upon Lucas’ reformulation about his ethical 
awareness of the nonhuman ‘other’, manoeuvring this sense of awareness to naturally 
protect the existence and peace of the colony. 
 
The latter-most argument may appear to somewhat twist the central function of the 
animal autobiography, as it concretises upon the idea of human intervention to protect 
and conserve ‘the nonhuman’. Unlike what You (2021) earlier spoke of the genre as 
“an apt form for de-familiarising human-centred territory” (p. 190), The Ant Bully 
recognises the necessity of the human ‘other’, within the space of the ‘nonhuman’, to 
intervene and fight for the cause of the latter. This seems to decapitate the claims made 
by critics like McFarland (2009) about animal agency as a problematic hermeneutic 
that disengages the public/audience from any subsequent human intervention/activism 
be implemented for the nonhuman and its protection. Lucas’ fight with the local 
exterminator, Stan Beals, does not only stem from Lucas’ self-interest to absolve 
himself from guilt-consciousness (for having called Beals in the first place), but also 
‘more’ from a self-driven responsibility to protect the ants from any possible harm. 
This encounter, further, led to Lucas’ valorisation as a ‘saviour’ within the colony. 
 
This social transition of Lucas from being a ‘destroyer’ to a ‘saviour’ possesses a 
utilitarian outlook. Like the sharks from Finding Nemo, Lucas’ intervention- and 
apparent knowledge of his ‘superior’ position in the ecosystem- dwells over the notion 
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of compassionate understanding (Singer, 1980) that allowed him to acknowledge not 
only his personal faults but also his significance within the colony as a ‘human’ 
counterpart. His ‘humanness’ becomes a vehicle to fight dangerous human-
invasiveness- represented, at first, through Lucas but, chiefly, through Beals- that 
poses an existential threat to the nonhuman. This is where The Ant Bully, in overturning 
the aesthetics of the animal autobiography, reconnects the ‘human/nonhuman’ 
dichotomy by acknowledging the inter-dependence of both humans and nonhumans 
upon one another. Where the ants are protected by Lucas, they simultaneously impart 
human-ethical values to the latter that may help not only Lucas but also the otherness 
of the nonhumans, as it would benefit and reassure their existential security from- and 
by- humans (You, 2021). 
 
Reflecting over Lucas’ discovery of ‘the ant within’, it is interesting to mention that 
the narrative is built upon the ‘human/nonhuman nexus’ which informs and pillars 
Lucas’ moral transformation. As the conversation between Zoc and Lucas unfolds, the 
audiences are awakened to what differentiates the ant-world (nonhuman) from the 
human-world: where the ant-world is based upon the idea of togetherness; the human-
world is made up of individual “differences”, in the sense that where the ants work 
‘for’ the collective growth of colony (represents a city in human definition), humans 
work ‘for’ self-interests and individual happiness. This is precisely why Lucas 
abandons an injured Hova during a wasp attack to save himself, more because his 
ideologies are oriented towards self-security and self-gain unlike the ants’ who 
persevere for the colony. In the ant-world, the colony stands for a single, collective 
metaphor for individual existence, inter-dependence, and centralised harmony that 
become the hallmarks of underground existence, and yet another instance to criticise 
human selfishness and self-centredness (Hübben, 2016). 
 
The logistics of togetherness, maintained within the colony, re-dresses Lucas’ 
perceptions about himself and others (typically those who are ‘weaker’). By ‘weaker’, 
please note, we do not aim to de-quantify the “co-constitutive agency” of the ants 
(You, 2021, p. 193), but only mean to address their status as a ‘lower’ species within 
the ecosystem, as a less powerful nonhuman entity. The ants’ ecological position as 
being ‘less powerful’ reminds us of the notion of self-induced power that concurrently 
pervades across the narrative and contaminates Lucas’ confidence over himself that is 
152 
 
constantly affected by the neighbourhood bullies. Lucas’ powerlessness over his 
bullies serves as a pivotal point of departure from ethical sensitivity, as his moral status 
of being ‘bullied’ not only punctures the sense of power he wishes to exercise, but also 
ravages his sensibilities while he destroys the ant-colony to only satisfy his broken 
ego. Surprisingly, it is from this sub-theme that the movie derives its title. 
 
Lucas’ foolishness to ‘bully the ants’ is an expression of his knowledge about his 
powerlessness, which is what he unlearns from the ants. During his time in the colony, 
Lucas is exposed to the synchronised functioning of the colony and its values of 
togetherness and how the ‘ant’ transforms into the antithesis of the ‘bully’ by virtue of 
its confidence over collective strength which, in return, serves as an essential backdrop 
for the colony’s existence, and, furthermore, for Lucas’ self-discovery of “the ant 
within”. This sense of discovery is, however, fulfilled when the narrative repeats an 
earlier episode (involving Hova and Lucas) to allow Lucas another chance to validate 
his sense of metaphorically ‘becoming-an-ant’ by saving a wasp during Stan Beals’ 
attack on the colony and its environs. The act of saving the wasp not only wins Lucas 
the respect of the ants (particularly Zoc and Hova) but also reinforces his own belief 
in his ‘power’ (both mental and physical). This instance allows him to experience the 
intrinsic nature and function of power. 
 
The ants teach Lucas that ‘real’ power does not imply a figurative sense of domination, 
nor does it entertain any plausible connotation to harming others. What Lucas ‘really’ 
learns is that power should transform as ‘moral strength’ which comes when power is 
oriented towards a higher goal, and not driven to serve foolish, egotistic purposes. This 
is where (and how) the ants tend to become more powerful than Lucas (and us) because 
they do not exert power to inspire fear, hopelessness, or anarchy, but channelise their 
physical (and cognitive) strength for the prosperity of the colony. As You (2021) 
poignantly remarks, the animal autobiography “beckons us to reach out to the other 
lifeforms in the biosphere and meet them beyond textual representations” (p. 194). 
Similarly, in the representation of the ant-world as “different” from the humans’, Lucas 
begins to identify with the ants and unlearns a set of ‘human’ ideologies to 
accommodate a few ‘nonhuman’ values that were epitomised by the ants, including 
co-existence, collective strength, togetherness, and centralised harmony. 
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Additionally, his moral transformation drags the audience back to a realisation of what 
humans are not. Through Zoc and Lucas’ midnight conversation, the narrative aims to 
strip humanity of its hidden rancour and reflect the shortcomings of our human-selves. 
Morris (1977) had once observed, “[humankind] has competed with [nonhumans] for 
living space, dominated them, and all too often exterminated them” (p. 260). At a point 
of convergence, Morris’ (1977) critique offers us an opportunity to re-evaluate human-
invasiveness and subordination of nonhumans as an exemplary symptom of 
powerlessness, fear, and human-fragility. This is reiterated in The Ant Bully through 
the image of Lucas and his mindless destruction of an ant’s colony that he pompously 
believed to embody- and reinforce- his sense of domination over the ‘other’. But, 
contrary to what he deemed true, his conceptions are soon demolished, fresh memories 
and opinions reformulated, when he begins to ‘live’ as-an-ant.  
 
Lucas’ transformation, indeed, was alarmingly conditioned by the ants’ socialising 
influence, as he recognises what it means to be ‘human’ in an ant’s world and vice-
versa. It is here that the narrative powerfully stresses upon the importance of 
perspective and the necessity of viewing others, at times (or more frequently), from 
their point-of-view. Through the narrative’s representation of ants’ point-of-view, 
Lucas is awakened to the realities of his perception towards little creatures and the 
horrors of his actions, as he begins to perceive everything from an ant’s perspective. 
This is where he arrives at the shocking revelation that a simple “shag carpet” could 
look like a giant maze- or a little “jellybean” may appear as a “sweet rock”- when you 
are less than a centimetre long (Davis, 2006, 42:21 – 49:32). Through a fresh 
revamping of the animal autobiography, the narrative successfully captures the 
ideological purposes of the genre. It pursues this by placing the ‘human’ alongside the 
‘animal’, at the narrative-centre, in a cherished attempt to enable the ‘human’ 
understand what it means to be an ‘animal’ (You, 2021) by re-locating the former 
within the habitat of the latter; to learn its ways of thinking; and deploy their 
understanding to self-evaluate, criticise, and re-modify human action towards the 
‘other’ (Gebhard et al., 2003). 
 
In doing so, The Ant Bully facilitates an outward, ‘animal’-oriented manifestation of 
the “creaturely consciousness” (You, 2021, p. 183) that encourages the audience to not 
only sympathise with the ants, but also perceive the human world from the ants’ 
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viewpoint. It achieves that through the character-transformation of Lucas Nickle. In 
the middle of his discovery of ‘the ant within’, we are awakened to new possibilities 
of renewal that can promote a better understanding of the human-animal dynamic, the 
problem of human-invasiveness, and the ‘urgency’ for human intervention. Unlike 
what McFarland (2009) suspects about anthropomorphic environmental films that 
reflect that “[humans] have no obligation to change [their] approach to the 
environment. . . leaving [them] blameless for the harm [they] cause other animals” (p. 
101), The Ant Bully emphasises human intervention for it recognises that ants 
themselves cannot protect their ant-mounds from indomitable agents that fall outside 
their control. If there can be a ‘saviour’, it must be a Lucas. 
 
III. Ferdinand (2017) 
 
Peculiarly subversive, Ferdinand (2017) outshines as the strongest narrative within 
our discussion on anthropomorphism and the ‘autobiographical animal’ (You, 2021). 
It deploys animal agency- and the animal’s ability to ‘talk back’- to strongly criticise 
the ‘ritualistic’ practice of bullfighting and, consequently, champion animal rights and 
welfare through its titular protagonist. As Cohen (2014) highlights, bullfighting has 
enjoyed a cult status in Spain, Portugal, and other Hispanic-American nations, and is 
frequently associated with notions of national identity, traditional aesthetics, and 
historical culture amongst the public (María et al., 2017). Against this view stands the 
present-day intellectual criticism of the practice that not only connects the sport with 
animal exploitation, human barbarity, and sadism but also serves as a defining catalyst 
for the declining popularity of bullfighting (Andrade, 2021). In relation to this 
criticism, Hemingway (1932) once spoke of bullfighting as an “[un]equal contest or 
an attempt at an equal contest between a bull and a man” (p. 22). 
 
Even though Hemingway’s opinions were predominantly in favour of the practice, 
considering his enthusiastic passion for sports and belief in the “paleo-Christian” 
perception of the bullfight as a “spiritual project” to “conquer Death” (Ozwald, 2019, 
p. 340), his acknowledgment of the malpractice as ‘[un]equal’ corroborates our critical 
defence of Ferdinand as a subversive, self-emancipatory animal autobiography 
registering Ferdinand’s viewpoint and critique of the ‘art’ of bullfighting (Andrade, 
2021). However, the subversive nature of the narrative has become a critical point of 
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intersection between animal self-agency and the loss of animal identity, giving rise to 
conflicting opinions about the narrative’s treatment of the “flower-bull”. For instance, 
Lorca (2018) maintains a subjective perception about the narrative as being ‘unnatural’ 
precisely due to Ferdinand’s dismissal of its ‘true’ animal nature. Contrarily, 
Wloszczyna (2017) rather appreciates Ferdinand’s courage to escape the shackles of 
human ‘misrepresentation’ and “stand against aggression, competitive rivalry and 
conforming to the expectations of others” (para 2). 
 
Indeed, subversion allows Ferdinand to ‘speak’ for the bulls. It attempts to re-vamp 
their moral status from being historically defined as “telluric and implacable object[s] 
of terror” or “the supreme enemy of Man” (Ozwald, 2019, p. 340) to being culturally 
normalised as “subjects-of-a-life” (Regan, 1988, p. 243). This narrative quality 
provides Ferdinand with an individual agency to challenge the human-perpetrators of 
his existential and ecological centrality and debunk the misconceptions about 
bullfights that the bulls at the Casa del Toro have perpetually maintained. It is 
intriguing to note that Ferdinand’s discovery of the ‘actual’ nature of bullfights stems 
from (1) his refusal to stay at the ranch, and (2) self-acceptance about his softness for 
the “flower-bull” that he is, which is when- while escaping- he learns that “no bull 
wins” (Saldanha, 2017, 01:06:46). Ferdinand’s discovery offers a climatic twist to the 
narrative, as the bulls’ misconceptions are imploded and they are awakened to the 
urgent necessity for self-worth after the former confides that the arena is “just another 
chop-house” (Saldanha, 2017, 01:07:05).  
 
However, this subversion truly culminates during the fight between Ferdinand and El 
Primero. Their duel becomes an archetype of self-assertive agency that upholds the 
animal as a ‘self’-controlled subject (You, 2021), independent from outside human 
influence and domination that El Primero, in a way, constantly tends to epitomise. In 
El Primero’s depiction as an undefeated matador, Ferdinand attempts to innocently 
play with Ozwald’s (2019) unbreakable faith in the matador’s “potential 
superhumanity”, as he maintains that 
 
. . . the matador is that superman, since he succeeds. . . 
in conquering death and expelling anxiety, in warding 
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off and dispelling the threat. . . in destroying evil (p. 
340).  
 
The narrative deploys subversion to symbolically denunciate the ‘human’ position of 
El Primero by swapping the cultural positions of Ferdinand and the former. It occurs 
when Primero’s red cape gets stuck in one of Ferdinand’s horns and Primero attempts 
to retrieve it back, communicating the episode as being a fight of the bull against the 
man, rather than being the other, ‘traditional’ way around (Tiznado, 2011). Outwardly, 
the scene may seem comedic, but it is precisely this episode that the narrative reserves 
much of its subversive quality for. The public encounter between Ferdinand and 
Primero allows the narrative to invest the former with individual meaning and self-
definition (You, 2021), as Ferdinand later sits back, in a mood of introspective 
contemplation, to let Primero strike the fatal blow. Here, it would be wrong to confuse 
Ferdinand’s ‘docility’ to a sense of ‘surrender’, for his docility before El Primero is a 
powerful manifestation of his acknowledgment about his self-identity as the “flower-
bull”. It is something that not only the narrative has maintained throughout, but also 
something Ferdinand takes pride in, more because the ‘flower-bull’ persona had 
always defined him, his decisions, and all his actions. 
 
Undoubtedly, Ferdinand was ‘bull enough’ to have disrespectfully killed El Primero, 
but he chooses to stick with his sense of character. Interestingly, the inter-play between 
character and action has been one of our points of special interest in Chapter II (Eden, 
2005) and Chapter III (Hancock & Hancock, 2008; Peterson & Park, 2008), as these 
critics strongly emphasise the significance of ‘character’ to study/understand an action, 
and how this paradigm is imperative for the structures of both Aristotelian tragedy and 
utopic superhero narratives. Similarly, Ferdinand utilises this philosophy to not only 
deconstruct or reconceptualise the stereotypical human representation of bulls as 
aggressive/dangerous beings (Baker, 2001) but also re-locate the ‘flower-bull’ within 
the framework of You’s (2021) empowered, autobiographical animal. In Ferdinand’s 
surrender before Primero, the audiences’ faculties are tweaked to re-consider the 
scenario from the bull’s point-of-view and re-evaluate the ‘surrender’ not as an 
example of animal subordination or human-conspired control, but as a triumphant 
vindication of a sense of being true-to-oneself. Therefore, in Ferdinand’s surrender, 
there are inward traces of moral victory and a denunciation of attributes that fail to 
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define the ‘Self’. Contrary to Lorca’s (2018) claim, Ferdinand’s animal nature is not 
‘renounced’, but revitalised, redefined, and reborn, and is released from being 
culturally restricted to the horrors of speciesism (Hübben, 2016); while the matador is 
still not ‘defeated’ but sadly excused from collective humiliation. 
 
It is a little discomforting to witness the narrative’s preservation of Primero’s 
arrogance, as he leaves the arena, suggesting that his ethical perception towards 
animals (in general) remains unchanged. Even though Ferdinand lives, El Primero 
returns with his initial sense of couched “superhumanity” (Ozwald, 2019, p. 340) 
which brings us to another interesting aspect that the narrative attempts to reflect. As 
Primero sets himself to plunge the sword into Ferdinand, the audiences’ catchy 
phrases- “spare the bull!” and “let the bull live!” (Saldanha, 2017, 01:33:56)- reverses 
the latter’s fate. We have reflected on Ferdinand’s determination to stick with his 
character as a symbol of subversive animal agency (You, 2021); but the picture stays 
incomplete. As much as Ferdinand’s determination gains him the respect of the 
matador, it could not have saved his life if it were not for the audiences who shouted 
to Primero for the bull’s pardoning, which leads to an uncomfortable realisation that it 
was ‘human intervention’ that spared the ‘animal’.  
 
Potentially, this can become a valid junction for criticism for developing contradictory 
ideas against what we have defended a few pages before. While analysing The Ant 
Bully, we appreciated Lucas’ intervention to shield the ant colony from Stan Beals for 
the narrative juxtaposed the ‘human’ and the ‘animal’, redeveloping a collective 
metaphor to criticise human callousness and indifference. This enables the audiences 
to perceive plausible human intervention as a necessary and supportive exercise that 
not only provides help to the ‘animal’ but also strengthens the weakened ‘human-
animal dynamic’ (You, 2021). However, we are inclined to criticise the same practice 
in Ferdinand because, within this context, human intervention overshadows animal 
agency and authority. The audiences’ united chanting of those phrases becomes the 
sole reason Primero spares Ferdinand, and, in doing so, the narrative not only wounds 
‘the empowered animal’ but also stunts its ability to psychologically grow, taking the 
animal back to the passive protection of humanity. Where human intervention, in The 
Ant Bully, polishes animal liberty; in Ferdinand, it figuratively leaves the animal 
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devoid of that same agency and independence, at least, briefly, but at an extremely 
critical point. 
 
Nonetheless, the narrative manages to maintain its depiction of ‘inherently-good’ 
human characters without being affected by the influence of the ‘inherently-bad’. 
Where characters like El Primero and Moreno (the owner of Casa del Toro) symbolise 
human cruelty, greed, and apathy, Nina and Juan represent the antithesis by virtue of 
being compassionate, welcoming, and kind. Here, we may understand this deliberate 
attempt to represent these human characters as ‘opposites’, as a symbolic manifestation 
of the difference(s) between cruelty and kindness. By antagonising the former two 
characters- and patronising the latter- Ferdinand encourages the re-evaluation of our 
perceptions towards the ‘nonhuman’ and progress towards understanding, amicability, 
and love. Therefore, Nina and Juan’s farm begins to epitomise what Derrida 
(2006/2008) had called a “zoosphere” (p. 37) that is represented in contemporary 
philosophy as a new avenue- a space- to explore ideas of “absolute hospitality” (p. 37). 
Their farm becomes a space where the bulls are privileged and valued for who they 
are, and unlike the Casa del Toro, it embodies ‘Home’ and all the connected emotions 
of belonging, self-identity, and happiness: 
 
“Home is where you’re happy 
[. . .] 
No more running 
I am good knowing 
that I belong 
[. . .] 
I got loving 
inside this island” 
 (Saldanha, 2017, 15:41). 
 
Naturally, their farm- a ‘zoosphere’, a ‘home’- answers Lupe’s question about ‘love’. 
Throughout the narrative, Lupe is depicted as restless to figure out the meaning of 
love, which she ultimately discovers in Nina’s hug. For the homely-looking Lupe, who 
was often ostracised at the ranch, Nina’s hug transforms into a zone of “security” and 
reassurance, as Lupe once confides, “I love love” (Saldanha, 2017, 01:36:42). Nina 
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and Juan’s innocent acceptance of Lupe- and other animals- communicates the power 
and necessity of human kindness (Luk et al., 1999), as it dismantles the modern 
centrality of human cruelty and apathy that characterises the Anthropocene (You, 
2021). In more than one way, Nina and Juan’s farm concretises upon animal security 
and preservation that was absent in the exploitative territories of Casa del Toro, and, 
naturally, that complemented the animals’ incapacities to identify with the “chop-
house”. This is where- and how- the narrative informs our understandings about the 
central disparities between ‘being cruel’ and ‘being kind’: where Nina and Juan’s 
kindness is returned with nonhuman-compassion; El Primero and Moreno’s cruelty is 
constantly abhorred (and mocked) by the animals. And even though Primero stays 
‘undefeated’, the fact that Ferdinand returns un-slain is a response castigating enough 
to demolish Primero’s sense of untamed superiority/arrogance that he had been 
exercising over the ‘animal’. Ideally, Ferdinand wins both ways. 
 
Ferdinand, therefore, emerges as a path-breaking landmark in anthropomorphic art for 
its unafraid treatment- and critique- of bullfighting, as it progresses to not only provide 
the bulls (particularly the titular protagonist) with an authoritative, empowered, self-
controlling ‘self’, but also essays to reconnect the human/animal thread that dwells 
over compassion and love. Indeed, the narrative’s thematic quality rests in its 
subversions that allow the animal characters to exert inexhaustible control over their 
lives, but, most critically, subordinate the ‘human’ at regular instances; however, what 
remains the most admirable factor about the narrative is its exploration of being-
human. In Nina and Juan’s ‘zoosphere’, the bulls regain a lost sense of belonging and 
are awakened by the inherent humanity of the ‘human’, something that they had never 
known before. It is the bulls’ unawareness about this side of humanity that explains 
Valiente’s counter-assertion to Ferdinand’s anti-bullfighting rhetoric, as the former 
differentiates a bull’s moral status between being “a fighter” or “meat” (Saldanha, 
2017, 49:04). This dichotomy reflects a strangely restrictive framework around which 
the bulls visualised their lives, which is because Casa del Toro never opens to them 
the knowledge about human’s inherent humanity. It is the farm of the ‘good’ daughter-
father that comforts the animals and reassures them the power of love, which is when 
they realise that the ‘bulls have won’. So, in a way, we might read Ferdinand as a tale 





Despite having acknowledged the benefits of anthropomorphism across the chapter, 
we may still fail to overlook a credible, paradoxical, reality that reflects over the 
repercussions of animal-centric narratives. Instead of raising ecological awareness, 
they tantalise human curiosity about the natural world. Using Finding Nemo as an 
example, DeMello (2012) has spoken about the problematics of anthropomorphic 
representation that harms the animal more than it helps (if!) and its culpability in 
disrupting the prevention of animal exploitation: 
 
After Finding Nemo’s release, the sales of clownfish 
skyrocketed, which meant that yet more fish were 
confined to bowls and tanks (p. 336). 
 
Naturally, these concerns may support the criticism from scholars and animal lovers 
who argue not only against the (mis)representation of the animal (Anderson & 
Henderson, 2005) but also against the very animal-agency that leaves no room for the 
plausibility of human-intervention in animal-or nature-related themes (McFarland, 
2009). The animal-agency, while possessing features of subversion, dissociates the 
kinship shared between ‘humanity’ and ‘animality’- as McFarland (2009) believes- 
and constantly keeps these two categories at the edges of polarity: unrelated and 
invisible. In doing so, the intentions behind anthropomorphic practice are usually 
questioned and the practice is conclusively labelled as dangerous/unethical. This 
understanding may trigger another contextual question: would a mass-discontinuance 
of the practice be the easiest- and most logical- way to counter this problem and save 
the animal from human acrimony? Unmistakably, DeMello’s (2012) concerned 
thoughts are notably valid. However, a complete discontinuance of anthropomorphism 
implies zero opportunity for the animal to ‘speak-out’ and self-trigger its subjective 
transition from an “object for human utility” (Tipper, 2011, p. 149) to a “subject-of-a-
life” (Regan, 1988, p. 243). 
 
Anthropomorphism allows the animal to manifest its self-agency and empowerment, 
and so we may not want to imagine a socio-cultural predicament that is completely 
devoid of the artform. We have frequently referred to anthropomorphism as ‘art’, 
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precisely because, while it dwells upon the animators’ individual perceptions about the 
‘nonhuman’, it offers the viewers a polysemous environment to understand animals 
and other nonhumans, bestowing the ‘animal’ with multiple interpretations and 
connotations. Certainly, this would possess a yin-and-yang output, suggesting an 
alarmingly equal possibility of animal (ab)use in relation to speciesism, occultism, and 
human sadism (Hübben, 2016). But, if we stress upon deploying the art of 
anthropomorphism for ecological reasons and nonhuman-preservation- like the genre 
of animal autobiography (You, 2021)- then, we may believe that the phenomenon is 
more required than useless. Our analysis of the three animal narratives helped us to 
recognise anthropomorphism as a borderless endeavour that facilitates a poignant 
resistance to “the [human] allegorisation of non-human subjects and animal-related 
themes” (You, 2021, p. 184), allowing the ‘animal’ to assume absolute control over its 
existential centrality. 
 
The above-discussed narratives uphold their respective autobiographical animals as 
powerful mouthpieces to re-address and critique the human/animal relationship and its 
concomitant aspects of (1) human-invasiveness and intervention and (2) human sadism 
and apathy. By using subversion, animal autobiographies frequently re-dress the 
‘animal’ and bestow it with an independent meaning that pillars the animal’s abilities 
to think, speak, and act. This, yet again, explains Ferdinand’s “flower-bull” persona or 
Dory’s “amnesia”, for instance, because these animal characters may remind us of 
ourselves (at some stage), for they ‘are’ humans. However, contrary to what the critics 
of (mis)representation imply, this ‘humanisation’ of animals (1) is metaphorical and 
(2) is often employed as emotional support to the animals’ empowerment. Pro-animal 
anthropomorphic narratives exercise crucial importance over animal-agency and the 
animal’s prospects of self-emancipation (You, 2021).  
 
As self-emancipated subjects, animals, then, may transform into what Bone (2013) had 
called “a conduit for learning to be human” (p. 61), communicating to the audiences 
the urgency to recoup some half-forgotten human values. Certainly, animals’ 
humanisation possesses strong traces of speciesism- that pushes the ‘animal’ outside 
the periphery (Hübben, 2016)- and may preclude our moral consideration of the latter 
as a ‘co-inhabitee’ (Wells, 2009) and, therefore, should be discouraged. However, 
within this context, animals’ self-embodiment of human values partakes in their own 
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reformation as emancipated subjects and does not affect their individuality as animal-
selves. As messengers of goodness and morality, they do not lose the war against 
humans, but only help them for their own good. 
 
Here, Lucas’ moral transformation could be considered a befitting example to illustrate 
the latter-most argument. It was Lucas’ discovery of the ‘ant within’ that enabled him 
to perceive the fallibilities of his character, as he attempts to redeem his destruction of 
the ant-colony by fighting Stan Beals and re-modifying his human-self against the 
identity of the ants (Gebhard et al., 2003). The Ant Bully manipulates Lucas’ morality-
tale to function as a symptom of contemporary humanity lost in self-centredness, 
passion, and domination. The narrative inclines the viewers’ attention towards a 
revival of the ‘traditional’ human values of collective growth, kindness, and communal 
happiness, taking the ants as epitomes of those human values and the necessity of 
identifying the ‘Self’ with these attributes. They help Lucas grow into a ‘better human’ 
without actually losing their intrinsic self-identity as ants. The narrative ensures that 
the ants’ metaphorical humanisation leaves them unexposed to Lucas’ ‘human’ 
influence and, therefore, even though Lucas’ recognition of intrinsic humanity is 
facilitated by the ants themselves, they are neither lost in their humanisation nor in 
Lucas’ moral awakenings. 
 
This is, indeed, the power of anthropomorphism. It encourages the ‘animal’ to step out 
into the public domain and imagination- without being unafraid of human control- as 
a self-entity that is subject to agency, constituency, and authority. It encapsulates a 
utilitarian philosophy that acknowledges the sentience of nonhumans and uplifts them 
as morally-equal (Singer, 1980). Therefore, the sharks’ assertion that “fish are friends” 
(in Finding Nemo) is not simply considered a comedic opinion, but an implicit, deeper 
manifestation of the sharks’ acknowledgment of ethical equality, leading onto 
becoming symbols of utilitarianism (and moral vegetarianism).  
 
Anthropomorphism, as an artform, endows the ‘animal’ with everything that humanity 
had kept it deprived of. In its recognition of human-conspired deprivation, the ‘animal’ 
is motivated to regain its ecological-and-existential centrality, its sense of dominion 
and power, its emotionality, its laughter- all at the expense of humanity’s disapproval. 
The ‘animal’ recognises that its sense of authority upsets the ‘human’, but the former 
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wins when it keeps on exerting an outward authority. As in Ferdinand, El Primero’s 
sense of anguish was driven by Ferdinand’s denial to comply inside the bullring, as 
Ferdinand’s acceptance of his ‘true’ nature both humiliates and endangers Primero’s 
exercised centrality. Ferdinand wins because anthropomorphism preserved its 
authority and identity of who he was, and this is where the essence of the ‘art’ lies: in 
its ability to make ‘the nonhuman-other’ grow out of the cloistered and inhibitive 




Conclusion: The Patchwork Quilt 
 
Across the dissertation, we have been curious about animations’ significance in the 
processes of children’s socialisation, and how they could function as ‘fantastical 
messengers’ of what Grusec (2002) had called “intrinsic values” (p. 144). Through 
looking at animations from polysemic perspectives and paradigms, we realised that 
animations possess the required capacities to reshape the human-self and re-develop 
what Mills (2000) had called the “sociological imagination” (p. 5) in the 
‘Introduction’. The latter-most aspect could be peculiarly characterised as an 
intellectual framework that encourages individuals to “acquire a new way of thinking 
. . . [and] experience a transvaluation of values” (p. 8). Thompson et al. (2019) 
emphasise the importance of such sociologically-imaginative individuals in bringing 
positive ideological and institutional changes in societies and cultures. In this sense, 
animated characters could be taken as equally-inspirational icons for change and hope.  
 
From Belle and Sebastian to The Ant Bully, and from Doraemon to Web Woman, we 
were privileged to probe into the intricacies of a diverse gamut of animations and view 
them through disparate conceptual dimensions. It brings us to an understanding of the 
dissertation’s development as a “patchwork quilt” (Wibben, 2011, p. 8). This suggests 
the pivotal role of the conclusion in re-connecting the key conceptual ideas, 
frameworks, and arguments proposed across the work to defend, and explore, the 
above-mentioned research thesis upon which the present dissertation has been 
founded. Within the dissertation, we attempted to encapsulate a broad range of 
concepts that, though distinct from each other, help us in our vindication(s) of 
animations and their socialising/moralising faculties. Furthermore, these concepts 
inform the thematic nature(s) of these animations which, unsurprisingly, is manifested 
frequently in animations on a largescale, i.e., these philosophical concepts could be 
studied in several popular animated forms. For each chapter, we aimed at one key 
concept/idea to support our respective readings of the selected animations and, 
thereby, we managed to perceive the ideological underpinnings of the ‘odyssey’, 




Of course, these concepts are relatively broad and extensive by nature and, 
subsequently, have not been approached within a strict, single paradigmatic template. 
These concepts have been deployed (1) to closely understand and appreciate the 
animations’ intrinsic value as a socialising sub-category of mass media, and (2) to 
stimulate further extensive research on the existence of sub-concepts within a 
‘concept’. Here, Tuan’s (1975) concept of “geopiety” (p. 11) to ‘read’ Heidi’s 
relationship with the Swiss Alps and her ‘self-transformative journey’ towards nature 
and belonging (in Chapter I) could be mentioned as one suitable example. Similarly, 
Lauren Wilcox’s (2017) symbolic trope of “woman-as-insect” (p. 26) intersects with 
our analysis of Web Woman (in Chapter III) as a manifestation of ‘the feminine-
superheroic’ and refreshes our understandings of the inter-relationship between 
‘utopianism’ and ‘feminism’. 
 
We refer to these intersections as random examples to illustrate how the five primary 
concepts can become a springboard for the exploration of other sub-concepts and 
philosophical thoughts, some of which we have attempted to uncover across the 
dissertation. But the overall significance of the five dealt concepts (forming the 
dissertation) has crucially been to discover the socialising output of animations and 
inform our acknowledgment about these productions as purveyors of personal growth, 
balanced harmony, homogenous happiness, and love. Essentially, these ideas 
predominate the discussed-ten narratives and could be collectively treated as coherent 
themes that inter-connect the animations. These children’s animations apprise and 
advise their viewers about similar human values and help us approach towards a phase 
of optimistic assimilation that un-clouds our moral/ethical vision, enabling a wide-
appealing introduction of collective imagination for a collective, bigger cause of 
humanity. It allows us to view ourselves as tomorrow’s “history makers” (Thompson 
et al., 2019, p. 4), promoting a philosophical understanding that each step an individual 
takes towards their personal/moral development could lead their societies’ towards 
progress, liberation, and peace. These animations emblematise the belief that our 
actions shape the future of tomorrow, and an assimilation of positive individual actions 





Subsequently, to the idea of optimistic assimilation is the parallel notion of 
‘retribalisation’ connected with, which is extensively pursued by the animation 
industry, as we have attempted to bring out and vindicate through a thorough content 
analysis of ten animated productions (seven television series and three movies). Before 
we progress ahead to reflect over the concept of ‘retribalisation’- and how animations 
disseminate its ideology- it is relatively important to mention that these animations, 
particularly the television series, were selected mostly because of a discomforting 
absence of critical scholarship on these subjects. Where Disney films and Warner Bros. 
productions have been one of the most popular destinations for media critique, a whole 
range of other productions were overshadowed/overlooked, and these animated series 
emerge from that slush pile. Even though animations like Heidi (1974) and Doraemon 
(1973-present) have managed to garner some critical recognition- due to the influential 
oeuvres of its makers- it still fails to match the amount of critical and public attention 
that the former two have hitherto received. Thereby, by studying a few uncommon 
animations, we aim to inspire further research into more unfamiliar and less popular 
animations and contribute to the body of knowledge that concentrates on the 
intersections between children’s socialisation/welfare and media artforms.  
 
However, contrary to several arguments brought over about mass media as a more 
detrimental- than rewarding- agent of socialisation (Levinson, 1975; Strasburger & 
Donnerstein, 1999), we focus on manifesting the dissertation as a critical defence of 
the former, in general, and animations, in particular. As a sub-agent of media 
socialisation, animation has been found to possess an extraordinary quality that helps 
retribalise the audiences’ modes of thinking and consolidate it towards collective, 
humanistic ambitions. It is strange to note that the notion of ‘retribalisation’ could be 
compared to Webb’s (2008) idea of ‘critical utopian hope’, for both ideas are inclined 
towards collective thought, balanced harmony, and sustained peace.  
 
The concept of retribalisation was pioneered by Marshall McLuhan (1964) in relation 
to his ideas about the ‘global village’. From a socio-political perspective, 
retribalisation was deemed a (1) response to the individual-centred print age and (2) a 
celebration of the liberalist electronic age (Lopez, 2014; Havers, 2003). The advent of 
electro-digital formats made the transmission of information across cultures and 
national boundaries easier, stimulating the development of a collective identity 
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amongst individuals. This sense of identity was governed by notions of “tribalist 
communitarianism” (Havers, 2003, p. 520) that influences the erasure of differences 
(individual or national) and the imagination of retribalised spaces of community-
building. In the paradigms of retribalisation, individual differences and prejudices are 
lost, and humanity is envisioned as a singular, collective entity. Retribalisation, indeed, 
becomes a dream about togetherness and equality. 
 
This notion of ‘retribalisation’ takes us back to Gerbner’s (2004) account of ‘stories’ 
that were upheld as powerful sources of quite a wide-scale range of human values that 
concentrate upon the retribalisation of modern thought (p. xi). Typically, during the 
present telecommunications era, we begin to acknowledge the multifaceted worth of 
many of these ‘stories’ that have drawn recognition during what Gerbner (2004) 
addresses as the “electronic revolution” (p. xi). Furthermore, he maintains that “unlike 
the industrial revolution, [this] new upheaval does not uproot people from their homes 
but transports [these stories] in their homes” (p. xi.), which becomes possible due to 
the prevalence of its most pervasive manifestation: the television. 
 
Levinson (1975) elsewhere had remarked about the growing popularity of the 
television and addressed it as an “‘early window’” (p. 561) for children. This argument 
may conjoin with Gerbner’s (2004) accounts of the dispersive nature of ‘stories’ to 
suggest that many of these stories can be- and are being- disseminated via the 
television. With respect to children’s media and entertainment, many of these stories 
are represented and reinforced through animations and because these ‘now-animated’ 
stories encapsulate a socialising function, they can be deemed gateways to brief 
instances of substituted human experience and interaction.  
 
Mead (1934), in his reflections about the ‘Self’, draws extreme emphasis over the 
necessity of human experience and interaction for the development of the ‘Self’ and 
treats them as vital components for the re-evaluation of what he interrogates as the ‘I’ 
and the ‘Me’ (p. 177-178). As we had discussed in the Introduction, Mead (1934) 
analyses the psychological, social, and emotional differences between these co-related 
latter concepts, as they juxtapose to become the two “distinguishable” (p. 178) 
elements of the ‘Self’. Indeed, the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’ are reshaped and remodified- and 
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constantly made to readjust- during the early socialisation years, and even further than 
our early ages into adolescence and adulthood.  
 
In a way, socialisation never stops, as we are constantly in the middle of ‘growing up’. 
As Graham White (1977) highlights, traditional sociology has frequently viewed and 
critiqued socialisation as a functional phase strictly inherent to childhood and, as a 
result, overlooked a few outside factors/agents that a child may never experience, but 
become riveting sources of socialisation or what has been identified as “adult 
socialisation” (p. 80). Amongst these, two major sources could be experiences at work 
and (with) family/partnerships that help redefine our individual faculties of the ‘Self’ 
and reshape our characters or public identities. Therefore, it does not surprise us when 
White (1977) outlines adult socialisation as an “on-going life-long process of learning 
experiences” (p. 81), suggestive of the social reality about humanity as constantly 
being in the middle of manifold phases of social evolution.  
 
Unfortunately, the scope of our current discourse on adult socialisation is (1) too 
enormous to be justifiably dissected in the present discussions on animations and 
children’s socialisation, and, naturally, (2) falls outside the scope of our analyses. We 
introduced this argument to propose and defend the possibilities (for) and realities 
about humans to be always in the middle of socialisation. In every walk of life, we are 
going to encounter, interact (and befriend) hundreds of individuals and will be learning 
something new, something we have been unaware of, either about ourselves or others 
through those interactions. It is the beauty of socialisation to transform into a range of 
perennial human processes of identity formation-and-reformation that rely upon as 
much as they nourish our abilities to extract learning from our experiences of 
interactions with others. These prospects about adult socialisation, yet again, opens 
another door for research that can focus on animations’ potentials to inspire and 
apprise adults, acting as substituted manifestations of human experience, and how this 
relationship between adult socialisation and animations can promote a wider 
understanding about animations’ particular status as sub-agents of socialisation. This 
can become an interesting avenue for further research around other intersectional and 
socio-cultural fields that can extend- and support- many of the arguments proposed 




Coming back to Mead’s (1934) concept of the ‘Self’ and the differences between the 
‘I’ and ‘Me’, it is thoughtful if we briefly return and revise what these two 
componential segments of the ‘Self’ stand for, which may help us quickly advance 
over the arguments we aim to propose about animations ahead. Thompson et al. (2019) 
provide us with a lucid explanation about what constitutes the two bio-social systems 
of the ‘I’ and ‘Me’ and how they are interdependent, their many intricacies and 
pathological co-existence, and how they are different to each other: 
 
The I is the unsocialized self as subject. More 
spontaneous, creative, and uninhibited than the me, the 
I is the initiator of social action. . . through socialization, 
however, as the sense of self develops more fully, the 
me component, or the socialized self as object, develops. 
The sense of me represents people’s ability to realize 
that they are members of a social world and that, while 
they have the ability to act in a way that has an impact 
on others, others can also act in ways that have an impact 
on them. Although the I is spontaneous and creative, the 
me is reactive; it is based on our perception of how 
others will respond to our actions (p. 90).  
 
This interplay between ‘I’ and ‘Me’ is integral for the development of ‘Self’ as a 
complete, wholesome entity. On one hand, where the ‘I’ is more individual-oriented; 
on the other hand, the ‘Me’ becomes more community-oriented and more inclined 
towards communal/collective welfare and harmony. Precisely, this transition from the 
‘I’ to the ‘Me’ happens due to socialisation, as individuals learn from experiences as 
they tag along the life-road. Most important, socialisation teaches them to incorporate 
multiple perspectives to analyse their actions and their impacts on others (Malti et al., 
2016). An acknowledgment about this serves as a stimulation of the gradual 
appearance of the ‘Me’ that concentrates on our abilities to understand the 
responsibilities of our decisions and actions; this, however, does not divorce the ‘Self’ 
from the ‘I’ which is an equally-central factor of one’s identity. What socialisation 
pursues is a balanced relationship between the ‘I’ and ‘Me’ and the ability to fluctuate 
between the two as per individual and communal needs (Thompson et al., 2019). Here, 
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Nobita Nobi (from Chapter II) may become a striking example to illustrate this 
argument and the repercussions of failing to harmoniously balance the two 
components of the ‘Self’. 
 
Nobita’s tragedy initiates because he is always busy satisfying the ‘I’, to an extent that 
the ‘Me’ is mostly diminished. Because he focuses on individual self-indulgences, the 
‘I’ is manifested as a part of the Ego that clouds his moral vision and restricts him from 
entering the dimensions of ‘Me’. He fails to recognise the significance of ‘Me’ in his 
relationships with others, as this building component could have helped him 
understand his social position and the responsibility of his ego-centred actions. But, 
because the ‘Me’ is lost in an excessive indulgence in the ‘I’ that Nobita’s identity is 
withered to tragic circumstances and unsuccessful relationships. Through Nobita, it 
becomes transparent that a positive ‘Self’ cannot be born out of imbalances, and that 
the ‘I’ and ‘Me’ are beneficial if harmoniously organised/amalgamated (Mead, 1934). 
Lastly, these bio-social systems discover their foundational basis in experience and 
interaction, further informing our critical reflections over animations’ socialising 
potentials. 
 
Ahead of this, it seems worthwhile if we recapitulate our five chapters to (1) briefly 
re-reflect over those key conceptual ideas and (2) understand how these concepts have 
helped transform our subjective vocabularies about animations as catalysts of self-
discovery. Additionally, we believe that this recapitulation is an indispensable 
prerequisite for our conclusive thesis about animations’ socialising prospects as it 
provides a concise, but wholesome picture to support our understandings of why 
animations are important and what do animations perpetuate that we (as readers or 
viewers) can consider. Indeed, this dissertation has attempted to answer these 
questions across its five chapters; however, yet again, it is imperative that those key 
ideas are reconsidered for the purposes of a concrete reading of the dissertation. 
 
Chapter I looks at the metaphorical centrality of ‘self-transformative journeys’ that 
allow for the characters (or animated voyagers) to reshape and restructure their 
“superior existential mode of ‘being-in-the-world’” (Morgan, 2010, p. 248). For this 
purpose, the chapter dwells over Smelser’s (2009) paradigmatic model of “the odyssey 
experience” (p. 8) to analyse the journeys registered in the three respective animations: 
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Triton of the Sea (1972), Heidi, Girl of the Alps (1974), and Belle and Sebastian (1981-
82). Within the chapter, we reflect over the possibilities of self-growth that is 
motivated through the independent journeys/odysseys that the protagonists undertake, 
and how these journeys could be ‘read’ as an external, inspirational opportunity for the 
audiences to partake in the protagonists’ moments of self-discovery and rejoice in the 
further individual possibility of self-growth.  
 
This idea of ‘learning-through-journeys’ is derived from an interesting amalgamation 
of Brian Stock’s (1993) formulation of an inter-relationship between “seeing” and 
“reading” (p. 315) - their intertwined significance to acknowledge one’s “sense of 
place” (p. 314) - and Feike Dietz’s (2019) concept of “mental travelling” (p. 197). 
Dietz (2019) deploys the interplay of ‘seeing’ and ‘reading’ to reconceptualise a 
distinct form of travelling, previously seen in several 18th century Dutch travel-
narratives for children, that translates children’s ‘reading’ of the narrative into a 
manifestation of ‘travelling’. This way children’s readings of a travel-narrative may 
help them re-position themselves alongside the characters (in the story) and be 
subjected to the same adventures and episodes of moral-learning as the characters. 
Similarly, this framework is redesigned within the three animations, enabling viewers 
to ‘mentally travel’ and accompany the protagonists on their respective odysseys 
without ever crossing the locational boundaries of ‘home’. This results in a reversal 
reaction: like the protagonists, the audiences may also emotionally and spiritually 
develop, as the odysseys help the latter as much as the former in the structural 
formation of what Dietz (2019) had called the “knowledgeable self” (p. 197). This 
mechanism, indeed, supports our analyses of these animations as tales of ambition, 
hopefulness, courage, sacrifice, friendships, and love. 
 
These values are repeated, albeit via a different approach, in our understandings of 
‘utopianism’ in Chapter III and how superheroes could emerge as ambitious models 
of inspiration and utopian imagination. Loeb and Morris (2005) rightly address them 
as “moral examples” (p. 30), as they exert a wide-scale influence upon children to stay 
on the right track, directing them from darkness to lightness. Additionally, children’s 
pathological inclination and attraction for these gigantic role-models justifies the 
latter’s influence (Rubin, 2007). Superheroes are adored by children and adults 
primarily because of the noble qualities they possess and illuminate; they inspire our 
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strengths through their sense of power, awakening our goodness through their 
sacrifices, altruism, and love for humanity. Loeb and Morris (2005) poignantly observe 
that superheroes’ outstanding/fantastical prowess is what helps them qualify as 
(super)heroes, while there are several other peoples who have committed (and still do) 
equally-heroic acts like our superheroes, but who are lost/underappreciated in the 
quandary of post-modernist chaos. Many of these individuals, as Loeb and Morris 
(2005) reflect, exist beyond our binocular vision and fail to attract peoples’ respect, 
largely because they are not ‘larger-than-life’ characters: 
 
There are many heroes in works of fiction, and in the 
real world, who don’t have superpowers at all. . . [like] 
firemen, police officers, doctors, nurses, and teachers. . 
. They fight for human health, safety, growth, and 
excellence. They are the warriors of everyday life. . . But 
we don’t often think of these people as heroes. And 
that’s too bad. Their contributions are so common, and 
so regular to our experience, that we can easily overlook 
their distinctive character. We notice such people and 
recognize them as heroic only when they go far beyond 
the range of their normally heroic activities and catch 
our attention in a particularly dramatic way (p. 19).  
 
This observation helps us reconsider the roles of Sebastian, Heidi, or Triton. In their 
respective pursuits, though personal by nature, they develop into “moral examples” 
(Loeb & Morris, 2005, p, 30) who can inspire audiences to be both kind and brave. 
Their odyssey experiences were fraught with uncertainties, insecurities, and dangers 
(Smelser, 2009), but they confront them and grow up into independent and selfless 
individuals. These animated children are ‘heroes’ in their own rights. Even though they 
fight for themselves, and not for humanity in the general sense, the values they 
propagate share a peculiar verisimilitude to what our superheroes embody in their 
socio-cultural positions as inspirational icons. Our three children and superheroes 
share the same platform, primarily in their abilities to elicit prosocial emotions that 
complement the audiences’ identity-formation/reshaping processes. Both inspire and 
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carry the potentials to reshape human-identity (Mead, 1934), though their methods 
might be variable. 
 
Unequivocally, these odysseys implicitly insinuate the moral advantages of ‘mistakes’ 
for character-development as they often project a few moments- scattered across the 
narrative(s)- of their protagonists’ self-realisation of a mistake (irrespective of any 
nature), and how these characters strive to learn something from their mistakes. For 
instance, Triton’s abuse of the indomitable power of the olihan dagger soon transforms 
into a form of self-recognition about the differences between necessary and 
unnecessary use of power, as he begins using the dagger both vigilantly and prudently. 
This identification of the ethical purpose of ‘mistakes’ in a narrative, further, becomes 
a significant bedrock in Chapter II, as the chapter seeks out to encourage the audience 
to learn from Nobita’s inherent nature of indulging in ‘mistakes’. It is intriguing to 
note, here, that unlike the protagonists from Chapter I who actively reflect over their 
mistakes and attempt at discontinuing them (as part of their processes of self-growth), 
Nobita never learns from his mistakes and, instead, keeps recurring them across the 
narrative. Obviously, this is deliberately pursued by Doraemon in its revamping as an 
Aristotelian tragedy and its contemporary remodification of the polysemic concept of 
the ‘Seven Deadly Sins’ to centralise Nobita as a manifestation of the tragic-hero 
whose moral discrepancies could serve as believable platforms for audiences to self-
identify, self-reflect, and self-rectify. Simply placed, Doraemon encourages viewers 
to learn from Nobita’s mistakes and leave them at bay. 
 
Chapter II becomes an intensive exploration on the subject of ‘tragedy’ and the 
‘unethical deadly sins’ as it probes into how these concepts have been reconceptualised 
in Doraemon. The animation pursues this specific narrative design for the purposes of 
locating Nobita as the central source of tragic learning. As mentioned earlier in the 
Introduction, the anime translates Nobita’s tragic misadventures as a “sort of life 
lesson [that is] added to the experiences children need in order to pass successfully 
into adulthood in a social context” (Gonzalez, 2018, p. 72). For the ‘tragedy’ to be 
instigated, the anime manipulates Nobita’s excessive indulgence in morally-
transgressive behaviour(s) as the root-cause of all his troubles; and it is interesting to 
note that most of these transgressions are interlinked with the ‘deadly sins’. This 
implies that Nobita’s moral transgressions derive their thematic subjects and natures 
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from the deadly sins and, subsequently, leading us to comfortably perceive Nobita’s 
many-tragedies against our hero’s fruitless indulgence in what Gregory I (as cited in 
Frank, 2001) had once classified as the five “sins of the spirit” (p. 96). 
 
As a collective entity, the five ‘spiritual’ sins embody the moral degradation of 
Nobita’s character (Nussbaum, 1992) which forms the backbone of the anime as a 
tragic narrative or as what Silverstone (2007) had called a “narrative of suffering” (p. 
280). Here, we are reminded of Newhauser’s (2007) ideological construction about 
what ‘a concept’ stands for (look: Chapter II). Philosophically speaking, a ‘concept’ 
has been maintained as a tangible- and pliable- set of ideas that is susceptible to change 
according to a culture’s interests. Doraemon evidences this argument by incorporating 
a once-theology-engraved concept (the seven sins) to experiment with another 
traditional artform (‘tragedy’) and juxtapose these concepts to criticise Nobita’s 
tragedies as outcomes of his own moralistic failings (Sherman, 1992). The anime, 
towards the end, pursues this to both warn the audiences against repeating Nobita’s 
transgressive actions and inspire them towards self-introspection, self-criticism, and 
self-discovery (Rorty, 1992). These ideas about concurrent intro-and-retrospection, yet 
again, introduce us to the philosophy of ‘utopianism’ that (1) revolves around socio-
political philosophies of comparison between a contemporary society with an 
imagined ‘other’ society/community that may or may not be better than the state an 
author lives in (Sargent, 2006), and (2) that establishes as the crux in Chapter III. 
 
Besides celebrating superheroes as utopian symbols, as we just reflected, Chapter III 
becomes an interesting space of inquiry for the relationship between ‘utopianism’ and 
‘feminism’. The latter-issue, further, transforms as a vital backdrop to our analyses in 
Chapter IV, and, thereby, it seems harmless if we reflect over the interconnectedness 
of ‘feminist utopianism/feminine superheroic’ and the ‘feminine aesthetic’ 
collectively. Paradoxically, animations’ reputation has been scarred by its apparent 
reinforcement of sexist, gender, and ethnic stereotypes. It, unsurprisingly, becomes 
one of the most common grounds of criticism from media scholars, and that may lead 
many ‘concerned’ guardians to boycott animations, in general, accusing these media 
products of perpetuating- and normalising- stereotypes which are detrimental not only 
for children’s socio-personal development, but also for their regular affinities with 
concepts of gender and sexuality. Against this backdrop, we analysed a few 
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empowered women characters from three animations: Web Woman (1978), Josie and 
the Pussycats (1971-72), and Doraemon (1979-2005). Where Web Woman epitomises 
the ideas of feminist utopianism and feminine superheroic through her manifestation 
as Lauren Wilcox’s (2017) symbolic montage of “woman-as-insect” (p. 26), the 
remaining female characters (from Chapter IV) embody the sentiments of an evolving 
feminist consciousness called the ‘feminine aesthetic’ (Wells, 1998). 
 
Utopianism concentrates upon social progression; it juxtaposes with feminism to 
recognise its new boundaries and the indispensability of gender in society. This 
exemplifies in Web Woman. As an individual female superhero, she not only radiates 
with utopian implications, but also dismantles several stereotypes and gender 
limitations that pervade across superhero-narratives (Miller et al., 2016). One of her 
contemporaries, Isis, may briefly qualify as a treasure-trove of similar feminist 
ideologies. However, where Isis’ feminist agency is blocked by the presence of other 
male superheroes, Web Woman thrives as a symbol of feminine resistance to not only 
patriarchal control, but also a sense of masculinist supremacy that revels over women’s 
voicelessness and socio-cultural annihilation (Sells, 1995; Tuchman, 1978; Wilcox, 
2017). As a female-superhero, Web Woman enables the reimagination of any futuristic 
society that recognises women’s socio-cultural and moral status as equal citizens 
worthy of liberation. She emerges as a conscious thought towards the public 
emancipation of women in animation. 
 
Web Woman’s utopian feminism finds an extension in the reconceptualised characters 
of women like Alexandra, Shizuka or Valerie who represent and communicate the 
values of the feminine aesthetic (Wells, 1998). The ‘golden’ age of Betty Boop and 
Olive Oyl is now a distant history; what these characters tend to communicate is the 
age of feminist consciousness that disregards the bondages of patriarchal 
control/agency and seeks to redefine the territories of what ‘gender’, ‘sexuality’ and 
‘feminism’ really imply. They now speak through a feminine aesthetic that celebrates 
womanhood, its insecurities and beliefs, its conundrums and values, and everything 
that women have been culturally deprived of. Josie and the Pussycats and Doraemon, 
in its portrayals of empowered women, introduce the contemporary meanings of 
womanhood, allowing its women to (1) embrace non-traditional roles like a 
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mechanical genius (Valerie) or (2) spurn stereotypically-feminine roles like 
dishwashing/mopping (Alexandra). 
 
As Gwynne (2015) had noted, women’s liberation from the boundaries of ‘home’ often 
becomes a prerequisite for their public and private emancipation. Indeed, Josie and the 
Pussycats approaches this understanding via transitioning its women from domesticity 
to the outside-world and positioning them as ‘travelling musicians’. These 
representational differences stimulate the conceptualisation of these animated women 
as doubly-emancipated. Doraemon progresses in its multifaceted portrayals of Shizuka 
Minamoto as a modern, post-war symbol of the ūman ribu (Shigematsu, 2018). As a 
Japanese schoolgirl, Shizuka debunks some of those conceptions that Western media 
had falsely- and stereotypically- represented in its cultural evaluations of the ‘Japanese 
schoolgirl trope’ (Hinton, 2013). Where she manages to transform into an affectionate 
fairy, at one instance, she even demonstrates her authoritative demeanour whenever 
required.  
 
Additionally, Doraemon’s celebrations of ‘difference’ extends into its representations 
of Nobita as a “new man” (Beynon, 2004, p. 200), who rejects the traditional 
denominators of hegemonic masculinity. The anime positions him as a subversion. By 
imagining Nobita as a symbol of subversive masculinity, Doraemon blurs the 
dichotomies between masculinities and femininities, as cat’s cradle becomes a neutral 
space of indulgence. Through these instances of positive experimentation, Doraemon 
validates its substantial and emotional value. Again, this connects to what the last two 
chapters have tried to uncover and defend. Via their depictions of gender, these 
animations capitalise upon some fresh trends in subjective representation that are 
distantiated from stereotyping and typecasting, and offer something that pushes people 
more towards emancipation than a pool of outdated thinking related to gender and sex. 
 
Chapter V digresses from ideas of gender to bring into its focus the issue of 
anthropomorphism, leading us to a stark acknowledgment about the necessity of 
anthropomorphic practice and art, particularly in the wake of the proposed horrors of 
the Anthropocene. We argue in favour of anthropomorphism and strongly believe- 
contrary to claims about the practice as being harmful to animals and nonhuman others 
(McFarland, 2009; Anderson & Henderson, 2005)- that this artform contains the 
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possibilities for the ‘animal’ to possess the individuality/voice it had long-awaited. To 
probe into these arguments, we extensively focus on You’s (2021) discussion about 
the subversive genre of the animal autobiography to analyse three narratives- Finding 
Nemo, The Ant Bully, and Ferdinand- as striking examples of the latter-mentioned 
genre. 
 
As autobiographical animals, the characters are self-awakened by an unusual spirit of 
resilience and agency that provides to them an absolute control over their 
destinies/journeys. Of course, there is human intervention but, mostly, it is criticised 
and attacked by animals and, sometimes, humans (in The Ant Bully), which brings us 
to a realisation about the necessity of positive human intervention for the cause of 
nonhumans. As Lucas who fought for the colony of insects, we need to understand our 
responsibilities, as the top-most species in the food-chain, about changing the ways we 
perceive the ‘nonhuman-other’. From a utilitarian point-of-view, Singer (1980) helps 
us acknowledge the reality about ‘nonhumans’ as being equally-sentient as humans 
and that they deserve an equal moral and ethical consideration. Despite the 
representation of animals as self-emancipated subjects, this chapter translates into a 
passionate plea for the natural protection of nonhumans and their treatment (by 
humans) with respect and kindness (Luk et al., 1999).  
 
Through Chapter V, we aimed to not only discuss the moral underpinnings of these 
narratives, but also trigger an emotional response from readers and viewers alike to re-
evaluate their relationships with nonhumans and reflect over in what new ways can the 
latter be subjected to more instances/experiences of human compassion/kindness than 
mindless and barbaric cruelty. Surprisingly, this argument slightly connects with the 
overall purpose of the dissertation. Children’s socialisation capitalises on the processes 
of ‘becoming human’. Here, we allude to Wrong’s (1961) reflections on socialisation 
because it recapitulates the quintessence of growing-up under the shade of prosocial 
human values that one can aspire to take forward into the future. It explains why our 
wandering children’s odysseys were celebrated. During their individual enterprises, 
they were socialised about a range of ‘intrinsic values’ (Grusec, 2002), including 




We referred to animations as ‘brief instances of substituted human experience’, 
precisely because of their capacities to transport, though partially, physical 
experiences of human-interaction or encounter to the comfort of our homes. This 
substitution of human experiences enables animations to transform themselves into 
similar ‘stories’ that Gerbner (2004) mentions; as a result, the characters’ journeys, 
adventures, or natures become the audiences’ very own. It corresponds with Dietz’s 
(2019) argument about ‘mental travelling’ where the voyagers’ experiences translate 
into the readers’ or viewers’ personal episodes of learning, emancipation and 
reformation. There is a type of ‘mentalising’ that is clearly involved in what animations 
offer to children. Animations provide us with virtual material that substitutes real-life 
based experiences and prepare us for our personal adventures outside parental 
boundaries.  
 
We handpicked some animations to illustrate and advance this argument to encourage 
further thoughts on the possibilities of socialisation through animations and cartoons. 
With the advent of the electronic revolution, there was a rapid transformation in the 
manner of dissemination of stories (Gerbner, 2004). Visual media dominated 
households, and, naturally, children’s entertainment was made to evolve, leading 
animations and cartoons to be manifested/deployed as intermediaries for narratives 
that complement the socialisation process (‘stories’). This becomes possible due to the 
aesthetic nature of many of these animations that punctuates them with an individuated 
agency, stimulating their development as independent stories of personal growth, 
liberty, feminism, animal-human symbiosis, self-analysis, self-reflection and 
harmony. Furthermore, it is the aestheticism within animations that renders them a 
polysemic value. It intersects with notions of reception and accentuates the possibility 
of these animations being received/interpreted by individuals differently, as we had 
earlier reflected in the Introduction.  
 
Holly (2002) and Iser (1980) enlighten our understanding of the ever-transitory nature 
of ‘meaning’ which could be transformed and reshaped with time, and which depends 
upon several factors outside the control of the text. According to reader-response 
criticism, these factors chiefly involve the reader’s participation and what Schmidt 
(1979) addresses as “the totality of life experience[s]” (p. 160). Reception aesthetics 
takes into serious consideration the multiple nuances of a reader’s sociocultural, 
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political, and linguistic backgrounds/inclinations and their life-experiences, which 
might affect their interpretation of a text. This may even apply to animations and the 
different ways in which children may perceive a specific content. These 
interpretational disparities, for example, might get influenced by children’s 
geographical locations: the Japanese backdrop of Doraemon might be different from 
how an American or Indian audience perceive certain notions about the school, family, 
and the home. Indeed, the digitalisation of animation-culture has stimulated a rapid 
interest/growth in overseas distribution; however, their reception might be affected by 
the audiences’ geographies. Thus, to ease these swift transcultural exchanges, dubbing 
often assimilates and incorporates the sociocultural overtones of the target-culture 
(Lee, 2011), localising an otherwise international product. Additionally, these notions 
about reception connect with ideas of retrospective viewing and attract curiosity about 
the lasting effects of an animation, and if the same content would evoke the same 
reaction amongst the same audiences after a specific amount of time. 
 
Potts et al. (2008) inferred that an individual might be able to retrospect and remember 
their episodes of childhood television-viewing. Although their research does not 
highlight if these animated products are received in the same way by the participants, 
nonetheless, it helps us answer the plausibility that the lessons learnt through the 
studied animations might be remembered and might influence individuals’ 
adolescence and adulthood. The researchers mention that memory is affected by 
repetitiveness (Potts et al., 2008, p. 41), and the episodic nature of televised animations 
triggers a strong impact on the viewers’ cognition and memory. It helps the animation 
sustain itself in the viewers’ sub-conscious and, therefore, even if the animation is no 
longer physically available, the context and content could be remembered and recalled 
(p. 55). There are alarming possibilities that the content might be contested when 
retrospectively viewed because, like technological progress, humanity has also 
transformed. The world has evolved; the politics has changed. Acts like Sebastian’s 
casual border-crossing or Triton’s physical abuse, therefore, might now be considered 
serious offences under criminal laws. These socio-political changes stagnate the 
possibility of present-day depictions of such images/beliefs. However, they should not 
obstruct the moral vision of the viewer to internalise the socialising impact of these 
productions. Present-day viewing of many of the analysed works relies much on a 
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wilful suspension of disbelief, so that we concentrate on the character - and what we 
might/not learn from them - rather than on the apparent paraphernalia of modernism. 
 
Bendazzi (1994) had addressed animation as “a pure work of the spirit” (p. xxi). This 
serves true to what animations achieve through their fictional depiction of human-
nature and appreciation for retribalisation (Gerbner, 2004). Our discussed animations 
have proven their capacities to raise challenging concerns about society and 
environment and help individuals sustain their faith in largescale humanity, and this 
dissertation has attempted to validate that. These animations operate through the 
systems of ‘conditional freedom’ (Chouliaraki, 2008), leaving the choice to act upon 
any socialising lessons propagated through these stories on us. As viewers or readers, 
we need to realise that we hold the keys to our communities’ progress and our actions 
may either mar it down or catapult it to prosperity; the choice remains chiefly ours. 
Therefore, none of the analysed animations- with Web Woman as an exception- 
attempt at preaching about their ideological reinforcements upon the audiences, but 
instead leave everything to the audiences’ interests/discretion.  
 
Now, it becomes obvious why Nobita’s tragedies simply conclude with an outcry. 
Doraemon never explains the cause of his tragedy; the meaning of the narrative 
extensively relies upon the viewer’s ability and interest to study the tragedy and 
internalise some hidden lessons into their personal lives, so that the tragedy is not 
repeated. Animations are stories about personal emancipation that can retribalise our 
imaginations towards collective harmony and welfare. We need more awareness to 
perceive that these representations are not just a bunch of smiling faces, neither 
caricatures nor weapons of mockery, but proactive agents of ideology that we could 
either discard or treasure. This, however, does not change the bottom-line that 
animations could emerge as homogenous representatives of a heterogenous humanity, 
communicating through collective instances of laughter, awakening us from a dead 
silence.  
 
In short, animations could be anything- frivolous, sagacious, evocative- but ‘not just 
sheer pleasure’. They teach us several patterns of socio-cultural behaviour; even 
though criticism might be levelled against some particular patterns, the patterns 
recorded in these ten animated productions undeniably have the potential to 
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complement the socialisation phases, in ‘one way or the other’. We say this because 
while an animation may advance certain positive stances, it could simultaneously be 
censured for promoting something negative. For example, where we rejoice in Triton’s 
odyssey, we criticise the same animation for restricting Pipiko within passive, 
stereotypical depictions. This helps us conclude that animations may have their own 
pros and cons, but they leave enough room for audiences to grow-up along with their 
characters. It is about travelling to unexplored or ignored avenues of human values, 
but within the confines of home and parental supervision and rehearsal. For we 
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